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White-collar offenders are generally better educated and more
sophisticated than most criminals. They commit their crimes not in a fit
of passion, but with cold, careful calculation. Accordingly, they are the
most rational offenders and are more likely than most to weigh the risks of
possible courses of action against the anticipated rewards of criminal
behavior. 1
A situation exerts an important press on the individual .... [I]t is not so
much the kind of person a man is,2 as the kind of situation in which he is
placed, that determines his action.
INTRODUCTION
One thing we learned from the recent wave of corporate scandals is that
lawyers behaved badly. 3 More specifically, inside lawyers 4 behaved badly.

1. Penalties for White Collar Offenses: Are We Really Getting Tough on Crime?
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. On Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2002) (statement of the Honorable James B. Cormey, Jr., United States Attorney,
Southern
District
of
New
York),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=280&witid=650.
2. Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18
Hum. Rel. 57, 72 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, app. C, at 1, In re
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003) Role of Enron's Attorneys),
available at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/examinerfinal.html [hereinafter Batson Report
Appendix C] ("[T]here is sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that
certain of Enron's attorneys involved in its [special purpose entity] transactions (i)
committed legal malpractice based on Texas Rule 1.12, (ii) committed legal malpractice
based on negligence or (iii) aided and abetted the Enron officers' breaches of fiduciary
duty."); Stephen M. Cutler, Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at
the University of Michigan Law School (Nov.
1, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch604.htm ("Yet, as of late, many inadequate or even
fraudulent disclosure documents have reached the public, almost certainly after having been
scrutinized by experienced corporate counsel.").
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Bankruptcy Examiner Neal Batson's Final Report on Enron's collapse
depicts an uninformed, hands-off, delegating, and detached Chief Legal
Officer: Enron's General Counsel James Derrick "rarely provided legal
advice to Enron's Board even when significant issues.., came to his
attention" and when he did advise the Enron Board, he "failed to educate
himself adequately on the underlying facts or the applicable law to enable
him to carry out his responsibilities as legal advisor." 5 But Derrick, and his
legal department, 6 are not alone. The list of ethically challenged inside
attorneys include those at Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Rite Aid, Symbol
Technologies, Inso, Warnaco,
Gemstar-TV Guide, Computer Associates
7
International, and Google.
Recognizing that many of these lawyers facilitated illegal transactions or
failed to act to protect the organizational client, Congress passed a statute
singling out inside counsel, for the first time in U.S. history, for special
treatment in the fight against securities fraud. It enacted section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,8 which-among other things-designates the
Chief Legal Officer ("CLO") as one of two primary recipients of a report of
"evidence of material violation" with special responsibilities for handling

4. I use the term "inside lawyers," "inside counsel," and "inside attorneys"
interchangeably to describe lawyers who work in corporate law departments for
corporations. Other commonly used terms include "in-house counsel," "house counsel," or
"corporate counsel."
5. Batson Report Appendix C, supra note 3, at 190.
6. Id. at 190-202 (analyzing the role of Enron's inside attorneys).
7. See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing
a Cease-and-Desist Order Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, In the Matter
of Google, Inc. and David C. Drummond, Securities Act Release No. 8523, 84 SEC Docket
2293 (Jan. 13, 2005), availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8523.htm; SEC v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,891, 83 SEC Docket 2462 (Sept. 22,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18891.htm (Computer
Associates International); SEC Charges Symbol Technologies, Inc. and 11 Former Symbol
Executives with Securities Fraud, SEC Litigation Release No. 18,734, 82 SEC Docket 3424
(June 3, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigationlitreleases/lr18734.htm (Symbol
Technologies); SEC Sues Three Additional Former Senior Executives of Gemstar-TV Guide
for Their Part in Financial Fraud, Litigation Release No. 18,530, 81 SEC Docket 3236 (Jan.
5, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-I.htm (Gemstar-TV Guide);
Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Kozlowski, No. 02 Civ. 7312 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17722.htm (Tyco);
Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bergonzi, No. 1:CV02-1084 (M.D. Penn. June 21,
2002), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comprlrl7577.htm (Rite Aid);
Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Hill, No. 02-CV-11244 (D. Mass. June 21, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complrl7578b.htm (Inso); Amon
Burton & John S. Dzienkowski, Reexamining the Role of In-House Lawyers After the
Conviction of Arthur Andersen, in Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Implications 689,
692-711 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Announces Settlement with Wamaco, Former Warnaco Executives, and PwC
for
Financial
Disclosure
Violations
(May
11,
2004),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-62.htm (Warnaco).
8. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
7245 (Supp. II 2002)).
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such reports. 9 Convinced that lawyers had too eagerly accommodated
managerial misconduct ° and that inside counsel are in a superior position
to interdict corporate fraud, Congress essentially deputized a public
corporation's CLO as a gatekeeper of our national securities markets. "1
While Congress sought to resolve the problem of lawyer acquiescence in
fraud, the provision's impact will probably be limited. Implicit in the
reform is the assumption that any breakdown in ethics is rooted in the
explicit tradeoffs between morality and greed; that ethical infractions are
conscious, rational, and intentional; that it is simply a matter of deliberate
choice. 12 This assumption is evidenced by the overwhelming reliance on
explicit moral commandments, backed by the threat of ex post disciplinary
or civil sanctions in the hopes of altering the lawyer's cost-benefit analysis.
While this "venality hypothesis"' 13 may well be true of the few known
9. In addition, for Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulations enacted
under Sarbanes-Oxley further specifying responsibilities of (both inside and outside)
supervisory and subordinate attorneys, see SEC Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.4 (2003) (Responsibilities of supervisory attorneys);
17 C.F.R. § 205.5 (2003) (Responsibilities of a subordinate attorney).
10. See 148 Cong. Rec. S6556 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statements of Sen. John
Edwards); id. (statements of Sen. Jon Corzine) ("[E]xecutives and accountants work day to
day with lawyers. They give them advice on almost each and every transaction. That means
when executives and accountants have been engaged in wrongdoing, there have been some
other folks at the scene of the crime-generally they are lawyers."); see also infra Part
III.A. 1.
11. Although the text of Sarbanes-Oxley section 307 does not employ the term
"gatekeeper," it is clear from SEC staff rhetoric and legislative history that certain
"gatekeeping" duties (as broadly defined infra) were imposed on inside counsel. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff, The Themes of
Sarbanes-Oxley as Reflected in the Commission's Enforcement Program (Sept. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm (noting that, consistent
with Sarbanes-Oxley's focus on the important role of lawyers as gatekeepers, the SEC has
stepped up scrutiny of the role of lawyers in corporate frauds, and discussing general
counsels who have been targets of SEC investigations). For purposes of this Article, I use
the term "gatekeeper" broadly, not only to include private parties who can disrupt
misconduct by withholding support, but also parties who may have duties to "'blow the
whistle' on [primary] wrongdoers or to resign from, discharge, or otherwise punish
wrongdoers." See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failureand Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 309 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee,
Gatekeeper Failure] (defining "gatekeeper" as a "reputational intermediary who provides
verification or certification services to investors"); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as
Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1293, 1297 (2003) [hereinafter
Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper] (defining "gatekeepers" as "independent professionals who
are so positioned that, if they withhold their consent, approval, or rating, the corporation may
be unable to effect some transaction or to maintain some desired status"); Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-PartyEnforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ.
& Org. 53, 54 n.3 (1986) (distinguishing gatekeeping regimes from other third-party
enforcement regimes, e.g., whistle-blower regimes).
12. Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)Ethical Are You?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Dec. 2003,
at 56 (arguing that the prevalence of counter-intentional, implicit biases suggests that people
unwittingly allow unconscious thoughts and feelings to influence seemingly objective
decisions).
13. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75, 78 (1993) (stating that the
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egregious examples of self-dealing and overt misrepresentation about the
true financial condition of the company, it lacks explanatory power for most
lawyer conduct in the scandals.
In my title, I suggest, like many others, 14 that fraud is banal, although I
make no claims to quantify the extent of fraudulent conduct.1 5 I do suggest,
however, that the "few" in "a few bad apples" does not adequately estimate
the size of the problem. 16 Such a conclusion should not surprise anyone
familiar with the decades of psychological research that show how
cognitive biases triggered by powerful situational forces distort our ethical
judgments and direct our actions.
In Part I, I discuss two models of fraud: the venality hypothesis
advanced by many, and my alternative banality hypothesis. I assert that the
banality hypothesis more adequately explains the problem of inside
counsel's acquiescence in fraud. I orientate the focus on inside counsel by
describing an undeniable trend: the ascendance of inside counsel as the
dominant provider of legal services to corporate America. I recount the role

article's purpose is to seek other possible explanations for lawyer complicity in fraud other
than "venality" or "stupidity"); Adam Cohen, Before WorldCom, the Funeral Industry Set
the Standardfor Venality, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2002, at A23 (recounting President Bush's
argument that the executive misdeeds were ethical lapses of a few bad actors, and that the
solution was criminal prosecution).
14. The plethora of financial restatements suggests that fraud is much more pervasive
than we would like to admit. See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Financial Statement
Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges
4-9 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03l38.pdf (summarizing data and
noting the 145% increase in restatements due to accounting irregularities from January 1997
through June 2002); Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 11, at 1300 (noting that the
"sudden spike in financial restatements strongly suggests that auditors became compromised
during the 1990s and acquiesced in risky and questionable accounting policies favored by
corporate managements"); Press Release, Ernst & Young, Study Finds Nearly Half of
Surveyed Global Organizations Report Having Been Significantly Defrauded in the Last
Year (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ey.com/global/Content.nsf/US/Media__Release_-_02-03-03DC.
15. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 77 ("We lack actual base-rate data establishing the
incidence of complicity, or documentation of the offsetting events when attorney
involvement has somehow deterred client misconduct.").
16. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle et al., The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the
Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Ethical Dilemmas Associated
with the CorporateAttorney's New Role, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 655, 667 (2003) [hereinafter
Panel, Ethical Dilemmas] (panel discussion); id. (comments of Susan Hackett, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel of the Association of Corporate Counsel) ("[B]ecause Enronlike debacles are not widespread problems, in spite of the amount of coverage they receive
and the size of these recent failures, I think that most assume that it is unlikely that they will
ever have to grapple with a situation that would give rise to the reporting requirements of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act."); Lynn E. Turner, Just a Few Rotten Apples? Better Audit Those
Books, Wash. Post, July 14, 2002, at BI ("In 2001, 270 public companies restated the
numbers in their financial statements.... Those numbers prove that there are more than the
'few bad apples' in the orchard than President Bush would have us believe following his
Wall Street speech on Tuesday."); Editorial, Too Little: Financial Reporting Needs
Systematic Reforms, Newsday, July 10, 2002, at A24 ("Bush... threw his weight behind the
notion that corporate abuses ... are the result of a few really bad apples in the business
world.").
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of Tyco's general counsel in one of the largest white-collar crime cases in
history to illustrate how these psychological forces may come to play in any
individual case. In Part II, I seek an alternative explanation, other than
venality, for why inside lawyers countenance managerial wrongdoing.
Drawing heavily from the work of social and cognitive psychologists and
organizational behavior literature, I suggest and explore several factors that
play an important role in the ethical decision making of inside counsel. In
Part III, I criticize the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
regulations under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the 2003 amendments
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for relying on an
underdescriptive model of fraud, which fails to take the situation of inside
counsel seriously and thus sets them up for failure under the new,
congressionally mandated gatekeeper regime. In Part IV, I propose an
alternative structural reform that transforms the ethical ecology of inside
counsel through "independence and empowerment rules," 17 so that they can
actually carry out their imposed gatekeeping responsibilities.
I. Two MODELS OF FRAUD

A. The Venality Hypothesis
Tyco. On July 15, 2004, following two months of testimony and five
days of jury deliberation, Mark A. Belnick, former general counsel of Tyco
International Ltd., was acquitted in New York State court on charges of
grand larceny, securities fraud, and falsifying business records. 18 He had
faced up to twenty-five years in prison for his complicity in one of the
largest white-collar crime cases in history. 19 Prior to joining Tyco in
September 1998 Belnick had been a star litigation partner at New York's
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison and a prot6g6 of litigation
legend Arthur Liman.

He had received national attention for his role in

20
helping Congress track down missing millions in the Iran-Contra affair.

17. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 11, at 335.
18. Anthony Lin, Ex-Tyco General Counsel Belnick Found Not Guilty of All Charges,

N.Y. L.J., July 16, 2004, at 1. For the official charges, see Indictment, New York v. Belnick,
No. 5258/02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 2002); Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v.
Kozlowski,

No.

1:02-CV-07312

(S.D.N.Y.

Sept.

11,

2002),

available

at

http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17722.htm.
19. Nanette Burnes, The Hunch That Led to Tyco's Tumble, Bus. Wk. Online, Dec. 23,
2002, http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/02.si/b3813013.htm?chan=m2
(noting that the case against Kozlowski and Swartz is one of the largest white-collar crime
cases in history).
20. Otis Bilodeau, What Happened to Mark Belnick?, Legal Times, Sept. 16, 2002, at 1.
Mark A. Belnick tracked down a missing $10 million payment that Lt. Col. Oliver North had
solicited from the Sultan of Brunei on behalf of Nicaraguan rebels. Belnick located the
money, plus $235,000 in interest, in a numbered Swiss bank account. Id.
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Former Senator Warren
Rudman had called him "brilliant, decent and a
21
model of integrity."
New York State prosecutors had accused Belnick of improperly receiving
and concealing more than $30 million in unauthorized compensation and
loans from the company. 22 The prosecution characterized Belnick's lavish
compensation and benefits, received without board approval, as "hush
money" for helping former Tyco Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
("CEO") L. Dennis Kozlowski conceal his own thefts of $170 million from
Tyco. 2 3 In her opening statement, Assistant District Attorney Amy
Schwartz told the jury that "'Belnick abused his fiduciary relationship with
Tyco to line his own pockets and defraud the shareholders .... [Sleduced
by the pursuit of wealth, Belnick betrayed his duty."' 24 Belnick's defense
asserted that Belnick's compensation was fully earned and in line with
customary Tyco compensation practices. Moreover, they argued, Belnick
reasonably relied on his boss, Kozlowski, and former Chief Financial
Officer ("CFO") Mark H. Swartz on issues of board approval and
25
disclosure.
The Belnick criminal case captures one of the most important debates
still going on in reaction to the recent corporate scandals and the SEC's
attempts to reform attorneys' professional responsibilities under SarbanesOxley. It poses the question of what, if any, ethical duties lawyers should
21. Id. In 1998, Warren Rudman, a partner at Paul, Weiss, recommended Belnick for
the job of chief counsel of Tyco. Id. at 18.
22. Anthony Lin, Trial Startsfor Tyco's Belnick, Nat'l L.J., May 10, 2004, at 18. In her
opening statement, prosecutor Amy Schwartz argued that Belnick received an improper
multimillion dollar bonus, failed to disclose his compensation to the board, and repeatedly
failed to report more than $14 million in company relocation loans. Jonathan D. Glater,
Latest Tyco Trial Starts as Lawyers' Showcase, N.Y. Times, May 7, 2004, at C2. As the
trial unfolded, the prosecution focused on Belnick's $17 million bonus as a bribe from L.
Dennis Kozlowski. See Steve Fishman, The Convert, NewYorkMetro.com, Aug. 9, 2004,
www.newyorkmetro.comlnymetro/news/people/features/9572/index.html.
23. Brooke A. Masters & Carrie Johnson, Former Tyco Executive Acquitted, Wash. Post,
July 16, 2004, at El. Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") Kozlowski and Chief Financial
Officer "CFO" Mark Swartz were found guilty on June 17, 2005, of conspiracy, fraud, and
falsifying business records. Martha Graybow, Former Tyco Chiefs Found Guilty, Reuters,
June
17,
2005,
available
at
http://www.news-fromnewspapers.comlen/reuters.comI2005/06/1 8/FormerTyco-chiefs-found__guilty.html.
Kozlowski and Swartz were charged with abusing two company loan programs for
executives-instead of using the loans for approved purposes, they allegedly used those
funds toward their extravagant lifestyles, palatial estates, and generous perquisites from
Tyco. For an in-depth description of Kozlowski's excesses, see James B. Stewart, Spend!
Spend! Spend! Where did Tyco's Money Go?, The New Yorker, Feb. 17, 2003, at 132.
24. Glater, supra note 22 (quoting Assistant District Attorney Amy Schwartz).
25. Anthony Lin, Belnick Testifies He Soon Felt Out of Place at Tyco, N.Y. L.J., June
23, 2004, at I [hereinafter Lin, Belnick Testifies] (reporting that Kozlowski told Belnick that
compensation at Tyco was "very generous"); Anthony Lin, Skewed Views of Business
Sparked Belnick Case, His Attorney Claims, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2004, at 1 [hereinafter Lin,
Skewed Views] (reporting the defense argument that Belnick "reasonably relied" on
Kozlowski and Swartz on issues of board approval and disclosure); Anthony Lin, Trial
Under Way for Tyco Ex-GC Mark Belnick, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2004, at 1 [hereinafter Lin,
Trial Under Way] (noting defense argument that Belnick earned his lavish compensation).
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have in preventing or reporting corporate fraud? It focuses on the related,
but more narrow question: What is and what should be the role of the
general counsel, a company's top legal dog? In closing arguments, the
defense counsel, Reid Weingarten of Steptoe & Johnson, said that the
prosecution had based its case on "wildly unrealistic" ideas of how a
general counsel or any other employee would interact with his superiors in
a corporate setting. According to Weingarten, the Manhattan District
Attorney's mistake was to presume that Belnick "'wasn't the general
counsel [but] the inspector general.' ' 26 As his defense attorney argued,
27
Belnick "'never saw his role as watchdog of the board.'
Belnick's acquittal leaves many questions open, especially for those
familiar with the role of general counsel. We wonder how he could have
been so gullible or mindless to have missed the red flags. To what extent
had Belnick enabled the wholesale pillaging of Tyco by the CEO and CFO?
Why did he not take it upon himself to investigate the possibility that
Kozlowski might be abusing the company loan programs (as suggested by
his outside counsel)? 2 8 Why did he not more aggressively investigate the
$100,000 in vacation expenses for Kozlowski's girlfriend Karen Mayo that
were paid out of a reserve designated for Tyco merger expenses? 29 Or the
$250 million that Kozlowski borrowed from Tyco to pay for everything
from dentist bills to beach house expenses for Mayo? 30 Why did Belnick
not do anything to address the unorthodox practice of using various cash
reserves to beef up cash flow in order to meet forecasts (a practice that
outside securities counsel had alerted him to)? 3 1 Why did he not take it
upon himself to ensure that his large cash and restricted stock bonuses
(valued at approximately $20 million in the calendar year 2000 alone) were
approved by the Board, instead of just relying on Kozlowski's word (which
he had good reason to distrust)? 32 Why did he fail to report his interest-free
loans of $14 million in the directors-and-officers questionnaires used to

26. Lin, Skewed Views, supra note 25, at 1.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Anthony Lin, Wilmer Lawyers Shake Up Trial of Tyco GC, Legal Times, June 7,
2004, at 1 (noting that Wilmer lawyers were satisfied with the explanation that senior

executives were using the company loan program as a "revolving credit arrangement").
29. Anthony Lin, At Belnick Trial, One Firm is Key to Both Sides, Nat'l L.J., June 7,
2004, at 17.
30. Fishman, supra note 22. Belnick inquired about these expenses and was told that
Kozlowski brought the balance to zero by the end of the year. It was later discovered that
Kozlowski had reduced the balance by using other company loan programs and by forgiving
some of those loans.
31. Lin, supra note 28.
32. Press Release, Tyco International, Ltd., Tyco Files Suit Against Former Chief
Corporate Counsel Mark Belnick for Broad Pattern of Misconduct Including Using
Company
Funds
for
Personal
Gain
(June
17,
2002),
available at
http://www.tyco.conm/ivesite/Page/Tyco/Who+We+Are/Press+Center/Press+Releases+Detai
ls/??&DCRID= 1290380366.
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prepare the company's SEC filings? 33 Why did he defer to CFO Swartz
about what should or should not be disclosed in an SEC filing? 34 The
Manhattan District Attorney queried 3Belnick
incredulously at trial,
5
"'Weren't you... the company lawyer?'
The conventional wisdom. Because Belnick's apparent lapses in
judgment seem implausible in light of his celebrated reputation, the
36
conventional explanation is what I call the venality hypothesis.
Notwithstanding the acquittal, the assumption is that, at some point in his
career, Belnick met a fork in the road and consciously and deliberately
chose the path of greed and depravity. In explaining his silence in the face
of Kozlowski's looting of the company, it is easy to assume that Belnick
willfully turned the other way. This explanation has many virtues. It
reflects a medieval morality play with a simple lesson. It also provides
great comfort by ratifying the sacred notion of free will 3 7 and,
conservatively, isolating the problem of corruption to a handful of aberrant
cases. Paradoxically, some form of the venality hypothesis has been used
by law reformers to justify the stiff penalties of Sarbanes-Oxley 3 8 and by
33. Otis Bilodeau, Indicted GC TelegraphsHis Defense, Mark Belnick: Tyco Executives
Knew About Disputed Loans, Legal Times, Oct. 28, 2002, at 1 (reporting that Belnick
received assurance from Swartz that relocation loans did not have to be disclosed).
34. Id.
35. See Fishman, supra note 22 (quoting Assistant District Attorney John Moscow).
36. One partner at Paul, Weiss wondered, "'If shenanigans were going on under Mark's
nose, where was the ethical guidance? . . . Mark should have known better, his antennae
should've been raised, he had to look the other way."' Id.; see, e.g., TYCO Former
Executives L. Dennis Kozlowski, Mark H. Swartz and Mark A. Belnick Sued for Fraud,
Accounting and Enforcement Act Litigation Release No. 17,722, 78 SEC Docket 1495 (Sept.
12, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17722.htm; see also John
Freeman, Ethics Watch: Lawyers and Corporate Disgrace, 14 S.C. Law. 9 (2003). John
Freeman writes,
[Kozlowski and Belnick] 'treated Tyco as their private bank, taking out hundreds
of millions of dollars of loans and compensation without ever telling investors,
[and, in doing so] put their own interests above those of Tyco's shareholders.'
• . . Evidently, lawyer Belnick was willing to grease the skids for Mr.
Kozlowski's sophisticated looting of Tyco in exchange for Mr. Kozlowski
greasing his lawyer's palms ....

[Ilt is impossible to justify corporate counsel

standing by, much less splitting the booty, when the entity, the "client," is being
looted.
Id. at 9 (quoting SEC Director of Enforcement Stephen M. Cutler). The venality hypothesis
has been generalized to other corporate scandals. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting
the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals about SelfDeception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 Geo. L.J. 285, 286
(2004) (noting that "unrestrained greed has now become the standard trope in the social
construction" of recent corporate scandals).
37. See Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will 28 (2002) (quoting Marvin
Minsky, The Society of Mind 306 (1985) ("None of us enjoys the thought that what we do
depends on processes we do not know; we prefer to attribute our choices to volition, will, or
self-control ....

Perhaps it would be more honest to say, 'My decision was determined by

internalforces I do not understand."')).
38. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, in Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Implications, supra
note 7, at 431, 445 (noting that "[t]he overwhelming characteristic of Sarbanes-Oxley's new
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those resisting further regulation, because, in their view, "corporate law
reform ... should not be assessed from such a small sampling of' failures
39
caused by unrestrained greed.
But the simplest explanation is not always the correct one. In fact,
decades of social scientific research into the causes and nature of unethical
behavior suggest that the venality hypothesis is too simplistic. It fails to
capture the complex interaction between the powerful situational forces,
and the psychological tendencies unleashed by those forces, that can
impede professional judgment. Belnick may not simply be one of the few
rogue apples. Rather, he is a symbolic marker, an illustrative, albeit
extreme, example of the kinds of pressures that all inside counsel face when
the senior officer to whom they report is engaged in misconduct, whether
overtly criminal or just subtly dishonest.
In some ways obviously
exceptional, the circumstances of Belnick's corruption may also be banal.
B. The Banality Hypothesis
Now imagine that you are a college student in need of a little money.
You answer a newspaper advertisement promising to pay volunteers $40 in
cash for participating in a one-hour experiment on "memory and learning,"
conducted by a professor of the Psychology Department. 40 In the research
facility, you greet the "experimenter," wearing a gray lab coat and carrying
a clipboard, who takes you into a laboratory where a friendly, bespectacled
middle-aged man-another volunteer-waits.
The experimenter then
describes the purpose of the study as exploring the possible benefits of
selective punishment on memory errors. He instructs you and the other
volunteer to draw a slip of paper from a hat, which randomly determines
which one is to play the role of "teacher" and which one "learner" in the
experiment. You go first, and you draw the slip of paper with the word
"Teacher."

criminal provisions is the severity of its prison terms," and summarizing the enhanced
penalty provisions).
39. See Langevoort, supra note 36, at 286-87 (noting that, for those opposed to law
reform, "the assumption of greed with guile in response to institutional incentives explains
enough").
40. This hypothetical is based on actual experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram of
Yale University. See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority 14-26 (1974); see also Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character,
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 150-54

(2003) (using Milgram's experiments as the basis for an illustrative hypothetical on
situationism versus dispositionism); David J..
Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in
Ethics in Practice: Lawyers' Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation 94, 96-97 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000) (using Milgram's experiments to explain the behavior of Mahlon Perkins

in the Berkey-Kodak case, and as the basis for an exposition on the excuse doctrine in
criminal law); Philip G. Zimbardo & Michael R. Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change

and Social Influence 65-72 (1991) (providing a summary and analysis of Milgram's
experiments). The compensation was $4 (plus fifty cents carfare) for the actual experiments
conducted by Milgram in the early 1960s.
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The experimenter then tells you that you are to read a series of random
word pairs to the learner and then test the learner's memory of the pairing
of the words. Incorrect answers are to be punished with an electric shock,
delivered by flipping one of the thirty switches of a "shock generator" that
the experimenter shows you.4 1 You briefly inspect the shock generator.
Each switch is clearly labeled (from left to right in fifteen-volt increments)
with voltage designations that range from fifteen to 450 volts. 42 In
addition, markings ranging from "Slight Shock" to "Danger: Severe
Shock" accompany each group of four switches. Two switches after this
last designation (435 to 450 range) are ominously marked "XXX." 4 3 The
experimenter instructs you, as the teacher, to punish the first error with a
mild fifteen-volt shock44 and then to increase the shock by fifteen volts for
each succeeding error.
Then, as you tag along, the experimenter takes the learner to an adjacent
room and straps him into an "electric chair" apparatus. 45 The experimenter
explains that the straps "prevent excessive movement while the learner [is]
An electrode is attached to the learner's wrist, and
being shocked ....
electrode paste is applied to avoid blisters and burns." 46 The experimenter
then explains that the electrode is attached to the shock generator in the
adjoining room.47 The learner looks a little nervous and mentions that he
has a "slight heart condition," but the experimenter reassures him that,
shocks can be extremely painful, they cause no permanent
"[a]lthough the 48
tissue damage."
The experimenter then escorts you to your seat in the main room in front
of the shock generator. He gives you a sample shock of forty-five volts,
which makes you flinch a little. 4 9 The experimenter then instructs you to
administer the learning task. You administer the learning task and the
learner responds correctly. Subsequently, however, the learner errs, and
you flip the switches at fifteen volts. Wrong answers continue and you
administer thirty and then forty-five volts. At seventy-five volts, the learner
verbally; at 150 volts, he demands to be
grunts; at 120 volts, he complains
50
released from the experiment.
At this point, you feel a little discomfort at the learner's demands. You
turn to the experimenter and say, "Maybe we should stop this. It sounds
like it's getting to be painful for him. He said he had a slight heart

41. See Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 66.
42. Milgram, supra note 40, at 20.
43. Id.

44. Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 67.
45. Milgram, supra note 40, at 19.
46. Id.
47. Id.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 20.
50. "His protests continue as the shocks escalate, growing increasingly vehement and
emotional. At 285 volts his response can only be described as an agonized scream." Id. at 4.
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condition." 5 1 The experimenter immediately counters, "The experiment
requires that you continue to go on. Please go on! '"52
What would you do in this situation? At what point would you disobey
the experimenter's commands? How far do you think other ordinary people
-like you-would administer brutal and perhaps lethal shocks at the
command of the experimenter?
The scenario that I just described to you is, of course, based on the
famous experiments 53 conducted by Stanley Milgram 54 from 1960-1963 to
study the psychological mechanisms of obedience to authority. Milgram
recruited over one thousand subjects from a diverse cross section of the
entire New Haven community to participate in his experiments. 55 The
original and basic design of the experiments included three actors: the
experimenter (who was played by a high school teacher of biology), the
learner (an accountant trained for the role), and the teacher (who was the
naYve volunteer subject). 56 But, through eighteen different permutations of
the experiments, Milgram manipulated various situational factors to test
their effect on actual behavior. 57 The "random" drawing from the hat was
rigged so that the naYve subject always drew the slip of paper designated
"Teacher." 58 Actual shocks were not delivered and the shouts and screams
were preprogrammed on tape. 59
What was the expected behavior of subjects? Three groups of peoplepsychiatrists, college students, and an audience of middle-class adults of
varied occupations-were given a detailed presentation describing the
experiment and were asked to predict when hypothetical subjects would
disobey the experimenter. They predicted that the majority of subjects
would not go beyond the tenth shock level (150 volts, when the learner
makes his first explicit demand to be freed) and that only a pathological
fringe, not exceeding one or two percent, would proceed all the way to 450

51. See id. at 65.
52. See id. at 21.

53. Although it has been four decades since those experiments were conducted,
Milgram's research is "perhaps the most widely cited program of studies in psychology,"
achieving "a visibility that is without precedent in the social sciences." A.G. Miller, The
Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in the Social Sciences, at v (1986).
Miller notes that "the number of references to the obedience research-in the Science
CitationIndex, for example-is truly vast." Id. at vi.
54. Milgram remains highly respected in the field. In a tabulation of citations in
introductory psychology texts, it was noted that Milgram ranked twelfth among all
psychologists, "just behind Carl Jung and higher than William James, John B. Watson,
Abraham Maslow, or Leon Festinger." See id. at 2.
55. Alan C. Elms, Obedience in Retrospect, Alan C. Elms Virtual Library,
http://www.ulmus.net/acellibrary/obedience.cfm; see also Milgram, supra note 40, at 14-16.
56. Milgram, supra note 40, at 16-17.
57. See Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 71 fig.25 (summarizing the results of the
eighteen experiments).
58. See Milgram, supra note 40, at 19.
59. See Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 68.
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volts (thirtieth shock level). 60 Moreover, no one believed that they
themselves would go all the way.
The results from the baseline experiment were startling, even to Milgram
himself. Of the first forty subjects, twenty-six (sixty-five percent) obeyed
the orders of the experimenter to the end, punishing the learner until they
reached the maximum shock on the generator. They did so in spite of the
victim's agonized screams, poundings on the wall, and, even later, chilling
silence. Moreover, comparable results have been attained by other
researchers in experiments conducted using subjects with different
demographic characteristics, in foreign countries, and in non-laboratory
conditions. 6 1 After the 450-volt shock was administered three times, the
experimenter terminated the session. 62 The average maximum shock level
administered by the subjects was 27.0, or 405 volts, quite a bit more than
the 150 volts (tenth shock level) predicted as the level that most
hypothetical subjects would refuse to administer. 63 As succinctly put by
David Luban, "Milgram demonstrates that each of us ought to believe three
things about ourselves: that we disapprove of destructive obedience, that
we think we would never engage in it, and, more likely than not, that we
'64
are wrong to think we would never engage in it."
The large discrepancy between ex ante predictions about likely behavior
and actual behavior of subjects confirms the existence of what is called the
fundamental attribution error 65-that
we grossly under-attribute the
relevance of situational influences on our behavior and over-attribute the
strength of dispositional factors. Dispositional (or internal) attributions
identify the causes of observed behavior as within the individual, i.e.,
personality or motives. 6 6 By contrast, situational (or external) "attributions
identify factors in the social and physical environment that are causing the
person to behave in a particular way." 6 7 Situational forces may include the
physical setting, roles, rules, uniforms, symbols, or, as will be discussed in
60. The surveyed respondents predicted that about four percent would reach the
twentieth shock level and about one subject in a thousand would administer the highest
shock. See Milgram, supra note 40, at 30 fig.5, 31.
61. See Miller, supra note 53, at 67-87 (summarizing other researchers' findings).
62. Milgram, supra note 40, at 33. It is this sixty-five percent obedience result that has
received the most publicity, although Milgram would later express reservations concerning
the manner in which his findings were assimilated by the public, focusing on the baseline
experiment and largely ignoring the programmatic nature of Milgram's experiments. See
Miller, supra note 53, at 9.
63. See Miller, supra note 53, at 21.
64. Luban, supra note 40, at 97.

65. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 40, at 136 (arguing that legal economists' inability to
analyze themselves through the same economic models they apply to everyone else is
explained by the fundamental attribution error); see also Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition:
Making Sense of People 430 (1999) (noting that participants in psychological studies
routinely "fail to appreciate the extent to which situational forces had contributed to that
behavior" and instead "tend to attribute behaviors to the enduring traits or abilities of the
person who had performed them").

66. Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 89.
67. Id. at 90.
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this Article, group consensus. 68 Milgram's experimental variations showed
that "obedience is powerfully influenced by relevant situational contextsthat it is capable of being produced at an extremely high rate or reduced to a
complete absence without taking into account any personalityfactors in the
69
individual researchparticipants."
Put another way, we are prone to overestimate the degree of stability
likely to be demonstrated in a given individual's behavior over time and
across different situational contexts. 70 We thus tend to rely heavily on
overly broad and simplistic notions of "good" or "bad" character, both in
our efforts to explain past behavior and predict future behavior. 7 1 Even
when we do recognize the situational constraints inducing a person's
behavior, we do not always take them into account. 72 Frequently, we jump
to conclusions about the person's underlying trait and fail to sufficiently
73
correct our inferences by adjusting for the situational context.
If the shocking context of Milgram's experiment makes one skeptical
about generalizing his findings, rest assured that the evidence
demonstrating the fundamental attribution error is now legion. The
fundamental attribution error is considered "pervasive and so full of
implications" and "one of the major lessons of social psychology. '74
Evidence for the fundamental attribution error "abound," 75 and classic
studies proving the fundamental attribution error 7 6 are now fixtures of
psychology textbooks.
The venality hypothesis suffers badly from the fundamental attribution
error. The venality explanation assumes a calculating and "self-contained
decision-maker[] flying solo," ignoring the scientific wisdom that the
"dynamics of individual decision making change dramatically when the
individual works in an organizational setting. '77 Like the laboratory at
Yale, the corporate setting is just another situational cue that gives
legitimacy to the authority's orders and thus demands that those orders be
followed. To understand why an inside lawyer makes unethical choices, do
not just inquire about her values or peer into her heart; ask her where she
sits on the organizational chart as well.

68. Id. at 93.
69. Miller, supra note 53, at 255 (summarizing Milgram's position).
70. Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal
Theory and Practice,97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1081, 1092 (2003).

71. See id. at 1093.
72. Kunda, supra note 65, at 431.
73. Id.
74. Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 93.
75. Id. at 94.
76. See, e.g., Kunda, supra note 65, at 429-30 (summarizing the classic Quiz Game
experiment, and pro-Castro essay experiment).
77. Luban, supra note 40, at 94.
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This is my alternative banality hypothesis. 7 8 It suggests that the
behavioral origins of lawyer acquiescence in corporate fraud are found in
commonplace interactions in organizational settings. In other words, what
we perceive as "extraordinary behavior" on the part of inside counsel is
better explained by analyzing what is "ordinary behavior" in the corporate
workplace. 79 Resisting the fundamental attribution error, my hypothetical
suggests that unethical decisions made by inside counsel are better
explained by the particular situation in which the inside counsel finds
herself and the particular roles-mere employee, faithful agent, and team
player-that constrain her actions.
This situation is configured by
economic, psychological, and ideological forces that incline the inside
counsel to be complicit in fraud, not through any overt or explicit
calculation, but through a subtle and implicit reconfiguration of preferences,
self-conception, and motivation.
To be clear, I am not saying that a venality explanation is never correct.
It may be, even in a nontrivial number of cases. Rather, my point is that the
banality hypothesis has better explanatory power for the typical inside
counsel situation, and that attempts to reform the "system" ignore this
model of fraud at their own peril.
C. Focusingon Inside Counsel
Before making my case for the banality hypothesis, I will justify my
focus on inside counsel as gatekeeper. Put simply, the inside counsel is the
single most important lawyer in a securities fraud committed by a public
company and, as Ronald Gilson has argued, the logical lawyer candidate for
the gatekeeping function. 80 This explains why Belnick, the general counsel,
was given such ridiculous sums of money by Kozlowski in the Tyco
scandal. Kozlowski needed to do everything he could to put Belnick in his
back pocket. In other words, Belnick's inaction at Tyco was a necessary
condition for corporate fraud to continue. This explains why Congress
conscripted the public company's general counsel, or CLO, to be a
gatekeeper, and why the SEC has recently stepped up its enforcement
efforts against inside counsel as gatekeepers. 8 1

78. The "banality hypothesis" derives from the oft-cited "normality thesis" of Milgram's
experiments. The "normality thesis" is situational in its focus, but recognizes that situations
are the product of people. It refutes the "pathology thesis" as the primary explanation for
evil; that is, it denies the proposition that evildoers are necessarily "different" from normal
people in terms of basic psychological functioning. See Miller, supra note 53, at 184-85.
79. See Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 70-71 (discussing the normality thesis of
Milgram' s experiments).
80. See Ronald G. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side

Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 915 (1990) (arguing that, since the market power necessary
for private gatekeeping has moved in-house, so, too, must the gatekeeping function).
81. See Cutler, supra note 11, at 1 (listing general counsels who allegedly were
complicit in fraudulent conduct and noting that about half of all lawyers charged with
misconduct were inside counsel). In addition, the SEC has been investigating inside and
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Within the corporate structure. Inside counsel have gained influence,
both within the corporate structure and also as compared to the role of
outside counsel. Most general counsels now sit at the top of the corporate
hierarchy. 82
The general counsel formally participates in planning
committees and, in many cases, is a member of the senior management
council or committee where final decisions are made. 8 3 She typically
reports to the CEO 84 and has the trust of senior management, who may be
suspicious of retained lawyers. 85 She is involved early in the decisionmaking process and, thus, is capable of influencing management decisions
at the strategy-setting stage. She has significant managerial responsibilities,
including the education and monitoring of lay employees with respect to
86
corporate compliance.
Due to her physical proximity to management and other company
employees, the inside lawyer has substantial access to informal sources of
information collected around the "water cooler." 87 This great access means
that the inside lawyer better understands the internal workings and
philosophy of the corporation than even the best outside counsel. 8 8 The
downside, of course, is greater opportunity to learn of corporate
outside lawyers of mutual funds whom it believes assisted their clients "in illegal late trading
or market timing arrangements that harmed mutual fund investors." Id.
82. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm,
37 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 277 (1985).
83. Id. at 282 (describing the trend toward formal integration of inside counsel into the
corporate planning process).
84. A survey conducted by American Corporate Counsel Association ("ACCA" or
"ACC") in 2001 reported that 61.4% of general counsels reported to the CEO, 15.3%
reported to the president, and 12.7% reported to another executive. Approximately 7% of
respondents indicated that the general counsel reported to the CFO. Susan Hackett, Inside
Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends in the In-House Profession, 44 Ariz. L. Rev.
609, 612 (2002) (reporting survey results and noting that general counsels are fighting the
trend to transfer reporting to the CFO).
85. According to a 1995 study conducted by Checkers, Simon & Rosner, L.L.P.,
approximately 40% of the CEOs and 45% CFOs surveyed believed they were being
overcharged by their outside counsel. Checkers, Simon & Rosner, L.L.P., What Corporate
Clients Think of Outside Counsel Billings, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at A5.
86. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 82, at 284-87 (describing the role of inside
counsel in developing programmatic prevention plans); Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel
in an Era of ComplianceProgramsand CorporateSelf-Policing, 46 Emory L.J. 1113, 114163 (1997) (discussing the role of general counsel in corporate compliance).
87. As described by Geoffrey Hazard, the "water cooler" refers to the
places and occasions for informal information interchange that occur in all
employment settings: the company cafeteria, the car pool, the informal exchanges
preceding company committee meetings, the evening get-togethers during out-oftown trips, and even the company picnics. These are opportunities for exchange of
back-channel information, office gossip, rumors and portents of future corporate
undertakings that have not yet been announced officially.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 Emory L.J. 1011, 1018
(1997).
88. See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural,Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lwyering for a
Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 Emory L.J. 1057, 1060-61
(1997) (noting that many believe they receive superior work from lawyers who are more
knowledgeable about the business affairs of the company).
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misconduct, even when the inside lawyer is not actively policing the
organization. This puts all but the most cloistered inside counsel in the
stressful position of being reminded of their fiduciary duty of loyalty and
potentially having to do so something about it. Sticky situations like this
lead academics, like Geoffrey Hazard, to observe that "the role of corporate
counsel is among the89most complex and difficult of those functions
performed by lawyers."
As compared to outside counsel. Since the late 1970s, inside counsel
have consolidated their position as the dominant providers of legal services
to corporate America. 90 Although not without a few minor countertrends, 9 1
corporations have increasingly internalized their legal "diagnostic and
referral needs" by building sophisticated in-house legal staffs92 to whom the
handling of legal matters are entrusted.
The flip side of the increasing domination by inside counsel is the
decreasing importance of the role of outside counsel. Law firms have been
displaced by inside counsel as the primary advisor to corporations and have
lost the function of general counsel. 93 Corporations now routinely shop for
outside lawyers, often holding "beauty contests" where law firms are forced
to compete for the right to do legal work. 94 In most large corporations, the
decision whether to retain outside counsel or handle the issue internally is

89. See Hazard, supranote 87, at 1011.
90. See id. at 1012 (noting that the "second-class citizenship" previously assigned to inhouse attorneys has now ceased as a result of changes in corporations' reliance on in-house
legal departments and changes in legal practice generally); Carl D. Liggio, The Changing
Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 Emory L.J. 1201, 1201 (1997) (arguing that corporate

counsel have become the dominant providers of legal services to corporate America, while
outside counsel have become "episodic" providers of legal services).
91. In his research on the redesigned corporations of the high technology industry in the
1990s, Robert Rosen has observed a few countertrends (e.g., outsourcing, porous borders,
and in-house downsizing) that may have negatively impacted but not reversed the larger
trend of the ascendance of inside counsel (relative to outside counsel). Robert Eli Rosen,
"We're All ConsultantsNow": How Change in Client OrganizationalStrategies Influences
Change in the Organization of CorporateLegal Services, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 637, 642, 647,
650 (2002).
92. See Gilson, supra note 80, at 889, 902-03 (observing that corporations have
internalized the "diagnostic" function (identifying what legal service is needed) and

"referral" function (selecting the appropriate provider of the category of legal service) by
hiring in-house legal staffs and thus reducing the traditional information asymmetry between
lawyer and client).
93. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 82, at 298; Gilson, supra note 80, at 897-99, 90203 (noting that corporations' increasing reliance on sophisticated in-house legal staffs has
resulted in a dramatic reduction in the lawyer-switching costs that historically gave law firms

de facto power over even the largest corporate clients); Hackett, supra note 84, at 611
(noting that the growing visibility of the in-house bar is due largely to a shift in the balance

of power between outside and in-house counsel, and not to any significant growth in the
number of inside counsel relative to other segments of the bar).
94. David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons
from the Diversity Wars, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 855, 884 (1998).
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made by the general counsel, not by ordinary executive management. 95
Previously, only routine matters would be dealt with in-house. Now, inside
counsel tend to keep for themselves matters of increasing complexity and
importance. 96 Outside counsel's role and scope of work are routinely
constrained by inside counsel, who see law firms' judgments as being
clouded by their pecuniary interest (through billable hours) in transactions
97
or litigation proceedings.
Even when outside counsel is retained on a critical legal matter, it is the
inside counsel that primarily participates in creating and developing legal
strategies, and in acting as the main intermediary to the corporation. 9 8 Law
firms are increasingly subject to exacting supervision over virtually every
aspect of the services they perform, and law firm partners know that
business will be taken away if inside lawyers become dissatisfied with the
quality or price of their work. 99 Without access to "back channel"
information, 10 0 elite law firms are increasingly processing legal work that
has been predigested and organized by their clients' inside lawyers. Law
firms may be directed to provide opinions based on "purely hypothetical"' 10 1
facts, selected precisely to accommodate a response that leads to a desired
02
legal opinion. 1

For instance, in response to the famous Watkins memo, warning that
Enron might implode in a "wave of accounting scandals," General Counsel
James Derrick limited the "preliminary" investigation by instructing outside
law firm Vinson & Elkins 103 not to second-guess Arthur Andersen's
treatment of underlying accounting issues, not to do a detailed analysis of
the transactions in question, and not to conduct a discovery-style

95. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 82, at 277-78; Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel
Movement, ProfessionalJudgment and OrganizationalRepresentation, 64 Ind. L.J. 479, 484
(1989).
96. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 82, at 277-78; see also Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth
Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in
Large Corporations,34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 457,458 (2000).
97. See Rosen, supra note 91, at 652 (noting that the best practice for mergers and
acquisitions ("M&A") in the redesigned corporation is to avoid contacting outside counsel
early in the deal, as law firms are financially biased in having the M&A deal proceed); see
also Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate
Litigation,67 Fordham L. Rev. 837, 849 (1998).
98. See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 96, at 458; Rosen, supra note 95, at 484.
99. See Wilkins, supra note 94, at 884.
100. See Hazard, supra note 87, at 1019 (noting that back-channel information cannot be
recreated even when the outside lawyer has received all relevant documents and has open
access to company employees).
101. See Rosen, supra note 95, at 485; see also ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982).
102. See Hazard, supra note 87, at 1019.
103. Watkins was opposed to hiring Vinson & Elkins, knowing that they had a conflict of
interest because they provided some true sale opinions on some of the questionable deals.
Memorandum from Sherron Watkins, Vice President for Corporate Dev., to Kenneth Lay,
Chairman
&
CEO
(Aug.
22,
2001),
available
at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/l07/hearings/02142002Hearing489/tabl 1.pdf.
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investigation.10 4 It is thus hardly surprising that Vinson & Elkins delivered
no further scrutiny into Sherron
a report to Enron's management that
1
Watkins's allegations was necessary. 05
Given inside counsel's influential role within the corporation and outside
counsel's reduced ability to act as gatekeepers to constrain client
demands, 106 it makes perfect sense to focus on inside counsel's role as
gatekeeper, a role that Congress and the SEC have imposed on inside
counsel. Having motivated the focus on inside counsel, we now turn to a
thicker description of the situation.
II. THE ETHICAL ECOLOGY OF INSIDE LAWYERS

The banality hypothesis takes the situation seriously. Three facets of the
situation of inside counsel capture the forces that guide (un)ethical
behavior. First, the inside counsel is simply an employee of the firm-and
employees tend to listen to their bosses. Second, these employees are also
professionalized to view themselves as agents, which requires alignment to
their principal. Finally, as part of the firm, inside counsel are expected to
be team players, which invites acquiescence and silence in the face of
corporate misconduct.
A. The Situation

1. Mere Employee
a. Obedience Pressures
The point here is simple: We are generally inclined to take orders from
superiors. Inside counsel, as employees of the firm, are thus inclined to
take orders from their employer-bosses. Technically, the employer is the
firm itself, but in practice, that means the management is the employer as
representative of the firm.
Although the general counsel of most
corporations is considered a member of senior management, she invariably
reports to another member of senior management, usually the CEO, a coagent but de facto boss.
To varying degrees, we have all internalized a tendency to obey authority
figures. Recall again Milgram's work. Let us assume that you were one of

104. Letter from Max Hendrick, III, Vinson & Elkins, to James V. Derrick, Jr., Executive
Vice President & General Counsel, Enron Corp., Preliminary Investigation of Allegations of
an Anonymous Employee (Oct. 15, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1764266 [hereinafter V&E
Report].
105. Id. at *7 ("[Tlhe facts disclosed through our preliminary investigation do not, in our
judgment, warrant a further widespread investigation by independent counsel and
auditors."). The report acknowledged, however, that "there is a serious risk of adverse
publicity and litigation." Id.
106. See Gilson, supra note 80, at 902-03.
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the defiant subjects who refused to go all the way and stopped at, say, 300
volts. What would you do after you quit? Would you check into the
adjacent room and see if the learner is seriously injured? 10 7 Shockingly, not
one of the more than one thousand subjects in Milgram's experiments
checked on the person they had possibly harmed. 10 8 As explained by Philip
Zimbardo and Michael Leippe,
"Stay in your seat, until I tell you that you can leave," is perhaps one of
the most lasting lessons of our early childhood education-coming from
elementary school teachers. That behavioral rule is so internalized that it
controlled the reactions of the "heroes" in the Milgram studies, who
disobeyed the experimenter's external command but totally obeyed this
more deeply ingrained internal command. 10 9
Milgram argued that, in modem society, the child is socialized to obey
not just mom and dad, but impersonal, legitimate authority figures-for
example, schoolteachers, police officers, and bosses."10 To Milgram, a
"legitimate" authority figure is one who is seen as having a right to issue
commands and to whom one feels an obligation to obey."' l Mere
indications of rank-dress, diploma, title, insignia-are often sufficient to
indicate "legitimate" authority. 112 In organizational settings, people interact
socialized to
with others on the basis of their role or position 1 13 and11are
4
behave according to the wishes of "legitimate" authorities.
But how can "legitimate" authority elicit destructive obedience in
ordinary people? Milgram theorized that people tend to accept the
definitions of reality provided by legitimate authority. He describes this act
of acceptance as an important component of obedience with moral
consequences:
Every situation also possesses a kind of ideology, which we call the
"definition of the situation," and which is the interpretation of the
107. This additional hypothetical is included in Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 73.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 74.
110. Miller, supra note 53, at 223. Milgram focused on the "legitimate" nature of his
experimenter, although others have argued that, for example, perceived "greater expertise"
was the driving force behind subjects' obedience. But the "trusting the expert" explanation
fails to adequately account for subjects' behavior in one experimental variation where the
experimenter gives his orders from another room and, thus, cannot see what level of shock
the teacher is actually administering. In this version, compliance drops drastically. See
Milgram, supra note 2, at 65-66. As nicely put by David Luban, the experimenter's
"superior knowledge is no different than if he was standing directly behind the teacher."
Luban, supra note 40, at 101. For a summary of the various aspects of the nature of
authority, see Thomas Blass, The Milgram ParadigmAfter 35 Years: Some Things We Now
Know About Obedience to Authority, in Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the
Milgram Paradigm 35, 41-44 (Thomas Blass ed., 2000).
111. Blass, supra note 110, at 38-41 (noting Milgram's position on the nature of the
authority).
112. Miller, supra note 53, at 223.
113. See id. (summarizing Damico's view of Milgram's contributions); Milgram, supra
note 2, at 72 (noting that, for some subjects, "obedient dispositions are deeply ingrained").
114. Miller, supra note 53, at 226.

2005]

THE BANALITY OF FRAUD

1003

meaning of a social occasion ....An act viewed in one perspective may
seem heinous; the same action viewed in another perspective seems fully
warranted. There is a propensityfor people to accept definitions of action
provided by legitimate authority.
...It is this ideological abrogation to the authority that constitutes the
principal cognitive basis of obedience. If, after all, the world or the
situation is as the authority defines it, a certain set of actions follows
logically. 115

Management creates the reality for inside counsel. Management defines
objectives, identifies specific responsibilities for inside lawyers, and
116
determines whether an inside lawyer's performance is acceptable.
Management is vested with the authority to speak on behalf of the
organization and is entrusted to give direction to inside counsel.
Obedience of the kind encountered in Milgram's experiments has
implicit "contractual" elements as well. 117 We are socialized to fulfill our
end of the bargain and to avoid awkward or embarrassing disruptions of
well-defined social scripts. Milgram's subjects felt an obligation to
complete their role in the experiment. Leaving would involve "making a
scene" and reneging on a commitment. 1 18 As A.G. Miller notes, "Having
volunteered to participate and having entered the laboratory, the subject is
in a sense 'locked' into what will transpire there. It is normative to play out
the part, to see things through."' 119
If such obedience pressures are encountered in a single experimental
interaction with a total stranger, consider what pressures exist for inside

115. Milgram, supra note 40, at 145. The second part of Milgram's theoretical
explanation, known as his theory of the "agentic" state, is much more controversial. See
Miller, supra note 53, at 233-38 (evaluating empirical evidence for Milgram's theory of the
shift into the "agentic state"). Milgram argued that obedient subjects enter into a different
experiential state-the agentic state-that enables them to relinquish ultimate moral
responsibility to the authority and follow his orders. See Milgram, supra note 40, at 145-46.
For an overview of critiques of Milgram's experiments, see Miller, supra note 53, at 139-78,
221-55; Blass, supra note 110, at 35-59.
116. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future
Enrons?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1097, 1123 (2003).
117. Lee Ross & Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation 56 (1991) (noting the
"implicit contract" elements of the Milgram experiments); see also Miller, supra note 53, at
229. But a contractual analysis of Milgram's experiments cannot be taken too far. Although
many subjects insisted that they went along with the experiment because the learner had
consented, a variation run by Milgram casts doubt on those post hoc explanations. In the
variation, the learner expressly reserved the right to back out of the experiment whenever he
wanted. Even under those circumstances, "[forty] percent of the subjects followed the
experimenter's instructions to the bitter end despite the learner's protests; and three-fourths
of the subjects proceeded long past the point where the learner withdrew his consent."
Luban, supra note 40, at 98.
118. Miller, supra note 53, at 229.
119. Id. at 225.
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counsel who face management and their commands day-to-day. 120 Unlike
outside lawyers, inside lawyers have a "psychological contract" with
management that is more "relational" than "transactional" because of the
continuing nature of their role as long-term or indefinite-term employees or
subordinates. 121
I do not mean to exaggerate the nature and impact of obedience pressures
applied to employees by their bosses. As Milgram discovered, some will
refuse to obey immoral commands. 122 Because one-third of subjects did
not comply to the end, Milgram's findings hardly support the hypothesis of
irresistible compulsion. 123 But we should not be cavalier and dismiss
obedience pressures experienced by corporate employees as de minimis.
Also, I do not assert that obedience is inherently blind or slavish. In
Milgram's experiments, many subjects did question the experimenter's
wisdom in continuing, urged the experimenter to check on the learner's
condition, or expressed the resolve not to continue, while continuing to flip
These subjects were not blindly obeying the
the switches. 124
experimenter's commands; they were seriously conflicted but unable to
transform an intellectual, moral conviction into action. 125 As noted by Lee
Ross, "[T]he Milgram experiments ultimately may have less to say about
'destructive obedience' than about ineffectual, and indecisive,
disobedience."'

1 26

120. Although some still question whether the destructive behavior observed by Milgram
in his laboratory is of the same genre as that found in the real world, his research evokes
skepticism regarding the human condition. See Milgram, supra note 2, at 57-76.
121. The "psychological contract" is, according to one definition, the "sum of mutual
expectations between the organization and the employee." See Neil Anderson & Rene
Schalk, The Psychological Contract in Retrospect and Prospect, 19 J. Org. Behav. 637, 638
(1998) (citations omitted). The concept encompasses both explicit and implicit, unspoken
expectations, some more conscious (e.g., expectations with respect to salary) and less
conscious (e.g., longer-term promotion prospects). Id. at 637-38. For purposes of this
Article, the important point is that the contents and status of the psychological contract (i.e.,
whether the "contract" has been violated) is an important determinant of employee behavior
The difference between "transactional" and "relational" psychological
and attitude.
contracts arises out of four dimensions with respect to the focus of the contract: time frame,
stability, scope, and tangibility. In general, relational contracts are more flexible and
dynamic, with less demarcated boundaries, and are more likely to involve aspects of the
employee's private lives. Transactional contracts are more inflexible and boundaries are
clearer. Id. at 640-41.
122. In Milgram's baseline experiment, twenty-six subjects obeyed the experimenter until
the end. Fourteen, however, ultimately defied in spite of the experimenter's protestations.
Milgram, supra note 40, at 33. What accounts for the varying levels of obedience across a
single experimental variation? We do not know. Personality, political persuasion, home
environment, cultural or social background, and prior familiarity with the Nuremberg trials
may all have played a role in the varying levels of obedience.
123. Luban, supra note 40, at 114.
124. See Ross & Nisbett, supra note 117, at 57.
125. Milgram, supra note 40, at 148.
126. See Ross & Nisbett, supra note 117, at 57.
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b. Threatened Self-Interest
Mark Belnick's compensation was at the heart of the prosecution's case.
In addition to his lavish salary, he had received a $17 million bonus for the
successful handling of an SEC inquiry (as his defense lawyer argued) and
$14 million in interest-free employee "relocation" loans to renovate a $2.8
million Manhattan apartment and buy a $10 million luxury home in Park
City, Utah (where Tyco had no office). 127 The prosecutor accused Belnick

of abandoning "'everything his training, education and prior experience had
taught him"' in pursuit of the riches dangled before him by former CEO
Kozlowski. 128
Assistant District Attorney Amy Schwartz, in the
prosecution's opening statement, said that 129
"'[h]e was that much in Dennis
'
Kozlowski's pocket, bought and paid for." "
Although Belnick's defense team successfully created reasonable doubt
in the prosecution's claim of overt greed and corruption, I suspect that there
was some truth, albeit more subtle, to the prosecution's picture. Lawyers,
like everyone else, are motivated by self-interest.
Of course, outside counsel too are motivated by financial self-interest.
They have a personal, pecuniary interest in currying favor with senior
managers by facilitating corporate transactions that generate legal fees, even
if the transaction is not wealth-enhancing for corporate shareholders. 130 It
is well-known, for example, that its largest client, Enron, represented seven
percent of Vinson & Elkins's total annual revenues. 13 1 But for inside
counsel, as employees of the firm, the economic pressures are not just
greater in degree, but also different in kind.
First, inside counsel are necessarily economically dependent on a single
client. If they get fired, they lose their entire income, their insurance, and
13 3
their basic livelihood. If pensions or stock options 132 have not vested,
127. See Bilodeau, supra note 33. The relocation loan program was designed to assist
employees who moved from Tyco's New Hampshire offices to its New York offices.
128. Lin, Trial Under Way, supra note 25, at 1.
129. Lin, supra note 22, at 18.
130. Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of
TransactionalLawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 9, 38-39 (2003).
131. See Michael C. Bender, Lawmakers Accuse Enron Lawyers of Hiding Employee's

Claims, Austin Am. Statesman, Mar. 15, 2002, at DI (noting that Vinson & Etkins billed
Enron for $36 million over the prior year).
132. Corporations are increasingly offering stock or stock options as compensation or
bonuses, and they often make the corporate stock a central feature of the employee
retirement plan. This has been justified as both a recruitment device for getting highly
qualified lawyers from private practice and as an efficient performance incentive. John S.
Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity
Investments in Clients, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 405, 517 (2002).

133. Employee stock options are usually given to the inside lawyer with a staggered
vesting schedule, sometimes over a period of as much as five years. When inside lawyers
are faced with the corporate misconduct of the co-agent to whom they directly or indirectly
report, it is easy to see why they might prefer silence over disclosure. Retaliation by
management in the form of termination could mean the forfeiture of an enormous amount of
personal wealth.
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then enormous sums of money can be forfeited as well. Even worse, if they
34-without
get fired for whistle-blowing, they may get blacklistedI
135
discharge.
retaliatory
for
sue
to
law
the
recourse under
Second, even if getting fired is not likely, inside counsel feels
unremitting pressure to justify herself and her department as a corporate
cost center. In today's competitive and profit-oriented environment, no
position feels completely secure, and the case that an adequate return on
firm investment is being achieved must always be made. The best way to
do so is to facilitate, not interfere with, corporate transactions favored by
management.
Third, pleasing management can produce bigger bonuses, which have
become a growing fraction of the total salary. As Patricia Hewlin has
argued, the "degree to which organizations base rewards on subjective
appraisals of performance will influence the degree to which employees
experience dilemmas of choosing how or how not to behave when their
values differ from those of the organization."' 136 As subjectivity increases,
the general counsel will more likely feel pressured to conceal her personal
or ethical values that differ from organizational values. In addition to
routine annual "bonuses," there may be other opportunities to be rewarded
for pleasing management. For example, Kristina Mordaunt, Enron's inside
counsel, not only facilitated some of the more controversial transactions,
but also greatly profited from her personal investments in one of Enron's
137
special purpose entities.
Finally, if the inside lawyer owns stock in the firm, then it may be in her
self-interest not to do anything that might send the stock price into a
tailspin. As shareholder, the lawyer's primary (and therefore superseding)
objective becomes to maximize the value of the equity investment. This
shareholder wealth maximization norm can compete with the lawyer's
fiduciary duty to the corporation. 138 One could argue that equity-based
134. As observed by Geoffrey Hazard, there are senior corporate officers who "do not
care about complying with the law or who feel that they cannot afford to do so. Many of
them will not hesitate in firing a lawyer who gives them a hard time and then bad-mouthing
the lawyer afterward. No system of rules can eliminate that risk." Hazard, supra note 87, at
1015-16.

135. For a discussion of inside counsel's right to sue under the tort of retaliatory
discharge, see infra Part IV.B (discussing whistle-blower protections).
136. Patricia Faison Hewlin, Note, And the Award for Best Actor Goes to... : Facades
of Conformity in OrganizationalSettings, 28 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 633, 637 (2003).

137. Mordaunt reportedly received over $1 million in return for a $5800 investment. She
made the investment without obtaining the consent of Enron's Chairman and CEO, in
violation of Enron's Code of Conduct. Batson Report Appendix C, supra note 3, at 121-22,
193-94.

138. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 132, at 520. But it would be simplistic to
characterize this shareholder objective to maximize the value of the equity investment in
solely self-serving terms. Studies of companies that have suffered because of unreasonable
legal or economic risks taken by their employees generally show a mix of motivations. See,
e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J.Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities

Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 726 (concluding, based on the
evidence, that most fraud-on-the-market cases do not involve managerial self-dealing, but
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compensation provides incentives to be honest, since fraud should be
discovered in the long run.1 39 But it is not clear that this is even true in the
long run. 140 In the short term, it may well be in inside counsel's selfinterest to misrepresent the company's financial condition in public
filings-for example, by postponing the disclosure of an adverse financial
development until the next quarter (after she quickly liquidates her
that a reasonably prudent
investment), or by understating adverse items
14 1
securities lawyer would more fully disclose.
Although equity ownership by lawyers raises a plethora of ethical issues,
at this time there are no federal securities regulations or state ethics rulings
or opinions that would bar lawyers from owning equity interests in their
142
clients, even if the legal representation entails securities law matters.
Since Enron, some legal academics have publicly chimed in on the issue of
compensation practices for lawyers, arguing that equity143compensation for
lawyers, including inside lawyers, should be scrutinized.
What Belnick did with his Tyco stock options is telling. Although the
grant of stock and options to Belnick were to enable him to "build
significant equity" in Tyco, "Belnick regularly abandoned his investment in
the Company and sold his shares (or converted options and sold the

rather attempts to conceal adverse business developments by senior managers, who think
they can turn the company around under extreme circumstances); Langevoort, supra note 36,
at 296-97 (providing examples of situations showing a mix of motivations).
139. Arlen & Carney, supra note 138, at 701, 727 (noting that only eleven percent of
detected frauds went undiscovered for three years or longer).
140. We do not have data on frauds which go undetected. Id. at 726.
141. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 132, at 523 (noting the temptation to
understate adverse items). It is worth noting that, although there is potentially enormous
pecuniary gain for managers (including lawyers) to engage in insider trading (trading stock
in advance of a market movement and deferring disclosure until after the informational
advantage is fully exploited), most known attorney violations of securities laws relate to
"issuer financial disclosure" and "securities offerings." See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Section
703 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Study and Report on Violations by Securities
Professionals, app. A, at 2 (Jan. 24, 2003) (Classifications by Securities Professionals),
available at http://www.sec.gov/newslstudieslsox703report.pdf (noting that, of forty-nine
violations by attorneys, only two relate to insider trading).
142. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 132, at 413, 478. Beginning in 1995, several bar
associations, ultimately including the American Bar Association ("ABA") in 2000, issued
ethics opinions that basically endorsed lawyers obtaining equity interests in their clients,
subject to a few exceptions and requirements. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I
But see ABA Task Force on Corp.
Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418 (2000).
Responsibility, Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility July 16, 2002, 58 Bus. Law. 189, 212-13 (2002) [hereinafter ABA
PreliminaryReport] (noting that "accepting securities in a client company in exchange for
legal services . . . raise[s] potential conflicts of interest with the client and may adversely
affect the attorney's independence and judgment").
143. "In a Sept[ember] 10 letter to Michael Eisenberg, the SEC's deputy general counsel,
[P]rofessor Richard Painter... suggest[ed] that the agency should examine 'conflicts created
by unorthodox methods of compensating lawyers .... .' Otis Bilodeau, After Tyco, GCs
Role Under Scrutiny, Legal Times, Sept. 26, 2002, at 1. Susan Koniak notes that stock
options "'push GCs toward the measurable'-work that clearly impacts company
profitability-and away from 'work that makes the company healthy and not corrupt."' Id.
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underlying shares) within days after they vested, earning him millions of
dollars."' 144 Some believe this is circumstantial evidence of his concealed
knowledge that the stock price was artificially inflated. Or perhaps he just
knew that his Tyco days were numbered.

In contrast to outside counsel, inside counsel is a mere employee.
Obedience pressures in the firm context will be substantial, so we should
not be surprised by the banal tendency to listen to superiors. Also, given
the stark financial self-interest, which is threatened by asking too many
questions or being viewed as obstructionist, we should not be surprised that
145
inside counsel regularly succumbs to the situation.
2. Faithful Agent
a. Alignment Pressures
Above, I argued that the inside lawyer is a mere employee. But, far from
being ordinary, the lawyer is a particular type of employee whose
fundamental self-conception is that of faithful agent of the firm. This
agency relationship is another crucial feature of the ethical ecology. Like
all agents, the lawyer has to justify her behavior to her client, which creates
pressures to align her views with those of her client. This alignment
pressure can distort the lawyer's judgments. How warped her judgments
are depends on how closely aligned she feels with her client. How closely
aligned she feels depends, in part, on her self-conceptualization of her role.
Lawyers can be professionally molded to accommodate various conceptions
of lawyering, with some conceptions creating greater alignment pressures
toward clients than others. The effect of all these alignment pressures is
that lawyers' ethical judgments will sway in the client's favor.
As a threshold matter, we should be clear who the client is. Formally, the
client is the organization, not its "constituents,"' 146 such as the board, the
entity's other employees or co-agents, or even the shareholders. Of course,
the organization is entirely fictitious and can only act through the flesh and
blood of its constituents. Therefore, in practice, the inside lawyer suspends
this fiction and interacts with senior management (who are vested with the
authority to direct her activities) as her de facto client or principal, although
they are merely co-agents. Both outside and inside lawyers refer to and
think of these co-agents as "clients," 147 and the Model Rules strongly
144. Press Release, Tyco International, Ltd., supra note 32.
145. Part II.B, infra, explains in greater detail the mechanisms by which these pressures

translate into unethical action.
146. Hazard, supra note 87, at 1013.
147. This tendency to conflate the corporate client with management is clearly
demonstrated in a statement made by the General Counsel of ACC: "[W]e now have
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support the identification of senior managers as the lawyer's de facto
clients. 14 8 Also, with the exception of independent counsel, 14 9 all inside
lawyers report, either directly or indirectly, to these co-agents. This
mismatch between the beneficiary of the lawyer's fiduciary duty (the
corporation) and the beneficiary of the lawyer's reporting duty
(management) is inherently problematic for the state of professional norms.
Auditing vignettes study. Now consider recent research on the impact of
roles on the judgments of professional auditors. 150 Don Moore, George
Loewenstein, Lloyd Tanlu, and Max Bazerman surveyed 139 auditors
employed full-time by one of the Big Four U.S. accounting firms. 15 1 Each
participant was given five intentionally ambiguous auditing vignettes 152 and
asked to judge the accounting for each. Half the participants were asked to
assume that they had been retained by the firm they were auditing; the rest
were asked to assume that they had been retained by an outside investor that
was considering investing money in the firm. The firm's unaudited
financial statements needed to be evaluated by all participants.
For all five vignettes, the auditors were on average about thirty percent
more likely to find that the accounting behind a company's financial reports
complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") if they
lawyers who do not represent the clients that they are retained by, but who represent the
public. That is the definition of a prosecutor or a policeman-not the definition of a
corporate lawyer." Panel, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 16, at 669; see also, Nelson &
Nielsen, supra note 96, at 463 (noting that, "[i]n many interviews, the corporate counsel
refer to various businesspeople and business units within their corporation as their 'clients,'
even though technically both lawyers and the business personnel are employees of the same
organization").
148. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism,Legal Ethics,
and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 299, 308-10 (criticizing the pre2003 Model Rules as contributing to lawyers' alignment with management even in the face
of managerial misconduct). A recent survey of inside counsel revealed that at least twenty
percent felt that their company's culture emphasized that senior management was the client.
Chad R. Brown, In-House Counsel Responsibilities in the Post-Enron Environment, ACCA
Docket, May 2003, at 96-97 (reporting the results of ACC's survey of 1216 members, who
are all inside counsel). The survey was conducted in 2002 by Widmeyer Research and
Polling for the ACC. Press Release, Ass'n of Corporate Counsel, In-house Counsel Poll on
Corporate
Scandals
(Oct.
21,
2002),
available
at
http://www.acca.comabout/press/item.php?key=20021021_15263.
149. Independent counsel is often retained by the Board of Directors.
150. Don A. Moore et al., Conflict of Interest and the Unconscious Intrusion of Bias
(Harvard Negotiations, Orgs., and Mkts. Unit, Working Paper No. 02-40, 2002) [hereinafter
Moore et al., Unconscious Intrusion of Bias]. This study is also referenced by Max H.
Bazerman, George Loewenstein, and Don A. Moore in their article Why Good Accountants
Do Bad Audits, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov. 2002, at 97, 100.
151. The average age of the participants was twenty-nine, with an average of five years
working as an auditor. Apparently, neither age nor years of auditing experience affected the
results. Moore et al., Unconscious Intrusionof Bias, supra note 150, at 12.
152. Each vignette depicted a situation in which the accounting issues are not clearly
addressed by current rule-based accounting standards. The issues included the recognition
of intangible assets on the financial statements, the restructuring of debt with dilutive
securities, the recognition versus deferral of revenues, capitalization versus expensing of
expenditures, and the treatment of research and development costs on the financial
statements. See id. at 11.
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were playing the role of auditor for that firm (as opposed to representing the
potential investor), demonstrating substantial bias in auditors' judgments
when asked to suppose a hypothetical role with a client. 153 If a mere
hypothetical relationship with a client could generate such great distortions
in auditing judgment, 154 one can only imagine the degree of distortion that
might exist in a longstanding relationship between a lawyer (acting in her
capacity as faithful agent) and her de facto client.
Accountability. Why were the judgments of the firm's auditors so
grossly distorted in favor of their client? The authors of the auditing
vignettes study explain these results by focusing on the mechanism of
"accountability" in the agent-principal relationship.' 55 Accountabilityhaving to justify one's views to others-is at the crux of the relationship.
Agents are, by definition, accountable to their principals; they must justify
their actions and views to their principals. Accountants and lawyers, as
agents, must justify their views and decisions to management in terms that
management understands and values.
Accountability can thus produce a chameleon-like shift in behavior in the
principal's direction. Other studies have demonstrated that even a weak
form of accountability between strangers can bias subjects in adopting
public positions that are more closely aligned with the preferences of those
to whom they are accountable. 156 If we know we are speaking before a
bunch of liberals, we perform more liberal talk; in front of conservatives,
we talk conservatively.
Accountability may produce an even deeper alignment. In a follow-up
study, Don A. Moore et al. found that role manipulation-that is, whether
the subject worked as "auditor" for either the seller or buyer-had a
significant effect in aligning private beliefs about the client's accounting in
favor of their hypothetical client.157 In other words, affiliated agents tend to
automatically adopt the principal's perspective of the world, which is a
"partisan point of view." Moreover, once the agent adopts a partisan

153. Id. at 13.

154. Id. at 14 (noting that a possible explanation for the substantial effect derived from a
weak manipulation is that "participants were familiar with the role of auditor, and so were
able to easily put themselves in the role of being employed by, and accountable to, the client
firm").
155. See id. at 5.
156. Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: Toward a
Social Contingency Model, 25 Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. 331, 341, 343

(1992) (noting that "subjects accountable to a liberal audience expressed more liberal views
whereas subjects accountable to a conservative audience expressed more conservative
ones"); see also Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor
Independence:

Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling 21 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,

Working
Paper
No.
03115,
2005),
available
at
http:llpapers.ssrn.com/so]3/papers.cfm?abstractid=667363 (noting that, in a pre-decisional
setting, accountability demands strategic attitude shifting-which need not be conscious).
157. Moore et al., Unconscious Intrusion of Bias, supra note 150, at 19 (noting that
auditors working for the seller reported the company to be more valuable than did auditors
working for the buyer).
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affiliation with the principal, "it can be difficult if not impossible to undo
158
that encoding or to retrieve unbiased information from memory."'
Strength of accountability. As explained above, an agent's accountability
to her principal produces alignment. It is reasonable to suppose that the
stronger the accountability, for whatever reasons, the greater the alignment.
What accounts for the strength of accountability? There are multiple
binding factors that determine the strength of the agency relationship.
Many of these factors are ones already identified as inherent in the "mere
employee" relationship. For example, stark financial ties to the principal
will increase accountability to the principal. 159 Evidence now suggests that
social ties also have that effect.' 60 Given the day-to-day social interaction
between management and inside counsel, this is another reason why
accountability to management should be strong.
In addition, the characteristic activities of lawyering may also contribute
to the strength of accountability. As Gerald Postema argues, unlike the
physician or auto mechanic, the lawyer "act[s] in the place of the client,
[which] require[s] the direct involvement of the lawyer's moral facultiesi.e., his capacities to deliberate, reason, argue, and act in the public
arena."' 16 1 As the client's agent, the lawyer speaks on behalf of the client
and enters into relationships with others in the name of the client. 162 What
the lawyer does is typically attributable to the client. 163 "Thus, at the
invitation of the client, the lawyer becomes an extension of the legal, and to
an extent the moral, personality of the client." 164 Consistently acting out
behavior may have far-reaching consequences. As cognitive dissonance
theory predicts, our internal attitudes are likely to shift toward the position
implied by our behavior, thereby making our behavior appear more
justifiable. 16 5 Thus, it is entirely plausible, as Karl Llewellyn suggested,
that the most powerful determinant of the attitudes and social orientation of
166
lawyers is the work they do.
158. Id. at 27 (citation omitted); see also Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of
Fairness in Bargaining,85 Am. Econ. Rev. 1337, 1342 (1995) (criticizing the "economic"
view, held by Richard Posner, that information facilitates settlement because it should cause
parties' expectations to converge).
159. Moore et al., Unconscious Intrusion of Bias, supra note 150, at 21.

160. Id. at 27 (concluding that social ties between auditors and their clients may be more
of a problem than financial incentives per se).
161. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.

Rev. 63, 76 (1980). The first exposition of the role-differentiated morality of the lawyerclient relationship (the "amoral professional role") was given by Richard Wasserstrom. See
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. 1, 14
(1975), reprinted in The Ethics of Lawyers 16 (David Luban ed., 1994).

162.
163.
164.
165.

Postema, supra note 161, at 77.
Id.
Id.
Kunda, supra note 65, at 216-20, 533.

166. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and ProfessionalAutonomy:

Social Values

and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 527 (1985) (citing
Karl Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What Result?, 167 Annals Am. Acad. 177, 177

(1933)). Karl Llewellyn states,

1012

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

b. Role Ideology
Another key variable in determining the strength of an agent's
accountability to her principal is her understanding of the nature of her role
as attorney and the ideological or normative commitments that such a role
entails-role ideology. 16 7 Ideologies about the law come with their own
particular normative vision of lawyering and the lawyer's role. Conversely,
roles come "ready-made," packaged by society, 168 with their own sets of
ideologies or "normative guidelines and values that give meaning and shape
behavior."' 69 Even an ideology that purports to view the lawyer's role in
"morally neutral" or "agnostic" terms still makes a normative choice that
we should view her role in such terms.
Role ideologies serve two functions. First, they constitute nontrivial ex
ante situational influences that define the universe of socially acceptable
norms for that role, to whom or what the lawyer is accountable, and what
degree of alignment to (or independence from) the de facto principal is
socially appropriate. When acting in accordance with a role, "one simply
acts as others expect one to act."' 7° As put by Postema, "Although there is
a personal or idiosyncratic element in any person's conception,
nevertheless, because the role of lawyer is largely socially defined,
significant public or shared elements are also involved." 17 1 Thus, socially
defined role ideologies can lend ideological legitimation to a given style of
lawyering (for example, lawyering based on "client supremacy"), making it
a more palatable option. 172 Over time, a lawyer may come to identify with
a particular role ideology and come to believe that her unethical choices are
in fact entirely consistent, and even possibly endorsed, by such role
ideology.
Second, even if role ideologies do not have a significant ex ante
situational influence on behavior in any given case, they can serve to
legitimate any post hoc rationalizations of unethical behavior 173 by framing

Now, any man's interests, any man's outlook, are shaped in greatest part by what
he does. . . .Hence the practice of corporation law not only works for business
men toward business ends, but develops within itself a business point of viewtoward the work to be done, toward the value of the work to the community,
indeed, toward the way in which to do the work.
Id. (citing Llewellyn, supra, at 177).
167. The term "role ideology" is borrowed from "gender-role ideology" which refers to
prescriptive beliefs about roles and behaviors for women and men, with the dimensions
defined by "traditional" and "feminist" poles.
168. See Postema, supra note 161, at 74.
169. Hewlin, supra note 136, at 638.
170. See Postema, supra note 161, at 74.
171. See id. at 73 n.26.
172. Such a "choice" may not be a rational choice in the traditional sense. See my
comments below in Part II.B.
173. In a post-decisional setting, accountability demands encourage post-decisional
bolstering and the selective generation of reasons to justify what one has already done.
Moore et al., supra note 156, at 21.
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the ethical problem in a manner that makes it more attractive to act
unethically. Thus,
[b]y taking shelter in the role, the individual places the responsibility for
all of his acts at the door of the institutional author of the role.
...For the person who [fully] identifies with [her] role, the response
"because I am a lawyer," or more generally "because that's
my job,"
174
suffices as a complete answer to the question "why do that?"
This next step might be that rationalization transforms into real attitude
change. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that our internal attitudes are
175
likely to shift toward the position implied by our actions.
In modern legal culture, various role ideologies are available. 176 At one
extreme is the "officer of the court" view, the "grand Brandeisian vision of
a public role for lawyers that contemplates a broader professional obligation
than to act only in the client's (or the lawyer's) self-interest.' 7 7 Under this
model, inside counsel, simply by virtue of being a lawyer, would be
accountable, not only to her client or co-agent, but also to the public. In
this world, the alignment generated by accountability to the de facto
principal might be partial (at best), since lawyers would not only have to
consider management's (perhaps fraudulent) goals, but also the public
welfare. Of course, outside of the legal academy, most lawyers do not live
in this world.178
At the other extreme, the lawyer's role is shaped by a "law is the enemy"
or "libertarian-antinomian"
philosophy,
which
sees regulation
contemptuously as nothing more than a tax on business, and a hindrance to
the wheels of private commerce. 17 9 This view is reflected in President
Ronald Reagan's inaugural address statements: "[G]overnment is not the
solution to our problem; government is the problem." 180 At Enron, such a
view was endorsed by management: Senior managers conducted a skit in
which one of the themes was deceiving the SEC. 18 1 Under this view, the

174. See Postema, supra note 161, at 74-75.
175. See Kunda, supra note 65, at 216-20, 533.
176. My summary of the various role ideologies borrows much from Robert W. Gordon.
See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate CounselorAfter Enron,
35 Conn. L. Rev. 1185, 1191-1207 (2003) (summarizing various views of the law and
lawyers' role).
177. See Gilson, supra note 80, at 871. The first sentence of the ABA's Preamble to the
Model Rules states that "[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." Model
Rules of Prof I Conduct pmbl. (1998).
178. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 39, 43-44
(1989) (arguing that the characterization of lawyers as officers of the court under
contemporary law is largely disingenuous).
179. Gordon, supra note 176, at 1191.
180. Lou Cannon, Clash of Temperament, Smithsonian, Oct. 2004, at 63, 64.
181. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Second
Annual General Counsel Roundtable: Tone at the Top: Getting it Right (Dec. 3, 2004),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120304smc.htm.
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lawyer's role is to assist the client in devising creative ways to circumvent
the law, regardless of any harm to third parties or the underlying purposes
of the law. As the view that is most hostile to law, the alignment to the de
facto principal (who favors unlawful actions) would be strong.
In the middle, two agency-centered conceptions characterize how some
inside lawyers view their role. One traditional conception of lawyering that
has found tremendous longstanding support in the organized bar] 82 and the
rules of professional ethics is that the lawyer should be committed to the
"aggressive and single-minded pursuit of the client's objectives" within, but
all the way up to, the limits of the law. 183 Her zealous advocacy should not
be constrained by her own moral sentiments or commitments, but only by
the "objective, identifiable bounds of the law." 184 Thus, under this model
of partisan loyalty, the lawyer is instructed to interpret legal boundaries
from the perspective of maximizing client interest. 185 In this clientcentered world, the alignment to the de facto principal would also be strong.
Another middle-of-the-road ideology that most accurately reflects the
type of lawyering that carries on day-to-day in corporate legal departments
is the "agnostic" view that law is a "neutral constraint,"] 86 and, accordingly,
that the lawyer's role is that of an amoral risk assessor. 18 7 This view is
characterized by the lack of moral imperative to comply with the law 18 8 and
the lawyer's moral detachment from the law. The lawyer's role is
182. The conception of lawyering as "zealous advocacy" has been the basis for the
organized bar's resistance to any change in the rules. See Gordon, supra note 176, at 1194.
183. See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Canon 7 (1980) ("A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."); Postema, supra note 161, at
73.
184. This role ideology encourages, at the very least, a degree of ethical opportunism. See
Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 614 (stating that the traditional and accepted
standard within the legal profession is that "[a]s long as what lawyer and client do is lawful,
it is the client who is morally accountable, not the lawyer"); David B. Wilkins, Legal
Realism for Lawyers, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 468, 473, 505 (1990) (arguing that legal realism's
indeterminacy thesis and traditional model of partisan loyalty effectively encourage the
lawyer to exploit doctrinal gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities to the narrow advantage of their
clients).
185. See Wilkins, supra note 184, at 473.
186. This view is captured well by a statement of one in-house lawyer:
Our job is to assess risks, and it's the businessperson's job to make decisions
about risks, what risks they are willing to assume. Now, having said that, I also
think of it as my job to make sure that the decision about what risks to assume is
being made at the appropriate level.
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 96, at 473.
187. Gordon, supra note 176, at 1192.
188. This lack of moral imperative is reflected in the comments of Professor (Judge)
Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel regarding corporate law compliance:
"Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when violations
are profitable to the firm .... We put to one side laws concerning violence or other acts
thought to be malum in se." Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by
Targets of Tender Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982) (citations omitted). For
a thorough summary and critique of this agnostic view of law, see Cynthia A. Williams,
Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265 (1998).
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diminished to that of a counselor who games the rules to work around the
constraints and lower "tariffs" or "taxes" as much as possible.1 89 While this
view is not openly hostile to the law, it is not respectful of it either, and thus
corrodes the legitimating force of the law. The lack of a moral imperative
to observe the law means that noncompliance is a feasible, even reasonable,
business option.
The actions of Nancy Temple, inside counsel at Arthur Andersen,
exemplify the "agnostic" view of law. Although Temple was fully aware of
an informal SEC investigation into Enron and a Vinson & Elkins
investigation into Watkins's allegations, she sent an e-mail to Arthur
Andersen's Houston practice director, reminding him to comply with their
document retention policy. 190 As a result of her reminder, a significant
number of documents relating to Enron were shredded. Unfortunately, it is
"unlawful to destroy documents if they are subject to discovery or relevant
to a 'clearly foreseeable' legal action."' 19 1 The jury convicted Andersen of
192
obstructing the SEC's Enron investigation by destroying documents.
On the one hand, Temple's advice seems unremarkable and in line with
"the kind of advice that lawyers routinely give."'193 On the other hand, the
fact that it may be "routine" is problematic. Instead of urging her director
to comply with the law and refrain from document destruction, she shows
complete indifference to what he ultimately and actually decides to do with
the evidence. It is no wonder that documents were shredded after her
advice was given. Meanwhile, Temple escapes responsibility because her
e-mail is carefully worded in a manner that does not explicitly counsel his
breaking the law.
This "agnostic" view of the law has taken on a distinctly pro-business
orientation, where "efficiency" (rather than "adversarialism") is the
paramount ideal of the profession. 194 As described by Mark Suchman, the
"good lawyer provides a cost-effective vehicle for his or her client's
specific interests, and in doing so, he or she also facilitates the efficient

189. Gordon, supra note 176, at 1192.
190. The e-mail states, "It might be useful to consider reminding the engagement team of
our documentation and retention policy. It will be helpful to make sure that we have
complied with that policy." E-mail from Nancy A. Temple, Counsel, Arthur Andersen, to
Michael C. Odom, Audit Partner, Arthur Andersen (Oct. 12, 2001, 08:53 CST), reprintedin
Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: Hearing Before the H.
Reps.
Comm.
on
Energy,
107th
Cong.
1,
45
(2002),
available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/house05ch 107.html.
191. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Baton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8 Stan. J.L.

Bus. & Fin. 9, 24 (2002).
192. For an in-depth account of the jury's basis for conviction, and the prominent role of
Nancy Temple in Arthur Andersen's conviction, see Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 7, at
692-711. The judgment was recently overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. See James
Vicini, High Court Overturns Andersen's Enron Conviction, Reuters, May 31, 2005,
available at http://www.ezilon.comlinformation/printer_5179.shtml.
193. Stephen Gillers, The Flaw in the Andersen Verdict, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2002, at

A23.
194. See Suchman, supra note 97, at 871.
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functioning of the economy as a whole." 195 This view is exacerbated by the
American Bar Association's ("ABA") official pronouncements that
"lawyers serve the public best by serving the private interests of their
clients with maximum zeal, in effect treating lawyers like Adam Smith's
tradesmen, who count on an invisible hand to transmute their pursuit of
196
private advantage into a benefit for the community as a whole."
As reported in an empirical study on inside counsel 9 7 performed by
Robert Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen, 19 8 many of the inside lawyers
surveyed viewed the law as "a source of profits, an instrument to be used
aggressively in the marketplace."' 199 They self-identified strongly with their
role as company employees and only secondarily with the legal profession.
These in-house legal "entrepreneurs" 20 0 emphasized the business values in
their work and embraced their mission, not just in providing high-quality
legal advice, but in "adding value" to the firm. Like their business
colleagues, they were "literally absorbed in a high-pressure corporate
environment, '20 1 as reflected in the corporate obsession with the bottom
2
line. 20
Robert Rosen has observed that, instead of being gatekeepers, 20 3 some
inside counsel have tailored their services to the operating rule: "[Y]ou will
be employed by us as long as you add value to the organization, and you are
continuously responsible for finding ways to add value." 20 4 And what
could "adding value" mean? "Adding value" means that inside lawyers
195. Id.
196. Anthony T. Kronman, The Law as a Profession, in Ethics in Practice: Lawyers'
Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation 29, 37 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
197. Nelson and Nielsen interviewed fifty-four informants of twenty-two corporations,
forty-two of whom are inside lawyers, and twelve of whom are nonlawyer managers. See
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 96, at 460-61.
198. A brief word about methodology. "Counsel" was treated as a default category. If
the participant, during his interview, did not meet certain criteria specified for "cop" or
"entrepreneur," he was classified as "counsel."
A [participant] was classified as a cop if he or she indicated that (a) they offered
only legal advice and avoided giving business advice, (b) they played an active
gatekeeping role (marked by an affirmative obligation to monitor compliance, the
ability to say no to business clients, and the ability to go over the head of
management), and that (c) they did not market the legal function within the
corporation. A [participant] was coded as an entrepreneur if he or she (a) offered
non-legal advice on business decisions, and (b) marketed the legal function.
Id. at 468.
199. Id. at 466. An example of lawyering in this vein might be an aggressive trademark
litigation strategy where the company uses the lawyer's services to sue small defendants on
weak legal grounds, aiming to intimidate or outspend small defendants into forfeiting a valid
trademark or trade name.
200. A significant minority (thirty-three percent) fit the definition of "entrepreneurs,"
seeing themselves mainly as business persons. Not only did entrepreneurial lawyers
outnumber cops by two to one, but also-based on the interviews-"the center of gravity
within the counsel category [was] closer to entrepreneurs than to cops." Id. at 469.
201. Id. at 490.
202. Id. at 472.
203. See Rosen, supra note 91, at 668.
204. See id. at 681.
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must not be content with giving legal advice that merely tells the co-agent
what is legally permissible. 20 5 "Adding value" might include advice about
how to circumvent inconvenient law, or at least doing everything possible
to avoid telling the co-agent that he cannot do something simply because it
is illegal. 20 6 "Adding value" carries the7 view that corporate compliance is
20
ultimately a "risk management" issue.
These empirical findings suggest that the agnostic view of the law (with
the focus on "adding value") has become the dominant role ideology for
inside counsel in the twenty-first century. This ideology is entirely
consistent with the rhetoric of most business management.20 8 And, as
Milgram showed, agents and subordinates readily accept the "definition of
20 9
the situation" advanced by their de facto principals and superiors.
Accepting management's "definition of the situation" means accepting
management's framing of the inside lawyer's role and responsibilities.
What that often leads to is a segmentation of compliance responsibilities.
Although inside counsel's duties include a prominent role in corporate
compliance, it is business management that guards the right to decide
whether to comply with the law, which is seen as the ultimate risk10
management decision. 2

205. Note the following excerpt from the 2004 ACC conference:
We must provide advice which anticipates and explains the "how to" of preferred
alternatives rather than solely the rationales for "why not" for disfavored, illegal,
or unethical courses of action ....

And we must practice preventive law when

counseling concerning the appropriate management [of] legal risk ... So we must
learn from our experiences . . . and continue to rely on the processes and

fundamentals that ensure that we are prepared for whatever may come, while
gaining and carrying out our roles as key members of the corporate team.
Ass'n Corporate Counsel, The New Face of In-house Counsel, 2004 ACC Conference,
http://www.acca.comlam/04/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
206. See id. The ACC's statements are in sharp contrast to the view of a lawyer's role by
lawyer and statesman Elihu Root, who said, "'[A]bout half the practice of a decent lawyer
consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop."' 1 Philip C.
Jessup, Elihu Root 133 (1938) (quoting Elihu Root).
207. Robert Rosen's research on Enron and other "redesigned corporations" shows that
compliance decisions are viewed as ultimate risk management decisions to be made by
business executives. Lawyers are used by project teams as hired guns to assess legal risk
and "think creatively." The most crucial consequence is that noncompliance becomes an
option. See Robert Eli Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of
Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1157, 1169, 1172 (2003).
208. See, e.g., id. at 1169 (quoting a senior executive who stated that "[f]rom a
[transactional] lawyer, what I want is quality of work: bringing up good issues and pertinent
points to defend our side of the equation"); Rosen, supra note 91, at 661 (adopting a
demand-side perspective and noting that corporate legal departments have been reengineered
and, thus, transformed by organizational development consultants to mirror multidisciplinary
practice firms).
209. See Nelson, supra note 166, at 527 (noting, based on empirical data gathered in a
case study of four Chicago law firms, that lawyers come to adopt the positions of the
corporate clients whom they represent).
210. See Rosen, supra note 207, at 1172.
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While being morally detached from the co-agent's compliance decisions,
the inside lawyer can still excel at being a legal technician. 2 11 She can take
tremendous pride in her craft, regardless of the ultimate purposes of the
client. In a reverse Machiavellian sense, the means justify the ends.
Potentially, this "moral independence" 2 12 from her client psychologically
relieves her of any felt responsibility to "follow up" on issues; she can just
take management's word that "it will be taken care of." She punts it. That
is what Donald M. Feuerstein, former CLO at Salomon Brothers, Inc., did
when he failed to follow up on a number of false bids made by his company
in an auction of U.S. treasury securities. 2 13 The lawyer feels she has
satisfied her job duties by giving the correct legal advice, even though she
may learn at the water cooler that, in fact, her advice was not taken. Now
all that is left to do is to memorialize that advice to the recipient in an
attorney-client privileged "CYA" 2 14 memorandum.

Compounded on top of obedience pressures, alignment pressures,
mediated by the mechanism of accountability, have a distorting effect on
the judgments and attitudes of inside lawyers. Social psychologist Philip
Tetlock observes that "decision-makers can be no better as well as no worse
than the constituencies to whom they are accountable." 2 15 Speaking about
inside counsel, the same point is rephrased by Geoffrey Hazard, who notes
with a tone of stark realism that "[c]orporate lawyers cannot be distinctly
more virtuous than the corporate management by which they are
2 16
employed.

211. Milgram observed the tendency of his subjects to become so consumed by the
narrow technical aspects of the task that they lost sight of potential, broader consequences
(e.g., the heart failure of the learner). Milgram, supra note 40, at 7. Gerald Postema also
notes the relationship between moral detachment and becoming a "legal technician."
Postema, supra note 161, at 80. Commenting on the Milgram experiments, J.P. Sabini and
Maury Silver note that Milgram's subjects confused technical responsibility (that is, the
experimenter's accountability for the conduct of the experiment itself) and moral
responsibility. See Miller, supra note 53, at 187-88.
212. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 507 (1994) (noting that the combined principles of loyalty
and moral independence permit lawyers to go to extremes on behalf of their clients and also
grant lawyers the authority to set the only limits on those extremes).
213. See Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31554, 52 SEC 93 (Dec. 3, 1992). In
a report that sets forth the SEC's views on the responsibilities of lawyers and compliance
officers, the SEC stated that Feuerstein was "obligated to take affirmative steps to ensure"
that misconduct was adequately addressed. Id. at 113. Such steps might include "disclosure
of the matter to the entity's board of directors, resignation from [the representation], or
disclosure to regulatory authorities." Id. at 114. In this case, the SEC demanded of
Feuerstein an obligation that was not expressly required by the Model Rules.
214. "Cover your ass."
215. Tetlock, supra note 156, at 349.
216. Hazard, supra note 87, at 1017. Although "virtue" is literally a dispositional quality,
in this statement, Professor Hazard demonstrates his sophisticated understanding of the
situational context of inside counsel.
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3. Team Player
a. Conformity Pressures
The above situational characteristics, of employee and agent status,
emphasized the consequences of vertical hierarchy. But the inside lawyer is
not only an employee or faithful agent, but also a "team player," a loyal
member of the corporate club. As such, horizontal social pressures further
incline the countenancing of unethical behavior.
In July 2000, when the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission had
tentatively approved a recall plan of defective sprinkler systems
manufactured by a Tyco subsidiary, Belnick wisely recommended that
Tyco offer consumers replacements for faulty sprinkler heads. 2 17 But to
Belnick's surprise, CEO Kozlowski accused Belnick of intentionally siding
with the government: "Do you work for the government? Or Tyco? ' '2 18 In
chiding Belnick, Kozlowski questioned Belnick's loyalty to the corporate
team and his fitness as a corporate citizen. Serving the company meant not
conceding to government's wishes-even if doing so would be good and
fair to consumers and the long-term interest of Tyco. After all, in
Kozlowski's view, the government is the enemy. Kozlowski's "us vs.
them" mentality left very little to the ethical discretion of the general
counsel.
In addition to obedience and alignment pressures, Belnick was subject to
considerable conformity pressures that arise from personal relationships
with colleagues and peers. "Conformity" is "a change in belief or behavior
in response to real or imagined group pressure when there is no direct
request to comply with the group nor any reasons given to justify the
behavior change." 2 19
Although Kozlowski's demand for "take no
prisoners" loyalty was rather explicit, he implicitly appealed to Belnick's
social identity with a particular group--the corporate team at Tyco.
Research on conformity confirms the enormous power of these group
pressures.
Half a century ago, Solomon Asch conducted a series of experiments
intended to demonstrate that conformity to the opinions of strangers is not
220
likely if the judgment stimulus is straightforward and unambiguous.
Asch recruited male college students for the stated purpose of participating
in an "experiment on visual judgment. '2 21 Participating in groups of seven
217. Miriam Rozen, Losing it All, Corp. Counsel, Feb. 2003, at 66, 70.
218. Id. at70.
219. Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 55.
220. Ross & Nisbett, supra note 117, at 31 (noting Asch's initial expectation that the vast
majority of his subjects would remain independent in the face of the unanimous majority);
Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 56.
221. This summary of the Asch study is compiled from Solomon E. Asch, Social
Psychology 450-59 (1952) [hereinafter Asch, Social Psychology]; Ross & Nisbett, supra
note 117, at 30-35; Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 40, at 56; Solomon E. Asch, Studies of
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to nine persons, they were asked to use their independent judgment and
indicate which of three "comparison" lines displayed on one card (at the
front of the classroom) matched the length of a so-called "standard" line
displayed on another card. All but one of the students were confederates of
the experimenter who announced their answers according to a prearranged
script. The sole real subject was nearly always seated in the next-to-last
seat and, thus, announced his judgment after hearing most of the
confederates' answers. On certain key trials, the confederates all chose the
same wrong line. When faced with this obvious discrepancy between the
evidence of his own senses and the divergent group consensus, how did the
subject react?
Notwithstanding the simple and objective nature of this task, one-third of
the answers in the key trials of Asch's baseline experiment 2 22 were wrong
and in line with those of the confederates, in contrast to a control group
whose judgments (made privately in writing) were "virtually free of
and consistently
error." 223 Only one-fifth of subjects never conformed
224
remained independent in face of group pressures.
Although Asch maintained that his experiments investigated the
conditions for both independence and lack of independence amidst group
pressure, 225 what has captured the fascination of most psychologists is the
stunning finding that, at least for a minority of subjects, a group norm can
influence behavior, even in the face of clear, objective standards. 2 26 Group
consensus is a powerful facet of the situation, and the observed tendency to
reach agreement with the group is a "dynamic requirementof the situation,"
to use Asch's words. 2 27 To be clear, this is not to say that "people are
sheep," 228 although one subject did describe his actions as a product of

Independence and Conformity, 70 Psychol. Monographs: Gen. and Applied 1 (1956)
[hereinafter Asch, Studies of Independence].
222. Asch, Studies on Independence, supra note 221, at 9 (noting that the proportion of
errors was less than one percent of the total number of critical estimates). Data reported
relate solely to Asch's baseline experiment, which Asch calls "Experiment I." Asch, Social
Psychology, supra note 221, at 457.
223. Asch, Social Psychology, supra note 221, at 457 tbl.I; Asch, Studies on
Independence, supra note 221, at 9.
224. Asch, Social Psychology, supra note 221, at 458.
225. Asch notes that "[i]t is consequently unduly narrowing to emphasize submission, to
the neglect of the not inconsiderable powers persons demonstrate on occasion for acting
according to conviction and rising above group passion." Asch, Studies of Independence,
supra note 221, at 3.
226. Asch, Social Psychology, supra note 221, at 483 (noting that "[i]n different ways
and with different strengths the situations studied showed a 'pull toward the group'; changes
of estimation went overwhelmingly in the majority direction"); Zimbardo & Leippe, supra
note 40, at 57; see also Ronald Friend, Yvonne Rafferty & Dana Bramel, A Puzzling
Misinterpretation of the Asch 'Conformity' Study, 20 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29 (1990)
(arguing that psychologists have mistakenly and increasingly accentuated the role of
conformity and underestimated that of independence in interpreting Asch's findings).
227. Asch, Social Psychology, supra note 221, at 484.
228. See Ross & Nisbett, supra note 117, at 33 (noting that the "people are sheep"
characterization illustrates the fundamental attribution error). Asch asserted that this
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"sheer force of habit. 2 29
Many more subjects experienced deep
"perplexity and bewilderment" when encountering a group's firm but
230
erroneous judgments.
The motivations underlying conformity are many. For purposes of this
Article, I would like to focus on the one that is systematically
underappreciated: the normal desire to avoid the stigma of dissenting from
the group. 23 1 Asch's post-experimental interviews with the subjects reveal
that, even for those subjects who consistently remained independent, the
threat of being stigmatized as a dissident loomed large. The following
examples of subjects' self-reports were typical of many reactions:
"I felt like a Malik or Molotov .
'2 32

.

.

. The stigma of being a

nonconformist-being stubborn.
"[It] would be amusing if I turned out to be right, but if wrong, sort of
233
lonely feeling."
"I felt the need to conform .... Mob psychology builds up on you. It
234
was more pleasant to agree than to disagree."
235
"We all want to be with the bandwagon."
"They were strangers. It was like being in a strange country. 'When in
Rome you do as the Romans."'

236

"striving to come nearer to the group" was "far from having its origin in blindly imitative
tendencies." Asch, Social Psychology, supra note 221, at 484.
229. Asch, Studies on Independence,supra note 221, at 41.
230. Asch, Social Psychology, supra note 221, at 454. Some subjects fidgeted in their
seats, turned around, whispered to their neighbors, smiled sheepishly, or stood up to look
more closely at the cards. Id.
231. Asch concluded that one of the underlying motivations for subjects' conforming
behavior was the avoidance of group disapproval:
"Subjects expressed fear of
conspicuousness, of public exposure of personal defects, and of group disapproval; they felt
the loneliness of their situation." Asch, Studies on Independence, supra note 221, at 70. The
most typical reason for errors given was "the painfulness of standing alone against the
majority." Id. Some subjects were "dominated by an imperious desire not to appear
different, apparently out of fear of revealing a general and undefined defect." Id. The term
"stigma avoidance" has been coined to describe "efforts organization members take to avoid
character blemishes associated with exposing wrong doings, or displaying objection to
wrongdoings they witness at work." Patricia Faison Hewlin & Ashleigh Shelby Rosette,
Stigma Avoidance: A Precursor to Workplace Discrimination 8 (August 2004) (unpublished
paper, on file with author) (presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, New
Orleans, LA) (discussing stigma avoidance in the context of workplace discrimination as a
motivating factor for organizational silence). The definition of "stigma" that I adopt is from
sociologist Erving Goffman, who defined "stigma" as an attribute of a person that is deeply
discrediting, reducing him or her "in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted,
discounted one." See Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled
Identity 3 (1963).
232. Asch, Studies on Independence, supra note 221, at 31.
233. Id. at 37.
234. Id. at 32, 47.
235. Id. at 32, 46.
236. Id. at 46.
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"I did not want to be apart from the group; I did not want to look like a
but my feeling
fool .... Scientifically speaking, I was acting improperly,
23 7
of not wanting to contradict the group overcame me."
"Here was a group; they had a definite idea; my idea disagreed; this
238
might arouse anger."
239
"When I disagreed I felt outside the group."
"I felt disturbed, puzzled, separated, like an outcast from the rest. Every
time I disagreed I was beginning to wonder if I wasn't beginning to look
240
funny."
What significance do Asch's findings have for inside lawyers? If
subjects were distressed about following the evidence of their eyes and
dissenting from a group of strangers, one can imagine how difficult it may
be for a corporate employee to dissent from the position of her colleagues
on a complex legal matter.
The Asch experiments suggest that the stigmatization of dissent from a
group's opinion is a normal by-product of group identity-however the
group is defined.
Countless studies have demonstrated that "mere
categorization" of people into different nominal groups, even in the absence
of any close relationship among group members, can elicit tendencies to
associate positive attributes toward in-group members (in-group favoritism)
and associate negative attributes toward out-group members (out-group
derogation or discrimination). 24 1 This tendency is so robust that even the
most arbitrary and seemingly inconsequential group classifications can have
24 2
real behavioral consequences.
As the now-abundant literature on whistle-blowers demonstrates, the act
of questioning management's actions-or "whistle-blowing"-may cast
one as a stigmatized member of the out-group. "Whistle-blowers" are
individuals who lack the required authority or power to directly make the
change being sought, and therefore must appeal to someone of greater
authority, either within the organization (known as internal whistleblowing) or outside of the organization (known as external whistleblowing). 243 Although sometimes viewed as reformers, or agents of

237. Asch, Social Psychology, supra note 221, at 472.
238. Asch, Studies on Independence, supra note 221, at 46.
239. Id. at 48.
240. Asch, Social Psychology, supra note 221, at 465.
241. See Ross & Nisbett, supra note 117, at 40 (describing findings by Henri Tajfel
showing that mere categorization of subjects based on artistic preferences for paintings was
sufficient to elicit in-group favoritism and out-group derogation).
242. The view that "we" are somehow better and more deserving than "they" is a "rather
basic aspect of social perception." Id. For a recent and fascinating discussion of Social
Identity Theory in the context of race relations, see Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1533-34 (2005).
243. Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowers in Organizations: Dissidents or

Reformers?, 9 Res. Org. Behav. 321, 324 (1987).
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change, 244 whistle-blowers are more commonly viewed as dissidents, 245
deviants, 246 or traitors.
From the organization's perspective, whistle-blowing represents a
voluntary challenge to the "legitimacy of these managers" and
concomitantly, a challenge to the authority structure of the organization that
serves as the basis for the organization's very existence. 247 Moreover,
whistle-blowing represents
a betrayal of the in-group's "team player" and
"anti-finking" norms. 2 48 Thus, the act of whistle-blowing (which is often
motivated, in part, by a feeling of company loyalty) 249 will often be viewed
as the ultimate treachery. All this may help explain why "whistleblowing is
250
an uncommon phenomenon."
The corporate whistle-blower at Enron, Sherron Watkins, was lauded by
Time magazine as one of their 2002 People of the Year, 25 1 but the House
Subcommittee that so eagerly sought Watkins's testimony took pains to
distinguish Watkins from other whistle-blowers: "Ms. Watkins is not a
whistle-blower in the conventional sense. She was and is a loyal company
employee." 252 The implication is clear that most whistle-blowers are not.
Idioms that denigrate
the status of whistle-blowers abound: He or she is a
"party crasher," 2 53 a "skunk at a picnic," 254 a "rat fink," 255 a "tattler," 25 6 a
'259
"troublemaker," 257 a "snitch," 258 or a "policeman.

244. Id. at 322; see also Janelle Brinker Dozier & Marcia P. Miceli, Potential Predictors
of Whistle-Blowing: A ProsocialBehavior Perspective, 10 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 823 (1985)
(arguing that whistle-blowing is a form of prosocial behavior).
245. Near & Miceli, supra note 243, at 322.
246. David B. Greenberger, Marcia P. Miceli & Debra J. Cohen, Oppositionists and
Group Norms: The Reciprocal Influence of Whistle-blowers and Co-workers, 6 J. Bus.
Ethics 527, 528 (1987) ("[Wlhistle-blowing can be one of the most important deviant actions
in which an organizational member can engage." (emphasis omitted)).
247. Near & Miceli, supra note 243, at 322.
248. We may have a deeply ingrained aversion to "tattling."
Social norms against
"finking"-reporting wrongdoing behind the wrongdoer's back-have been suggested in
several studies on children. For a summary of studies, see Marcia P. Miceli & Janet P. Near,
Blowing the Whistle: The Organizational and Legal Implications for Companies and
Employees 147 (1992) (summarizing studies that showed that subjects were less likely to
report when the wrongdoer was of high status); see also Dozier & Miceli, supra note 244, at
828 (summarizing Herbert Harari's and John W. McDavid's study of school children
evidencing a norm against "finking" on a high social status peer).
249. Miceli & Near, supra note 248, at 26 (summarizing the literature and noting that
"external whistle-blowers often describe themselves as members who initiated whistleblowing because of their loyalty to the organization" and that "loyal, long-term members
may be more likely to blow the whistle than to remain silent").
250. Dozier & Miceli, supra note 244, at 834.
251. Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, Time, Dec. 30, 2002, at 30.
252. The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 3
(2002), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/l07/action/l07-89.pdf (remarks by
Rep. James Greenwood).
253. See, e.g., Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher,Time, Dec. 30, 2002,
at 52.
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An inside lawyer who goes over the head of her boss and makes a report
under Sarbanes-Oxley to the board of directors may be perceived as not
being a "team player." More likely than not, she will find it easier to stay
silent rather than risk the consequences of stigmatization.
b. OrganizationalSilence
The fact that dissent is stigmatized is confirmed by a growing body of
organizational behavior literature that explores the causes of employee
silence as a collective phenomenon within organizations. 260 In one recent
exploratory study, Frances Milliken, Elizabeth Morrison, and Patricia
Hewlin analyzed the reasons for employee silence, based on interviews with
employee subjects. 26 1 The study found that being silent about issues and
problems at work is a very common experience among employees. 26 2 In
addition, a large number of respondents felt that ethical or fairness issues
were "undiscussable"-not to be raised with superiors. 26 3 The major
reason reported in the study was the desire to avoid stigma-the fear of

254. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and
Crime after Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 357, 363 n.27 (2003) (noting Senator Charles
Grassley's term).
255. Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate
Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 St.
John's L. Rev. 875, 894.
256. See Near & Miceli, supra note 243, at 325.
257. See, e.g., Dozier & Miceli, supra note 244, at 826.
258. News Release, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Vote by American Bar Association to Turn
Lawyers into 'Snitches'
is Not Necessary (Aug. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.nysba.org/template.cfm?template=/PressRelease/PressReleaseDispay.cfm&Pres
sReleaselD=153.
259. See Panel, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 16, at 668-69 (quoting ACC's general
counsel in describing the proposed regulations as transforming the lawyer's role into that of
a policeman).
260. See, e.g., Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, OrganizationalSilence:
A Barrier to Change and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 706,
708 (2000) (arguing that widespread organizational silence "is less a product of multiple,
unconnected individual choices and more a product of forces within the organization-and
forces stemming from management-that systematically reinforce silence"); Craig C. Pinder
& Karen P. Harlos, Employee Silence: Quiescence and Acquiescence as Responses to
Perceived Injustice, in 20 Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management 331
(Gerald R. Ferris ed., 2001) (challenging the predominant assumption that employee silence
is "inactive endorsement").
261. The authors of the study interviewed forty full-time employees working in the
consulting, financial services, news media, pharmaceuticals, and advertising industries, who
were also part-time MBA students at a large urban university. See Frances J. Milliken et al.,
An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don't Communicate
Upward and Why, 40 J. Mgmt. Stud. 1453 (2003).
262. Id. at 1459 (noting that 85% of the sample said that, on at least one occasion, they
felt unable to raise an issue or concern to their bosses even though they felt the issue was
important).
263. Id. at 1461 (noting that 20% of respondents mentioned that they were unable to raise
"ethical or fairness" issues (e.g., professional misconduct, discrimination) and 17.5% were
unable to raise "harassment or abuse" issues).
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or viewed negatively as a "troublemaker," "complainer," or
being labeled
264
"tattletale."
A second reason for employee silence was the fear that speaking up about
issues would damage their relationships with their colleagues-people on
whom they relied either for information or to do their job. Employees
feared "others (bosses and peers) would no longer like them or view them
short, they feared the loss of "relational currency" or
,is credible." 2 65'26In
"social capital. 6
speaking up was not worth
A third reason was "futility: the feeling that
267
the effort and would not make a difference."
A fourth reason was the fear of retaliation or punishment, such as losing
one's job or not getting a promotion. 268 Because Enron was legally advised
not to retaliate against Watkins, 269 Watkins was not terminated, but was
reassigned "from her executive suite to a starkly furnished office 33 floors
below and relegated to performing make-work tasks." 2 70 According to a
study of eighty-four whistle-blowers conducted in the early 1990s, "82%
were fired, 17% lost
experienced harassment after blowing the whistle, 60%
27 1
their homes, and 10% admitted to attempted suicide."
Silence is less a product of multiple, unconnected individual choices and
more a product of forces within the organization-stemming from
272
management and systematically reinforced by other employees.
Employees who are silent note that they are not alone in withholding
sensitive information. Indeed, many employees in the study suggested that
knowledge of a problem was widespread among peers, but not conveyed to
senior management. 273 According to the testimony of Sherron Watkins,
where there was widespread
there was a "culture of intimidation at Enron 274
knowledge of the company's shaky finances."
264. Id. at 1463.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1470.
267. Id. at 1464.
268. Id. A fifth reason was the fear "that speaking up might negatively impact someone
else in the organization." Id.
269. Within two days of Watkins's meeting with Enron Chairman Ken Lay, a Vinson &
Elkins lawyer had given legal advice to Enron regarding "possible risks associated with
discharging (or constructively discharging) employees who report allegations of improper
accounting practices," including a report on the status of Texas law on whistle-blower
protection. For a summary, see Brickey, supra note 254, at 362.
270. Id. at 363 (summarizing Enron's post-revelatory treatment of Watkins).
271. David Culp, Whistleblowers: CorporateAnarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial
Perspective, 13 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 109, 113 (1995).

272. See Morrison & Milliken, supra note 260, at 707, 708 (noting that silence is a
collective phenomenon, hence their focus on contextual rather than individual-level
variables).
273. See Milliken et al., supra note 261, at 1465 (noting that seventy-four percent of
employees reported that other employees were aware of the issue, but felt uncomfortable
speaking up about it).
274. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron Official Says Many Knew About Shaky Company

Finances, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2002, at Al.

Similar reports exist about WorldCom. See
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Even in the face of unethical conduct, conformity pressures that are
common to all organizational settings can lead inside lawyers to remain
silent and not risk the consequences of whistle-blowing. Although not
impossible to resist, 27 5 the desire to avoid stigma and maintain social
capital-in essence, to remain a team player-are powerful self-preserving
influences. During the debates about Sarbanes-Oxley, the public rhetoric
against turning lawyers into prosecutors, policemen, or snitches took on a
romper-room-like quality, evidencing a visceral discomfort with the act of
whistle-blowing. 276 Nobody likes the kid sibling who tattletells on them.
B. The Cognition
So far I have argued that inside counsel's situation-of being a mere
employee, faithful agent, and team player-makes unethical behavior, at
least in the form of acquiescence, likely. But one could object to this story
as too deterministic. Why can a smart professional not recognize the
situational pressures toward unethical behavior, exercise her moral
autonomy, and simply take an ethical stand? Of course, sometimes she can:
Witness Watkins's blowing the whistle.
But the conflict is rarely framed in just this stark manner-as a clean
choice between venal greed and pure righteousness. The "conflict" is often
automatically managed, without our conscious consideration. We, as
lawyers, take pride in our ability to process issues in a deliberate, logical
manner. Therefore, we tend to underestimate influences on our behavior
that are automatic rather than controlled. But cognitive psychology teaches
us that many of our mental processes are automatic, rapid, unintentional,
effortless, and operate to a great extent without our conscious awareness. 277

Yochi J. Dreazen & Deborah Solomon, WorldCom Aide Conceded Flaws-ControllerSaid
Company Was Forced to Disguise Expenses, Ignore Warnings, Wall St. J., July 16, 2002, at
A3 (reporting that lawmakers released documents in an attempt to bolster their case that
WorldCom's accounting irregularities aroused the suspicion of more employees than the
company's management had disclosed).
275. See Rod Bond & Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of
Studies Using Asch's (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 Psychol. Bull. 111 (1996)
(noting that levels of conformity differ among countries and over time).
276. See News Release, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 258.
277. Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 171, 173
(2004); see also John A. Bargh, The FourHorsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention,
Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition, in 1 Handbook of Social Cognition 1 (Robert S.
Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 1994) [hereinafter Bargh, Four Horsemen]; John A.
Bargh et al., The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral
Goals, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1014, 1015 (2001) (noting studies that "show that

primed information-processing goals produce the same outcomes as goals that have been
activated by a conscious act of will").
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The end result of this automatic processing is an objectively acceptable
27 8
state of affairs.
1. Self-Serving Bias
A principal way by which this tolerable equilibrium is reached is through
Self-interest
what social psychologists call the "self-serving bias."
pressures permeate every role taken by inside counsel and are inextricably
intertwined with obedience, alignment, and conformity pressures. For
example, a "mere employee" will succumb to obedience pressures, not only
because she has been socially conditioned to, but also because it is in her
obvious self-interest to obey her boss. We all suffer from a tendency to
arrive at judgments or estimations that reflect a "self-serving" or
"egocentric" bias; we rate attributes that are relevant to our own self-image
in a self-serving fashion. 279 Although psychologists debate the underlying
cause of the self-serving bias, its existence is well-established in the
theoretical and empirical literature.280
The self-serving bias is evident in the "above average" effect, whereby
well over half of survey respondents typically rate themselves in the top
fifty percent of drivers, 28 1 ethics, 282 managerial prowess, 283 health, 2 84 and
productivity. 2 85 A whopping 94% of college professors think they are
better than average teachers. 286 People also overestimate their own
contributions to a collaborative task and, therefore, have a strong tendency
278. See generally David Alain Armor, The Illusion of Objectivity: A Bias in the
Perception of Freedom From Bias (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California Los Angeles) (on file with author).
279. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining,22 J. Legal Stud. 135, 138 (1993).
280. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. Econ. Persp. 109, 110 (1997); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 134 (1997) (noting that

we should take the egocentric bias seriously as a behavioral risk, even if we cannot
determine its exact role in a given context).
281. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?,

47 Acta Psychologica 143 (1981).
282. See generally Raymond Baumhart S.J., Ethics in Business 23 (1968) (hard-cover
edition published under the title An Honest Profit) (reporting that two-thirds of the men rated
the practices of their company more ethical than the climate in their industry).
283. See Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, ManagerialMyopia: Self-Serving Biases
in OrganizationalPlanning, 62 J. Applied Psychol. 194, 198 (1977) ("Studies indicate that

self-serving biases are a wide-ranging phenomenon that can affect managerial decision
making through the process of overly optimistic planning.").
284. Ziva Kunda, The Casefor Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psychol. Bull. 480, 488 (1990)

(noting studies which confirm that "[c]ollege students tend to assume that they are and will
be healthier than average").
285. Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 111.
286. K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, but Will College Teaching Be Improved?, 17 New Dir.

for Higher Ed.: Renewing and Evaluating Teaching 1, 10 (1977) (finding that ninety-four
percent of college professors rate themselves as above average teachers, and sixty-eight
percent rank themselves in the top quarter of effective teachers).
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to overclaim credit. For example, when Harvard MBA students in study
groups were asked to estimate what portion of their group's work each had
done, the totals for each study group averaged 139%.287
This self-serving bias is also seen in how we conflate what is fair with
what benefits (materially or otherwise) ourselves. 288
When study
participants were asked to imagine that they had worked different amounts
of time at a joint task and assess what a fair compensation would be for
themselves and for others who "worked" more or less than they, their
judgments were clearly self-serving. 289 Participants who "worked" longer
hours were more likely to believe that an equal hourly wage was fair.
Participants who "worked" shorter hours were more likely to believe that
equal pay was fair. This study suggests that self-serving assessments of
fairness are likely to occur in morally ambiguous settings where there are
multiple possible interpretations about what is fair. 290 In addition, "when
there are multiple notions of fairness, individuals tend to default to those
notions that favor" themselves. 29 1 Moreover, it only took a relatively weak
adoption of a role (through imagination) to generate a self-serving fairness
bias.
The self-serving bias has been confirmed in field studies with actual
payoffs, 292 in individuals' perceptions of the groups that they are affiliated
with, 293 in a simulated labor dispute, 294 in real-world public school teacher
contract negotiations, 295 in practicing physicians recommending treatments
287. Babcock et -al., supra note 158, at 1337 (noting that "[w]hen married couples
estimate the fraction of various household tasks they are responsible for, their estimates
typically sum to more than 100 percent"); Banaji et al., supra note 12, at 61.
288. Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 110.
289. David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J. Experimental
Soc. Psychol. 418, 432, 434 (1979) (finding an egocentric bias in the fairness judgments,
observing that "people are capable of ignoring or compromising what they know to be
ethically correct in order to achieve a hedonically more preferred outcome").
290. Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 111.
291. Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to
Physiciansfrom Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 253 (2003).
292. A doctoral student of Messick's obtained very similar results in a "field study" in
which subjects actually worked and were given cash to allocate as they saw fit. See David M.
Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Biases, in Equity Theory:
Psychological and Sociological Perspectives 76-79 (David M. Messick & Karen S. Cook
eds., 1983) (reporting the unpublished results of experiments performed by Van Avermaet).
293. See Leigh Thompson, "They Saw a Negotiation": Partisanshipand Involvement, 68
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 839, 840 (1995) (describing the classic Hastorf and Cantril
1954 study entitled "They Saw a Game" in which fans of opposing football teams left the
game with each group thinking that the referees were partial to the other team).
294. Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretationsof Fairnessand
Interpersonal Conflict, 51 Organizational Behav. and Hum. Decision Processes 176, 176-97
(1992) (noting that individuals assigned the role of union representatives reported that a
higher wage was fairer, whereas those assigned the role of management reported that a lower
wage was fairer).
295. See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 116-17 (confirming the hypothesis
that both sides in public school teacher contract negotiations in Pennsylvania would advance
self-serving beliefs about which communities were comparable for purposes of determining
teacher salary).
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or writing drug prescriptions for the sake of small gifts provided by
pharmaceutical companies and equipment suppliers, 296 and in practicing
lawyers and judges. 297 The self-serving bias is all the "more pernicious
because people seldom believe it applies to them[]---even when confronted
'29 8
with [persuasive] research.
2. Motivated Reasoning
Texas tort case study. The self-serving bias is mediated through the key
mechanism of "motivated reasoning," the process through which we
assimilate information in a self-serving manner. In an illuminating study,
Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, and Colin
Camerer presented subjects with identical materials (depositions, police
reports, maps, doctors' reports) abstracted from an actual Texas lawsuit
filed by an injured motorcyclist against the driver of the automobile that
collided with him. 299 Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of
plaintiff or defendant and were told to read the case materials and negotiate
a settlement within a certain time. After reading the case materials and
before negotiating, subjects were asked to predict the amount the judge
300
would award the plaintiff if negotiations stalled.
The results confirm the existence of the self-serving bias. Participants
playing the motorcyclist plaintiff tended to predict that they would receive
significantly larger awards than what the defendants predicted. Armed with
the same information, different people reached different conclusions-ones
that favored their own interests.
In an experimental variation, a group of subjects were told which role
they would play only after having read the case materials and offering their
estimates of the judge's award and a fair settlement. 30 As predicted by the
researchers, those who learned their roles after they read the case materials
and offered estimates were significantly more likely to settle and settled at a
quicker pace than those who were initially assigned their roles. 30 2 The
296. See Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 291, at 254 (discussing research that suggests
that even small gifts may be surprisingly influential in creating an unconscious bias in the
physician to favor a particular drug treatment, despite self-reports to the contrary).
297. Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 121 (suggesting self-serving bias as the
basis for significant survey results from experienced bankruptcy lawyers and judges on

questions relating to lawyers' fees in bankruptcy cases); Theodore Eisenberg, Differing
Perceptionsof Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 979 (1994).

298. Max H. Bazerman & George Loewenstein, Taking the Bias Out of Bean Counting,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov. 2001, at 28. For research showing the prevalence of the "bias in the
perception of freedom from bias," see Armor, supra note 278.
299. This study is reported in detail in Babcock et al., supra note 158, at 1337-42.
300. Id. at 1338-39; Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 112.
301. Babcock et al., supra note 158, at 1339; Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at
113.
302. Ninety-four percent of the pairs who did not know their roles initially settled and
settled in an average of 2.51 periods, but only 72% of those who knew their roles initially
settled and settled in an average of 2.51 periods. In other words, when subjects did not know
their roles initially, only 6% of the negotiations had to be resolved by a judge. However,
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results indicate a strong tendency toward self-serving judgments of fairness
and predictions of the judge's award when subjects knew of their roles prior
to reading the written materials. 30 3 Similar results were obtained when,
after the negotiation, subjects were presented with sixteen arguments
to predict how a
favoring either the plaintiff or defendant and were asked
30 4
neutral third party would rate each of those arguments.
The results of this study confirm the findings of prior research on the
connection between self-serving biases and selective information
Because we are imperfect
processing or "motivated reasoning."
information processors, we first automatically determine our "preference
for a certain outcome on the basis of self-interest and then justify this
preference on the basis of fairness by changing the importance of attributes
affecting what is fair."' 30 5 When a situational cue such as a role (for
example, plaintiff or defendant) is conferred upon a subject, a "directional
goal," the goal of arriving at a desired conclusion, 30 6 is triggered. With a
directional goal, people are "more likely to search spontaneously for
30 7
hypothesis-consistent evidence than for inconsistent evidence."
Directional goals can bias reasoning, but this influence is limited by
beliefs and rules of logic, which will
cognitive factors, such as available
30 8
determine the magnitude of bias.
The Texas tort case study demonstrates that complex and ambiguous
contexts (such as a tort case) where multiple arguments can be generated
are ideal environments for triggering self-serving biases, because they allow
subjects to focus on, or weight, differentially, arguments favoring
30 9
themselves (or their clients or de facto principals) over other parties.
Accordingly, the complex nature of law, whether you are dealing with
federal securities law to determine if there is a duty to disclose to the

when subjects knew their roles initially, 28% had to be resolved by the judge. Babcock et al.,
supra note 158, at 1339-40.

303. Furthermore, the magnitude of the bias was a significant predictor of bargaining
impasse. Id. at 1341.
304. Id. at 1339-40; Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at 114-15.
305. Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38 Sloan Mgmt.

Rev. 89, 91 (1997).
306. See Kunda, supra note 65, at 212.
307. Kunda, supra note 284, at 495; see also Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated
Use of Differential Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred
Skepticism:
Conclusions, 63 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 568, 569 (1992) (noting the "robust tendency
of individuals to perceive information that is consistent with a preferred judgment conclusion
(preference-consistent information) as more valid than information that is inconsistent with
that conclusion (preference-inconsistent information)"); id. at 570 (noting that studies
support the conclusion that "information consistent with a preferred judgment conclusion is
less likely to initiate intensive cognitive analysis than is information inconsistent with that
conclusion").
308. Kunda, supra note 284, at 495.
309. Babcock et al., supra note 158, at 1342; Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 280, at
122.
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public 310 or professional rules to determine what to do when a co-agent is
breaking the law, 31 1 makes it a fertile breeding ground for the kind of
motivated and self-serving interpretations that rationalize unethical actions.
As suggested above, through motivated reasoning, ethical dilemmas can
be managed in a manner that avoids stark conflict. Understanding how the
mind processes information makes clear how this is possible. It is now
widely accepted in social and cognitive psychology that two processing
systems are often at work when a person makes judgments or solves
problems. 3 12 These two systems can operate simultaneously, "in parallel[,]
and are capable of reaching differing conclusions." 313 The first system
invokes automatic processes. It is a more intuitive system of processes that
are relatively rapid, effortless, automatic, involuntary, and-to a large
extent-operate without our conscious awareness. The second system
invokes controlled processes. It is a more reflective system of processes
that are relatively deliberate, voluntary, controlled, analytical, and effortful,
as well as rules-based. Self-interest tends to exert a more automatic
influence than, say, any moral reasoning that goes into determining one's
ethical responsibilities, which would tend to be invoked through controlled
3 14
processing.
Given the dual nature, we tend to have superior introspective access to
our controlled processes than our automatic processes; that is, "we can often
articulate the various costs and benefits that went into a deliberate
decision," 3 15 but we are generally unable to recall the automatic cognitive
processes that pulled us toward certain actions. 3 16 Because of this limited
access to our automatic processes, their influence on judgment and decision
making is difficult to eliminate or correct. The consequence of this

310. Even more so than bean counting, ambiguity characterizes most legal issues relating
to the duty to disclose under Rule lOb-5. See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The
Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule l0b-5, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1639 (2004).

311. See ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 142 (criticizing the 2002 text of Model
Rule 1.13); Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 7, at 718 (criticizing Rule 1.13 from the
perspective of in-house counsel as providing "withdrawal" as the last available option);
Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical

Issues, 58 Bus. Law. 143, 174-75, 180 (2002) (criticizing Model Rule 1.13(b) for being
unhelpful and ambiguous).
312. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist

Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 Psychol. Rev. 814, 819 (2001) (citing Bargh, Chartrand,
Greenwald, and Banaji).
313. Id. at 819; see also Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction to Heuristics and
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 16 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)
(arguing that the parallel-processing model provides a better explanation of the "dual
process" nature of cognition, because it does "not postulate two different 'routes' of
information processing that operate in either-or fashion according to the motivation of the
information processor").
314. Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the
Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 189, 190 (2004).
315. Id. at 192.
316. See Haidt, supra note 312, at 822 (comparing post hoc moral reasonings with a priori
moral theories).
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differential processing is that automatic processes tend to dominate-they
tend to be "first on the scene," with controlled
processes acting mainly as a
3 17
potential, but severely constrained, override.
As Jonathan Haidt has noted, "The emerging view in social cognition3 is
18
that most of our behaviors and judgments are... made automatically."
Haidt has persuasively argued that, while people tend to believe that their
moral judgments are backed by logic, most moral judgments in fact result
from quick, automatic evaluations, akin to aesthetic judgments, with
explicit moral reasoning playing a largely secondary role. 3 19 Therefore,
instead of our moral reasoning causing our moral judgment (as we would
like to believe), moral reasoning is more likely to be the rational tail that
wags the emotional dog, a post-hoc construction 320 intended to justify
automatic-and typically self-interested-judgments.
When asked to
explain previous behaviors, we engage in an effortful search that may feel
like introspection. 32 1 In fact, we are actually searching for a priori causal
theories-"a pool of [plausible,] culturally supplied explanations for
behavior." 3 22 Here, for example: "My duty as a zealous advocate required
me to keep confidences no matter what the harmful consequences may be."
To be clear, this is not to say that moral reasoning plays no ex ante causal
role in ethical decision making. 323 Since we are highly attuned to group
norms, we are less likely to engage in conduct that clearly violates those
norms. Explicit moral reasoning may play a role in societies or professions
in defining those norms and prescribing what is minimally acceptable
conduct.
The venality hypothesis supposes a unimodal model of cognition, in
which the wayward individual makes an explicit and calculated decision to
sacrifice ethics for self-interest.
The banality hypothesis, however,
supposes a more complex, bimodal view of cognition, in which the
317. The overriding ability of controlled processes is severely constrained by our lack of
introspective access to automatic processes and the controlled system's "serial processing"
nature and reactivity to cognitive load. Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 314, at 193. It is
important not to overstate the dichotomy. Most complex mental processes studied by social
psychologists are not exclusively automatic or exclusively controlled but are in fact
combinations of both. See Bargh, Four Horsemen, supra note 277, at 3.
318. Haidt, supra note 312, at 819 (citing Bargh, Chartrand, Greenwald, and Banaji)
(emphasis omitted).
319. See id. at 823.

320. See id.
321. As Haidt has argued, we are not really searching for a memory of the actual
cognitive processes that caused behaviors, because these processes are generally not
accessible (operate outside of our conscious awareness). Id. at 822.
322. Id. (citing a 1977 study conducted by Nisbett & Wilson). As argued by Haidt, a
priori moral theories provide acceptable reasons for praise and blame--e.g., "unprovoked
harm is bad," or "people should strive to live up to God's commandments." Id.
323. See id. at 828-29 (reconciling and integrating rationalism and intuitionism). But see
Wegner, supra note 37, at 26, 97 (arguing that our intuitive belief that we consciously will
our voluntary actions is illusory, and that the experience of control or conscious will is not a
direct indication of their real causal influence on action, but rather a misapprehension of the
mechanistic causal relations underlying our own behavior).
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individual is not always fully aware of the extent to which her decisions are
in fact driven by the automatic pursuit of self-interest and-in cases where
the unethical route is taken-any moral reasoning concerning fiduciary
324
duties to the organizational client fails to override self-interest.
Other heuristics or tendencies. Alloyed with the self-serving bias are
other heuristics or tendencies that make bad decisions seem, well, not so
bad-especially in the context of securities fraud. We are more likely to
hurt and ignore victims who are statistical or abstract-actual and potential
shareholders of a large publicly held corporation, for example-rather than
individuals whom we personally know. 325 We also tend to be far more
responsive to immediate consequences (for example, a forthcoming bonus
or raise) than delayed ones, especially if delayed outcomes are uncertain
(for example, legal sanctions for securities fraud). 3 26 We also tend to view
sins of omission (for example, not disclosing a material company
development) as more acceptable than sins of commission (for example,
affirmative misrepresentations). 327 And, as Milgram's experiments show,
we also tend to engage in ethical lapses where harm is immaterial and then
escalate our commitment to previously chosen courses of actions to avoid

324. With respect to inside counsel, however, it is not only self-interest that exerts the
powerful automatic influence on ethical decisions. Inside counsel are also affected by
obedience, alignment, or conformity pressures.
325. See Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 314, at 197; Deborah A. Small & George
Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J.
Risk & Uncertainty 5 (2003). In all public securities fraud cases, the victims are actual or
potential shareholders, a large and diffuse group, largely unknown to management or
counsel, whereas management are viewed as paying "clients" (or, in the case of inside
counsel, bosses) with whom they have an ongoing relationship. Bazerman et al., supra note
305, at 92 (noting that auditors are likely to be well acquainted with people who would be
hurt by a negative audit).
326. David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of
Decision Making, 37 Sloan Mgmt. Rev. 9, 11 (1996); Moore & Loewenstein, supra note
314, at 198. For inside counsel, complicity with management's unethical behavior might
mean a larger bonus, better perquisites, or closer bonding, whereas refusal to follow
unethical orders might mean confrontation, humiliation, and the loss of a job. This is not to
say that we should give up on legal sanctions; they are important, but they should not be our
sole method. The prospect of punishment represents yet another situational feature that
influences the behavior of potential transgressors, and "the harsher and more certain those
prospects, assuming that the potential aggressor in question is rational, the greater the
general deterrent value." Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 70, at 1103; see also Robert A.
Prentice, The Case of the IrrationalAuditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud
Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 133, 176-79 (2000) (noting the "time-delay trap").
327. Messick & Bazerman, supra note 326, at 15; Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M.
Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. Just.
Res. 223, 230 (2004). This "omission bias" is particularly relevant for lawyers in securities
fraud contexts, who choose not to prevent or report a co-agent's wrongdoing. When fraud
proceeds, even though the lawyer had a clear opportunity to stop it, it is easy to shift any
blame from self to others, especially when the lawyer can point to the wrongdoer's specific
actions as the "proximate cause" for the harm, or the board as the ultimate decision maker.
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that those actions were improper, or to
admitting (to ourselves and others)
328
cover up our previous mistakes.

In sum, the "moral autonomy" objection carries some, but not decisive,
force. To think that it wins the contest is part of the venality hypothesis
mindset, to think that inside counsel generally knows the difference
between right and wrong and makes a conscious choice to commit sin for
personal gain. Sometimes this is true. But the banality hypothesis suggests
that the typical story is different. When complexity or ambiguity presents
itself, it is interpreted in ways to avoid the stark moral choice that the
"moral autonomy" objection forces. In many situations, we automatically
dodge that hard choice by becoming blind to its very existence. Given the
situation, inside counsel are inclined to acquiesce, and the moral choice that
seems so obvious in hindsight or from an academic perch afar is never even
experienced as a fully conscious decision.

III.

RECENT REFORM: MISUNDERSTANDING THE ETHICAL ECOLOGY

In Part III, I critique section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the ABA's 2003
amendments to the Model Rules as ignoring the situation of inside counsel
by not addressing the ethical ecology of inside counsel, thus, setting them
up for failure under the new, congressionally mandated gatekeeper regime.
To be clear, my task is not to defend or justify the particular model of
gatekeeping chosen by Congress, implemented by the SEC, and grappled
with by the ABA. Rather, it is to show why the particular solutions adopted
by the SEC and the ABA ultimately fail to address the situational pressures
of inside counsel and are thus inadequate. This Article is prescriptive in
It analyzes the incongruity between the expressed goals of
nature:
Sarbanes-Oxley (deputizing inside counsel as gatekeepers) and the specific
solutions advanced by the SEC and the ABA.
A. Background
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307
In response to the major corporate scandals of this new century, Congress
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, which became effective on July 30, 2002,329 to

328. "Milgram's own analysis" of his experiments pointed out "the gradual, stepwise
character of the shift from" mild feedback to lethal harm. Ross & Nisbett, supra note 117, at
56. This method avoids a single, explicit confrontation of moral values and incrementally
and carefully shapes the subject into obedience as the stepwise progression continues and the
shocks reach alarming levels. See Miller, supra note 53, at 33 (noting Steven Gilbert's
analysis of the gradated shock process); Ross & Nisbett, supra note 117, at 56.
329. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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restore integrity to the U.S. capital markets by promoting corporate
responsibility, accountability, and. transparency. 330
Sarbanes-Oxley
imposed harsh penalties for violators, created an elaborate system for
governing and regulating auditors, and required the securities industry's
self-regulatory organizations to adopt prophylactic rules that prevent
conflicts of interest and enhance the independence of securities analysts. 33 1
With respect to lawyers, it delegated authority to the SEC to establish
"minimum standards of professional conduct" under section 307. This
represents the first time in history 332 that the SEC would have sweeping
authority to establish rules that would enable it to discipline lawyers
"appearing or practicing before the Commission." The genesis of section
307 was a simple request to the SEC by forty legal academics, led by
Professor Richard Painter in March 2002, to require lawyers to report
unrectified securities law violations to the board. 3 33 The SEC declined to
act, 334 and the proposal was then submitted to Congress.
Senators John Edwards, Michael Enzi, and Jon Corzine introduced the
proposal during the floor debate 335 as a late amendment to the Sarbanes

330. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. H5462 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
331. Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley,
49 Vill. L. Rev 725, 728 (2004) (describing the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley).
332. Current Rule 102(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice permits the SEC to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys who violate the securities laws, assist in someone
else's violation, or otherwise engage in unprofessional conduct. The predecessor to Rule
102(e), Rule 2(e), was promulgated by the SEC on its own initiative in 1935. This rule,
however, has only rarely been the basis of lawyer discipline, and the SEC ordinarily will not
initiate proceedings under this rule unless a prior criminal conviction or civil injunction for a
securities law violation has been obtained. See Royce De R. Barondes, Professionalism
Consequences of Law Firm Investments in Clients: An EmpiricalAssessment, 39 Am. Bus.
L.J. 379, 407 (2002).
333. Letter from Richard W. Painter et al., to Harvey Pitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n
(Mar.
7,
2002),
available
at
http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/PG%20Links/pittletter.htm.
Painter has long
advocated clarification of a lawyer's duties with respect to corporate fraud. See Richard W.
Painter, Rule Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 665, 719 (2001); Richard W. Painter,
Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing
Rules, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 221 (1995) (proposing a voluntary, contractual regime of
lawyer whistle-blowing, whereby lawyers could select and publicize the rules by which they
will be governed, enforceable by third party civil liability and disciplinary sanctions);
Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud:
Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. Rev. 225 (1996) (proposing SEC Rules, or
alternatively, an amendment to the Exchange Act, requiring up-the-ladder reporting by
issuer's counsel, either to the issuer's full board or to a committee of issuer's board
designated by the issuer in advance).
334. Letter from David Becker, Gen. Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to Richard W.
Painter
et
al.
(Mar.
28,
2002),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/becker.pdf (responding to an earlier
letter of Painter et al. and declining to consider the matter because of the legal profession's
heated opposition to it and the SEC's lack of express legislative authority).
335. 148 Cong. Rec. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (testimony of Sens. John Edwards
and Richard Durbin).
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bill. 336 With the assistance of Professor Susan Koniak, the Senators
defended the so-called "Edwards Amendment" against opposition fueled by
the ABA. 337 The cosponsors agreed that the spotlight of corporate
responsibility should shift to lawyers, since many constituents believed that
the recent scandals could not have occurred but for the fact that the lawyers
failed in their gatekeeper duties. Senator Edwards stated,
The truth is that executives and accountants do not work alone.
Anybody who works in corporate America knows that wherever you see
corporate executives and accountants working, lawyers are virtually
always there looking over their shoulder. If executives and/or accountants
are breaking the law, you can be sure that part of the problem is that the
lawyers who are there and involved are not doing their jobs.

...With Enron and WorldCom, and all the other corporate misconduct
we have seen, it is again clear that corporate lawyers should not be left to
no more than accountants should be left to regulate
regulate themselves
338
themselves.

The Edwards Amendment provided that when lawyers, in the course of
representing a client, encounter evidence of a material violation of law
relevant to the SEC's jurisdiction, they must report the existence of such
evidence up the corporate ladder-to the board of directors, if necessaryand ensure that the evidence is investigated and any wrongdoing rectified.
339
The amendment to the Sarbanes bill passed the Senate by a vote of 97-0.
On January 23, 2003, the SEC issued part 205, the final regulations
called for under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 340 These rules reflect the
SEC's expectation that general counsels, as CLOs of public companies, will
be primarily responsible for investigating and advising the board and senior
management on how to address reports of material violations. Accordingly,
senior SEC officials have urged general counsels to play a more active role
in policing compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley through the development of a
more assertive relationship with the board and management. Alan Beller,

336. The bill (S.2673) was sponsored by Senate Banking Committee chairman Paul
Sarbanes and passed the Senate by a vote of 97-0 on July 15, 2002. 148 Cong. Rec. S6734,
6778-79 (daily ed. July 15, 2002).
337. See Cramton, supra note 311, at 175-76, 179 n.147 (noting the contributions from
Professor Susan Koniak and opposition from the ABA). The ABA lobbied Congress against
passage of section 307, arguing that the federal government should stay out of lawyer
regulation because state bar authorities would enact appropriate reforms to address the
problem of lawyers in the recent frauds. See Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See,
Lawyers, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 195, 220-21 (2003).
338. 148 Cong. Rec. S6551, 6551-52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002).
339. See Koniak, supra note 337, at 220.
340. See Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003). These
regulations became effective on August 5, 2003. These rules cover any SEC-reporting
company, including companies that have filed (and not withdrawn) a 1933 Securities Act
registration statement with the SEC.
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Director of the Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC, urged general
counsels to claim "[a] place at the table at every significant discussion about
how [her] company should act with respect to every important issue raised
by Sarbanes-Oxley, [SEC] rules or other aspects of the new
environment. '34 1 Belier also emphasized that general counsels should seek
"[a]ccess to the board ... to assure good behavior. '342 According to Beller,
regardless of whether she is a securities law specialist or not involved "in
detail in financial reporting decisions," the general counsel is "the chief
legal officer, and thus has the responsibility for getting the legal
requirements right.

'34 3

These comments assume that general counsels' passivity or acquiescence
in managerial misconduct derive from a lack of assertiveness-a
dispositional quality. This is an example of the fundamental attribution
error. In the SEC's view, general counsels could play a greater role in their
companies if only they would, by an act of conscious will, assert
themselves more, claim a place "at the table," and, magically, gain "access
to the board." The sad reality is that many inside counsel (including
general counsels) do not have independent access to the board and are
constrained by their formal or informal job descriptions. 3 44 The SEC
officials' faith in people's ability to simply will themselves into a position
of greater access (and thus power) demonstrates an unexamined reliance on
the venality hypothesis.
But, as I have detailed above, the ethical ecology is much more complex
than an issue of disposition (assertiveness) or an act of conscious will.
Inside counsel are subject to situational pressures-arising out of their
multiple roles as mere employees, faithful agents, and team-players-that
induce them to acquiesce in managerial fraud, and Sarbanes-Oxley does
nothing to mitigate those pressures. Before I critique part 205 in detail, I
briefly summarize the regulations.
Up-the-ladder reporting. The basic reporting rule is this: An attorney
must report any "evidence of a material violation" 345 to the CLO, or to both
the CLO and CEO, subject to a futility exception. 34 6 Unless the attorney
341. Allan L. Belier, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., Remarks before the ABA's 2003
Conference for Corporate Counsel (June 12, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch06l203alb.htm).
342. Id.
343. Id.

344. A recent survey of inside counsel reported that at least forty-four percent of inside
counsel believed that better access to the board was needed to ensure the well-being of their
corporate clients. See Brown, supra note 148, at 96-97.
345. "Evidence of a material violation" means "credible evidence, based upon which it
would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to
conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur." 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e). "Material violation" means a material violation of
U.S. federal or state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under any
federal or state law, or a similar material violation of any federal or state law. id. § 205.2(i).
346. Id. § 205.3(b)(4). This basic reporting rule is subject to what is known as "the
futility exception": The attorney may directly report to the board or a committee thereof if
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reasonably believes that the CLO or CEO has provided an "appropriate
response"347 within a reasonable time, he must go over their heads and
report further to the board or an appropriate board committee. 348 If the
attorney has taken the report "up the ladder" and does not reasonably
believe that the company has made an appropriate response, the attorney
this belief to the CLO, CEO, and directors to
must explain the reasons for
349
whom the report was made.

Alternative reporting rule. An alternative reporting mechanism may be
used if the company has previously formed a Qualified Legal Compliance
350
Committee ("QLCC"), a committee of independent board members
charged with adopting written procedures for confidentially receiving,
retaining, and considering any report of evidence of a material violation,
and with recommending remedial measures. 35 1 Under this alternative rule,
the attorney or the supervisory attorney may bypass the CEO or CLO and
submit a report directly to the QLCC (if the company has previously
formed a QLCC) and need not determine further whether the company has
made an appropriate response. The QLCC will determine whether an
investigation is necessary and may incur any expense (including retaining
experts) in order to perform an investigation. The QLCC may
notify the
35 2
SEC if recommended remedial measures are not implemented.
CLO's obligations. When the CLO receives a report of evidence of a
material violation, she is responsible for piloting its investigation, taking
she reasonably believes it would be futile to report to the Chief Legal Officer ("CLO") or
CEO.
347. "Appropriate response" means a response as a result of which the reporting attorney
reasonably believes that (1) no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
occur; or (2) the issuer has adopted appropriate remedial measures, including appropriate
steps or sanctions to stop an ongoing material violation, to prevent a future violation, or to
remedy (or otherwise appropriately address) a past violation and minimize the possibility of
its recurrence; or (3) the issuer, with the consent of the board of directors or an appropriate
committee thereof, has retained or directed an attorney to review the evidence of material
violation and has either substantially implemented such attorney's remedial
recommendations (after a reasonable investigation and evaluation of the reported evidence)
or has been advised that such attorney may assert a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer
(or its officers or agents) in any investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding. Id. §
205.2(b).
348. He must report to (a) the audit committee of the issuer's board; or (b) if the issuer
does not have an audit committee, another board committee consisting entirely of
nonemployee directors; or (c) if the issuer does not have any such committee, the board of
directors. Id. § 205.3(b)(3).
349. Id. § 205.3(b)(9).
350. Id. § 205.3(c). The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee ("QLCC") may be the
issuer's audit committee (which under new SEC rules must consist exclusively of
independent directors) or a separate board committee consisting of at least three membersone member of the audit committee and two or more nonemployee directors. Id. § 205.2(k).
351. It should be noted that, while the QLCC must have the authority and responsibility
to recommend that an issuer implement an "appropriate response," the final rules do not
require that the QLCC have the authority to direct such action itself, except that the QLCC
has the authority to notify the SEC if the issuer fails to implement an appropriate response
that the QLCC has recommended. Id.
352. Id.
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any necessary remedial measures, and providing an "appropriate response"
to the reporting attorney. If the company has previously formed a QLCC,
any
the CLO can refer the matter directly to the QLCC (without making
353
further inquiry) and advise the reporting attorney of such referral.
Permissive "reporting out." An attorney may, but is not required to,
reveal to the SEC, without the company's consent, confidential information
relating to his representation. The triggering standard for "reporting out" is
considerably more stringent than the triggering standard for the initial
"reporting up."

354

2. 2003 Amendments to the Model Rules
Although attorney professional conduct is governed by the rules
promulgated and enforced by the highest court in the state where the
3 55
attorney practices, most state ethics codes are based on the Model Rules,
which have "symbolic importance and salience to practicing lawyers that
may even exceed that of formally applicable ethics rules of individual
states." 356 Moreover, the Model Rules are carefully studied in most law
schools' professional responsibility courses, where nascent role ideologies
begin to form. Given the above, it makes sense to focus on the Model
Rules amendments as a tool for understanding how the leaders of the legal
profession diagnose and attempt to resolve the problem of lawyer
acquiescence in fraud.
In response to the scandals, the ABA created its Presidential Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility ("ABA Task Force") in March 2002 to address
"systemic issues relating to corporate responsibility arising out of the
unexpected and traumatic bankruptcy of Enron and Enron-like
situations ...."357

The ABA Task Force identified two rules to be

reviewed: Model Rule 1.6 on the duty of confidentiality and Model Rule
3 58
1.13, the rule on representing organizations.

353. Id. § 205.3(b)(2).

354. See id. § 205.3(d)(2). In contrast to the triggering standard for "reporting up," where
an attorney is obligated to report credible evidence when it would be unreasonable for her
not to conclude that a material violation is reasonably likely to occur (or have occurred, or is
ongoing), the triggering standard for "reporting out" is triggered when there is a clear sense
of urgency. An attorney may "report out" if she reasonably believes reporting out is
necessary to (a) prevent the company from committing a material violation that is likely to
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors; or (b)
rectify the consequences of a material violation that caused (or may cause) such injury, if the
attorney's services were used in furtherance of the violation; or (c) prevent the company
from committing or suborning perjury, or perpetrating a fraud upon the SEC. Id.
355. See ABA PreliminaryReport, supra note 142, at 202 n.22.
356. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and the
2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 35, 56

(2003).
357. See ABA PreliminaryReport, supra note 142, at 189 (quoting Mission Statement of
ABA Task Force).
358. Hamermesh, supra note 356, at 36-37.
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On August 11 and 12, 2003, after a "highly visible battle," 359 the ABA
House of Delegates adopted amendments to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13,
which were substantially the same as those recommended in the ABA Task
Force's final report. Rule 1.6 was changed to allow disclosure of client
fraud in well-defined situations involving grave future or ongoing harm.360
Rule 1.13 was amended to (i) require the lawyer, under certain
circumstances, to inform the highest authority of an organization when
responsible co-agents fail to take action to address a law violation and (ii)
permit her, under certain circumstances, to disclose confidential information
outside the organization when the highest authority of the organization fails
36 1
to address a law violation.
In short, the basic problem with the Model Rules amendments is that they
appear to have served the function of "a backstop addressing extraordinary
and deviant circumstances. ' 362 This reflects a common view that lawyer
acquiescence in misconduct is not a widespread problem and that only "a
few bad apples" are responsible. Also, the language of the amendments
suggests that the drafters were preoccupied with the unlikely scenario that
lawyers would engage in unwarranted, rampant whistle-blowing. 363 This
shows a profound misunderstanding of the ethical ecology of inside and
outside lawyers, who are more inclined to find any excuse to avoid
reporting co-agent misconduct.
To be clear, I do not argue that the ABA shared Sarbanes-Oxley's goals
of imposing gatekeeping duties on lawyers. Although the ABA attempted
to conform to the core SEC up-the-ladder reporting rule, some have
described those efforts as primarily motivated by the conservative desire to
derail any further federal regulation. 364

359. Id. at 56.
360. Pre-2003 Model Rule 1.6 had imposed a strict duty of confidentiality, permitting the
lawyer to disclose client confidences only if necessary to prevent a criminal act likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, and under other narrow circumstances.
Although the ABA Model Rules have been widely adopted by states, most states had not
adopted the pre-2003 Model Rule 1.6. See ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 142, at 206
(noting that "[florty-one states either permit or require disclosure to prevent a client from
perpetrating a fraud that constitutes a crime, and eighteen states permit or require disclosure
to rectify substantial loss resulting from client crime or fraud in which the client used the
lawyer's services").
361. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.13(b), (c) (2004).
362. Hamermesh, supra note 356, at 36, 55 (noting that "even amended Model Rule
1.13(b) will apply only in relatively extreme cases").
363. As an example of unfound fears of rampant whistle-blowing, see, e.g., Lawrence J.
Fox, The Academics Have It Wrong: Hysteria Is No Substitute for Sound Public Policy

Analysis, in Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Implications, supra note 7, at 851, 869
(expressing the fear of "too many up-the-ladder reports" to the board).
364. See Cramton et al., supra note 331, at 729-33 (describing the ABA's efforts relating
to Sarbanes-Oxley); Koniak, supra note 337, at 220-21.
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B. Critique
1. Mere Employee
Sarbanes-Oxley fails to adequately address the obedience pressures that
arise from inside counsel's status as "mere employees." It does little to
overcome an employee's natural reluctance to go over the heads of
superiors to make an unwelcomed report. In addition, it fails to address the
formidable self-interest pressures that arise from the employee status by not
providing inside counsel with protection against retaliation for making a
good-faith report or immunity against disciplinary sanctions for reasonable
disclosures of co-agent's confidences in a nonfrivolous claim for retaliatory
discharge.
Sarbanes-Oxley relies predominantly on the ill-advised "chain-ofcommand" approach for reporting misconduct. 365 According to the SEC
implementing regulations, a "subordinate" attorney must report evidence of
a material violation to her "supervisory" attorney unless she "reasonably
believes" that her supervisory attorney has failed to comply with the
regulations. 366
In the unlikely scenario that she will make that
determination, she can then report to the CLO, who has special
responsibilities to investigate the allegations. The "chain-of-command"
approach generally does not facilitate internal whistle-blowing, especially
when "top managers are implicated. '367 When an inside lawyer must
utilize existing chains of command to forward a report, obedience and selfinterest pressures will generally sway her against reporting. Moreover, a
significant number of securities frauds are committed by senior managers,

368
often CEOs.

One could counter that the SEC provided a viable option to the "chainof-command" approach with its alternative QLCC reporting rule. Under
this rule, the attorney or the supervisory attorney may freely bypass the
CEO or CLO and submit a report directly to a preformed QLCC. She is
then relieved from having to make any further determination about whether
365. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2003) states that, if an attorney becomes aware of evidence of
a material violation, she must report such evidence to the CLO, or to both the CLO and
CEO, subject to a "futility" exception.
366. Id. § 205.5(c), (d). For a critique of Sarbanes-Oxley's treatment of subordinate inhouse counsel, see Lisa H. Nicholson, Sarbox 307's Impact on Subordinate In-House
Counsel: Between a Rock and a HardPlace, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 559.

367. Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate
Governance:
Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and
Employee Empowerment, 40 Am. Bus. L.J. 177, 205 (2002).

368. Arlen & Carney, supra note 138, at 727 (concluding, based on the evidence, that
agents sued for fraud are more often senior managers, as opposed to lower-level employees);
Elizabeth MacDonald & Joann S. Lublin, SEC May Put Small Firms in Audit Plan:
Proposalsfor Strengthening CorporateAudit Panels Influenced by New Data, Wall St. J.,

Mar. 25, 1999, at A2 (reporting that a study of more than 200 corporate fraud cases brought
by the SEC in recent years found that, in eighty-three percent of the cases, the CEO or CFO,
or both, were involved in the fraud).
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the company has appropriately responded. 369 This approach can provide an
attractive safe harbor for attorneys, because the QLCC, as the anointed
recipient of all reports, will obviate the need for the attorney to make the
difficult case-by-case determination of whether to circumvent her
superiors. 370 Creation of this independent and centralized channel for
submitting reports will mitigate obedience pressures, because utilizing such
a channel is less likely to be seen as "insubordinate" or "disruptive" to the
sacred reporting relationships. The main problem with this QLCC
alternative is that the QLCC is not mandatory, and few companies feel
compelled to create one in the absence of a mandatory "reporting out"
provision (where an attorney would be required to report unrectified
misconduct to the SEC under certain circumstances), which, under the
previous SEC proposals, the QLCC approach would have obviated the need
for. 37 1 In addition, even if the company has previously formed a QLCC
under the regulations, a subordinate attorney still may not report directly to
the QLCC unless she reasonably believes that her supervisory attorney (to
whom she has submitted a report) has failed to comply with the
372
regulations.
Sarbanes-Oxley also does little to relieve the self-interest pressures that
inevitably arise from the employee status. If the inside attorney makes an
unwelcomed report to the board, her boss could demote her, give her a
smaller bonus, freeze her salary, or worse, terminate her, upon which she
would lose all of her unvested stock options, insurance, or other benefits.
Moreover, she could be professionally blacklisted and, in many states, left
373
with no legal recourse to sue for retaliatory discharge.
The SEC implementing regulations do not afford inside lawyers much, if
any, assurance from retaliation. While, under the final rules, the inside
lawyer may notify the board (or any committee thereof) of any retaliatory

369. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).
370. While, arguably, providing this "safe harbor" allows the inside lawyer to, once
again, punt the ultimate responsibility, on balance it should encourage inside counsel to
report misconduct to the board in the first place.
371. A company's adoption of a QLCC would have eliminated any "reporting out"
obligations of both inside or outside attorneys under either of the two mandatory "reporting
out" proposals which the SEC had originally proposed (neither of which was finally
adopted). Under either proposal, inside and outside attorneys can satisfy their reporting
obligations by referring the matter to a QLCC and need not further assess whether the
company undertook appropriate remedial measures. Any authority or responsibility to report
outside of the company would rest solely in the hands of the QLCC. See Sabino Rodriguez
III & Robert Knuts, Esq., Representing the Public Company: A Post-Sarbanes-Oxley
Governance Paradigm for In-House Lawyers and Outside Counsel, 8 Briefly: Persp. on
Legis., Reg., & Litig. 1, 45-46 (2004) (noting that many issuers shunned QLCCs in the
initial months following the effective date of the final rules, because the QLCC would
remove control over the process from the CLO, and companies perceived this as "potentially
disruptive").

372. 17 C.F.R. § 205.5 (d).
373. For a discussion of inside counsel's right to sue under a retaliatory discharge claim
in whistle-blower protection, see infra Part IV.B.
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act, 374

the SEC rules do not guarantee her any protection from any adverse
personnel action, including retaliatory discharge. 375 The final rules
conspicuously fail to mention whether the inside attorney has any legal
rights of redress or whether she may even notify the SEC of the mere fact of
her termination.
Inexplicably, while the SEC's originally proposed
"reporting out" provision permitted both employed or retained attorneys to
report their retaliatory discharge to the SEC, 376 the final rules do not
address retaliation at all.37 7 This silence exacerbates self-interest pressures.
A permissive "reporting out" provision that at least allowed attorneys to
report retaliatory acts to the SEC would have reassured attorneys that they
would not be disciplined for reporting retaliation. Additionally, this
provision would have strengthened the attorney's hand when making the
initial report up the ladder, encouraging boards to address the alleged law
violation in good faith. Under the regulations, while the attorney has the
option to "report out" to the SEC a company's unaddressed material law
violation, she does not have the consistent option to "report out" her
retaliatory discharge.
Although the SEC is silent about retaliatory discharge, Sarbanes-Oxley
contains two federal whistle-blower protection provisions that may be
construed to apply to inside lawyers. The civil whistle-blower protection
provision, section 806, prohibits retaliatory action against employees who
engage in both internal or external whistle-blowing, but it is limited in its
applicability to publicly traded companies and to specified federal subject
matters (for example, securities fraud). 378 The criminal provision, section
1107, makes it a felony for a publicly traded or privately held employer to
take any retaliatory action against an employee who engages in external
whistle-blowing about evidence of any federal crime, whether they
voluntarily come forth or are sought out by investigators. 379 While the
374. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(10). The SEC states in the adopting release that "[t]his
provision, an important corollary to the up-the-ladder reporting requirement, is designed to
ensure that a [CLO] . .. is not permitted to block a report to the issuer's board or other
committee by discharging a reporting attorney." See Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, 79 SEC Docket
1351 (Jan. 29, 2003), available at 2003 WL 193527, at *27 [hereinafter Adopting Release].
375. This may be due to the fact that the SEC may not feel it has the authority under the
statute to create whistle-blower protection for inside attorneys.
376. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act
Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (proposed §
205.3(d)(4)). The proposing release did not specify what remedies, if any, the SEC could
have sought in such circumstances.
377. The second "reporting out" proposal is also silent with respect to whether employed
or retained attorneys may report their retaliatory discharge to the SEC, although the proposal
requires them to notify the issuer's CLO. Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (proposed
Jan. 29, 2003) (proposed § 205.3(d)(3)).
378. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West Supp. 2003).
379. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513(e); see also Brickey, supra note 254, at 367-68 (noting that this
provision is limited to apply to retaliatory conduct that occurs in connection with providing
information to federal authorities).
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plain language of sections 806 and 1107 suggest that whistle-blower
protection should cover inside attorneys, the lack of clear legislative intent
and clear language extending protection to inside lawyers is problematic in
light of conflicting state court decisions on 380
whether inside counsel even
have the right to sue for retaliatory discharge.
Moreover, even assuming that the inside attorney has the right to sue
under state or federal statute or common law, can she disclose co-agents'
confidences to pursue a claim of retaliatory discharge? Unfortunately, the
state of the law here is also conflicting and, at least with respect to federal
whistle-blower protection, fails to protect inside lawyers. 38 1 Although the
plain language of the relevant SEC regulation permitting disclosure of
issuers' confidences is fairly broad 382 and could be interpreted to permit
disclosure of co-agents' confidences to establish a claim of retaliatory
discharge against a former employer, it is not at all clear whether the SEC
would endorse such an interpretation. The adopting release emphasizes the
defensive and protective nature of this disclosure rule, suggesting that this
rule may not be relied upon in an offensive legal action launched by the
3 83
attorney.
2. Faithful Agent
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Model Rules amendments fail to adequately
address the alignment pressures that arise from inside counsel's status as
"faithful agents." They fail to mitigate (and, in some respects, affirmatively
contribute to) the automatic tendency to conflate the organizational client
with senior management. The SEC accomplishes this by relying solely on
behavioral exhortation, and the ABA does the same by failing to develop a
coherent analysis of an agent's authority under Rule 1.13 and by
maintaining the misguided structure of Rule 1.6, which fails to distinguish
between organizational and individual clients.
As described in Part II, the situational pressures that arise from the
special agency relationship between the inside lawyer and the corporate
officer as de facto principal can sway the inside lawyer to conform her
380. See infra Part IV.B (discussing whistle-blower protection).
381. See infra Part IV.B (discussing Willy v. Coastal Corp.).

382. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(1) (2003) states, "Any report under this section (or the
contemporaneous record thereof) or any response thereto (or the contemporaneous record
thereof) may be used by an attorney is connection with any investigation, proceeding, or
litigation in which the attorney's compliance with this part is in issue."
383. In its accompanying release, the SEC stated,
Paragraph (d)(1) makes clear that an attorney may use any records the attorney
may have made in the course of fulfilling his or her reporting obligations under this
part to defend himself or herself against charges of misconduct. It is effectively
equivalent to the ABA's present Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) and corresponding "selfdefense" exceptions to client-confidentiality rules in every state. The Commission
believes that it is important to make clear in the rule that attorneys can use any
records they may have prepared in complying with the rule to protect themselves.
Adopting Release, supra note 374, at 1735.
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conduct to the officer's preferences. These alignment pressures affect both
inside and outside lawyers in ways that can induce acquiescence in
corporate misconduct. These alignment pressures arise because the actual
principal of the lawyer, the organizational client, is fictitious and can only
act through its agents, to whom inside lawyers are accountable.
The SEC regulations open with a reminder that an attorney owes "his or
her professional and ethical duties to the issuer as an organization," and that
in
the "issuer's officers, directors, or employees" that the attorney advises 384
the course of representing the company are not the attorney's clients.
While the SEC correctly spotted the issue of conflation, its response
consists mainly of behavioral exhortation.
The Model Rules contribute to these alignment pressures. Rule 1.13
adheres to what is known as the "entity theory of representation," the view
that the organizational entity, and not its individual constituents (officers,
employees, board, shareholders), is the client of the lawyer: A lawyer
employed or retained by an organization385represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents.
According to this view, the lawyer can safely accept direction from her
co-agents, who have been entrusted with a position of authority to speak on
services. 3 86 Therefore,
behalf of the client and to direct the lawyer's
"authority" of the co-agent is the touchstone. 387
Rule 1.13(b) sets forth the ABA's model "reporting up" provision.
According to this amended rule, if a lawyer for an organization knows that a
co-agent violates a duty to the organization or otherwise engages in a law
violation "that reasonably might be imputed to the organization," the lawyer
"shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization"-but only if the misconduct in question is "likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization." 388 The lawyer is then instructed to
"refer the matter to higher authority in the organization," "[u]nless the
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
corporation to do so."
Conspicuously, this rule fails to develop a coherent analysis of a coagent's authority, saying nothing about whether such authority expires upon
an unlawful act or a violation of his fiduciary duty to the principal, although
it is well established that an agent, no matter how high up in the corporate
hierarchy, "cannot lawfully overstep the limits imposed by the principles of
384. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(a). For a discussion on how the SEC refrained from imposing a
fiduciary duty on shareholders, see Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice for
Lawyers: Navigating the New Realm of FederalRegulation of Legal Ethics, 72 U. Cin. L.

Rev. 609, 628-29 (2003).
385. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(a) (2004).
386. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 1.13:106, at
395 (2001).
387. William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?:
An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 57, 80 (2003) (criticizing the
incoherence of Model Rule 1.13).

388. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(b).
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agency law on an agent's authority to commit to a course of action on
behalf of the principal." 38 9 This omission gives the dangerous impression
that the co-agent still maintains some degree of authority to direct the
actions of the lawyer, even if he has violated his fiduciary duties to the
corporation. As noted by William Simon, "Even the highest authority,
when it engages in an injurious and 'clearly' illegal course of conduct, is
not 'duly authorized.' If it lacks authority to engage in the conduct, then it
lacks authority to instruct the lawyer to remain passive about it." 390 The
failure of the rule to make this very simple pronouncement reinforces the
Model Rules' general tendency to conflate the organizational client with

management. 39 1

This certainly contributes to substantial alignment

pressures arising out of the fact that lawyers are generally accountable to

management.
We see the same tendency to conflate the organizational client with
management in Rule 1.6, the rule on confidentiality. Rule 1.6 prohibits the
disclosure of "information relating to the representation," 392 except in
39 3
On top of the original exceptions,
narrowly limited circumstances.
amended Rule 1.6(b) permits (but does not mandate) a lawyer to reveal
confidential information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary (1) "to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another . . . ,,394 and (2) "to prevent, mitigate or rectify
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is

389. Hazard, supra note 87, at 1014. Perhaps the failure to include an analysis of the coagent's authority reflects the ABA's reluctance to give the attorney the discretion to
determine valid "authority." But if the attorney does not make this determination, who will?
Whatever the ABA's reason, this is not surprising, as suggested by Robert Nelson, given the
historical opposition within the organized bar to any obligations on corporate practitioners to
go over the head of wrongdoing management. Nelson, supra note 166, at 542.
390. See Simon, supra note 387, at 81.
391. Id. at 65 ("[C]ourts treat the principle of corporate representation as conclusive
against the constituent's claim by tacitly conflating the interests of the corporation with those
of incumbent management.").
392. As the commentary to Rule 1.6 suggests, "information relating to the representation"
is extremely broad. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 1. It applies not only to
matters communicated in confidence by the client, but also to all information relating to the
representation, "whatever its source." Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 3. Presumably, this category is
significantly broader than what the attorney work product doctrine or the attorey-client
privilege would protect from disclosure.
393. Prior to its amendment, Model Rule 1.6(b) permitted the lawyer to reveal
confidential information "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm," "to
secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with [the Model Rules]," "to establish a
claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client,"
and "to comply with other law or a court order." Id. R. 1.6(b). The original "substantial
bodily harm" exception was so restrictive that, absent clear evidence of criminal intent, the
corporate lawyer was well advised to presume that Model Rule 1.6(b)(l), as originally
enacted, would not be triggered. I John K. Villa, Corporate Counsel Guidelines § 3.11, at 382 (2005).
394. Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.6(b)(2).
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reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of
a crime or fraud

..

. 395

These precepts apply only if, in either case, the client uses or has used the
lawyer's services to further the crime or fraud. 396 The ABA ultimately
opted for permissive disclosure, although many in the ABA Task Force
believed that "mandatory disclosure of client crime would strengthen the
lawyer's hand in persuading a client to abandon conduct known by the
lawyer to be criminal,3 97and would do so more effectively than mere
permission to disclose."
The addition of the two new exceptions to the overarching duty of
confidentiality are symbolically significant, because they represent a retreat
from the organized bar's rigid stance that no further exception to this duty is
necessary. However, these changes do not represent a significant change to
the actual rule in most jurisdictions. 39 8 Moreover, there are endemic
problems with this rule that these crafted exceptions simply do not cure.
First, the framing of the rule improperly suggests that the lawyer still owes
a duty to a wrongdoing co-agent. This rule was drafted against the
399
paradigm of the individual client, rather than the organizational client,
although the vast majority of legal representations involve organizational
clients and most managerial fraud (certainly, the most serious kind) happens
in the corporate context. Thus, by not distinguishing the individual client
from a co-agent of the client, the rule conflates the organizational client
with management. While this conflation may be grounded in the felt need
for a uniform rule, the effect is to give the impression that the lawyer still
owes a general duty of confidentiality to the co-agent, even when that coagent exceeds his agency authority (unless the co-agent's conduct triggers
one of the narrow exceptions to the rule).
Second, the framing of the rule predetermines that any exceptions to the
rule will be exceedingly narrow. By not distinguishing wrongdoing coagents from individual clients, the rule deems any disclosures made by the

395. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).
396. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2), (b)(3); see also Hamermesh, supra note 356, at 40 (describing the
rationale behind the "lawyer's services" limitation as resting on the belief that the client's
use of the lawyer's services to perpetrate crime or fraud "constitutes an abuse by the client of
the client-lawyer relationship, forfeiting the client's absolute entitlement to the protection of
Model Rule 1.6").
397. Hamermesh, supra note 356, at 38. Certainly, there is a significant difference in
tone between the statement, "If you violate the law, I have no choice but to report," (which is
likely to be interpreted as an honest attempt to follow professional mandates) and "If you
violate the law, I may report you" (which sounds much more like a "power play").
398. "Forty-one states either permit or require disclosure to prevent a client from
perpetrating a fraud that constitutes a crime, and eighteen states permit or require disclosure
to rectify substantial loss resulting from client crime or fraud in which the client used the
lawyer's services." ABA PreliminaryReport, supra note 142, at 206. Most states refused to
adopt the ABA's 1983 version of Model Rule 1.6. See Hamermesh, supra note 356, at 49.
399. George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure
to Prevent Harm to OrganizationalClients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing,
11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 597, 612 (1998).
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lawyer to be "adverse" to the client, an interpretation that the comments to
the rule openly endorse. 400 "Adverse disclosures" are generally justifiable
on the very rare occasion when the lawyer's duty to the public or to third
parties outweighs the lawyer's duty of confidentiality and loyalty to her
40 1
wrongdoing client.
But in the corporate context, disclosures of confidences entrusted by a
co-agent can actually be "'loyal' disclosures," which are justifiable not
despite loyalty to the client, but because of loyalty to the client.40 2 For
loyal disclosures, there is no need to balance the interest of the
organizational client against the interest of the potential victim, because the
client is the victim of the intended crime or fraud. 403 Only benefit to the
organizational client is needed. Although Rule 1.6(b) was amended to
address the issue of managerial fraud in the corporate context, it misses the
boat. Actually, any loyal disclosures that benefit the organizational client
would have been consistent with even the primary confidentiality rule,
which permits disclosures that are "impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation ... ."404 By not even entertaining the possibility of
"loyal disclosures" in the corporate context, the Model Rules contribute to
alignment pressures and the tendency to conflate senior management with
the corporate client.
Third, the crafted exceptions are so narrow that only egregious
misconduct, assisted by legal advice, is contemplated, limiting the impact of
the amendments. In order for an exception to be triggered, the crime or
fraud must "reasonably [be] certain" to result in "substantial" injury to the
"financial interests or property of another," and the client must have used
the lawyer's services "in furtherance of' such crime or fraud. But what if
the crime or fraud is false revenue recognition that could still amount to
billions of dollars worth of financial statement misrepresentation? Under
the current articulation of the rule, a lawyer may be constrained in
disclosing a co-agent's confidences to stop such a massive fraud (to the
extent not waived by the corporation) because her services may not be
40 5
deemed to have been "in furtherance of' such fraud.
3. Motivated Reasoning
While Sarbanes-Oxley and the Model Rules amendments also fail to
address the conformity pressures that arise from inside counsel's status as a
400. The comments to the rule are entitled "Disclosure Adverse to Client" and frame the
issue as one in which the "public interest" (as opposed to the interest of the organizational
client) is served.
401. See Harris, supra note 399, at 599.

402. Id.
403. Id. at 602.
404. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(a) (2004).

405. Securities lawyers are not necessarily involved in the drafting of financial statements
or the "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations" portion of the registration statement.
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"team player" of the company, as discussed in greater detail below, 4 06 such
pressures are extremely difficult to mitigate and, thus, I do not expect the
SEC or the ABA to have addressed them in a systematic manner. Rathe r, I
focus my critique now on motivated reasoning.
In Part II, I described the situational pressures under the umbrella of the
various roles of inside lawyers-as mere employees, faithful agents, and
team players. But self-interest pressures permeate all these roles and exert a
general, automatic influence on all ethical decision making. Motivated
reasoning is the key mechanism by which ethical issues are obscured and
stark conflict is avoided.
The Texas tort case study described in Part II above showed that complex
and ambiguous contexts can serve as a fertile breeding ground 40 7 for
motivated reasoning, which leads to self-serving interpretations of the
situation that will rationalize the lawyer's passivity. Complexity arises
when a problem has numerous initial options or those options cascade into a
"decision tree" with still more options. Ambiguity arises when decision
makers are constrained in their knowledge of certain facts necessary to
make the optimal decision, or when decision makers are uncertain about
how certain facts or rules (perhaps due to the indeterminate nature of those
rules and facts) will affect the ultimate outcome. 40 8 There are many
examples of such "fertile breeding grounds" in Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Model Rules. I will note just a few.
Pursuant to the SEC regulations under Sarbanes-Oxley, an attorney's
reporting obligation is triggered when she becomes aware of "evidence of
material violation," defined as "credible evidence, based upon which it
would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and
competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
'
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. 409
This complex standard adopted by the SEC contains a double negative,
which violates the SEC's own "plain English" rules and is difficult to
understand, interpret, and apply. 4 10 It will be even more difficult to
enforce, requiring the SEC's staff to assume the impossible burden of
proving two negatives. 4 11 Also, "materiality" is intentionally left undefined
by the rules. 4 12 Since "material" modifies the term "violation," which itself

406.
407.
408.
Russell

See infra Part IV.D (Ethical Norms).
See supraPart II.B.2 (discussing the Texas tort case study).
For an excellent discussion on judgments under complexity and ambiguity, see
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the

Rationality Assumptionfrom Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1077-84 (2000).

409. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2003).
410. Rule 421(d) under the Securities Act of 1933 states, "You must draft the
language... so that at a minimum it substantially complies with each of the following plain
English writing principles: ... (vi) No multiple negatives." 17 C.F.R. § 230.421.
411. See Cramton et al., supranote 331, at 752-53.
412. The adopting release states that the term should be read as understood under the U.S.
federal securities laws, citing leading cases which have established a fact is material if there
is "a substantial likelihood that the... fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
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is extremely broad, 4 13 presumably more than the violation's financial
impact should be considered.
The SEC's qualification that the evidence must show that a material
violation is "reasonably likely" is also unduly confusing. The adopting
release states that, "[t]o be 'reasonably likely' a material violation must be
' 4 14
more than a mere possibility, but it need not be 'more likely than not.'
SEC staff members have unofficially stated publicly that "reasonably
likely" means less than "'more probably than not' and that conduct in the
'4 15
'the 20%-40% range of likelihood' should trigger a report.
Unfortunately, most attorneys would probably understand the phrase to
mean "probably or more likely than not." 4 16 The muddled language will
surely create a breeding ground for bias.
We see similar complexity and ambiguity in the Model Rules
amendments, which reflect a distinct reluctance to adopt the gatekeeping
regime finally settled on by the SEC. Before a lawyer may resort to
reporting up the ladder, Model Rule 1.13(b) requires that the lawyer know
that the decision in question violates a duty to the organization or otherwise
engages in a law violation "that reasonably might be imputed to the
organization" and is "likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization." 4 17 The Model Rules define the term "knows" as meaning
"actual knowledge of the fact in question." 4 18 Thus, this triggering standard
is subjective and imposes a very high level of certainty, which will be
nearly impossible to meet in decisions involving, for example, a co-agent's
breach of the duty of due care. 4 19 The adoption of the subjective standard
also reinforces the principle that the lawyer is not generally charged with
the duty to investigate the accuracy of a client's recitation of the relevant
4 20
facts.

investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." See
Adopting Release, supra note 374, at 1728 n.59 (citing TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)); Fraidin & Mutterperl, supra note 384, at 632 (noting possible
interpretation of the SEC's definition of "materiality").
413. Violations of any federal or state law, including breaches of fiduciary duty arising
out of federal or state law, are contemplated. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i).
414. Adopting Release, supra note 374, at 1727.
415. Cramton et al., supra note 331, at 754 (citing Simon N. Lorne, An Issue-Annotated
Version of the SOX 307 Rules, in Attorneys' Liab. Assurance Soc'y, Loss Prevention
Programs A- 117, A-125 (June 12, 2003)).
416. Id. at 755 (citing Comments of Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., on the
SEC
Proposed
Rule
205
(Mar.
28,
2003),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/attorneyslia1.htm).
417. While "substantial injury" is not expressly defined, the ABA Task Force described
the relevant circumstances as "[an] extraordinary circumstance of a significant failure of
governance that puts or threatens to put the interest of the organization into serious
jeopardy." Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Liability 45 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Final Report].
418. Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.0(f) (2004).
419. Villa, supranote 393, § 3.07[C].
420. Id. § 3.20[Dl[2] (noting that, nonetheless, the lawyer is not privileged to turn a blind
eye to information that appears dubious).
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Model Rule 1.13(b) is replete with qualifications that give the lawyer
more room to talk herself out of reporting up. 4 21 When the duty to report
up is finally triggered, the lawyer "shall proceed as is reasonably necessary
in the best interest of the organization." 4 22 And what is "in the best interest
of the organization"? The rule does not explicitly define the vague term,
but the comment to the rule suggests that, ordinarily, up-the-ladder
reporting to a "higher authority" would be necessary, 42 3 "[u]nless the
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
organization to do so. ....
,,424 Also, if "warranted by the circumstances,"
the lawyer may refer the matter to the "highest authority that can act on
behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. '4 25 Although
up-the-ladder reporting of violations is literally mandatory (as evident by
use of the term "shall"), this is quite misleading, given the replete
qualifications, the highly subjective triggering standard, and the wide
discretion not to act if acting is deemed to be not "in the best interest of the
organization."
What is the "highest authority"? The comment to the rule states that the
organization's highest authority would ordinarily be the board of directors,
noting that "applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the
highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent
directors of a corporation." 426 Curiously, the comment does not mention
shareholders as potentially the "highest authority," although under state
corporations codes, shareholders alone are entitled to decide on certain
fundamental matters. 4 27 Of course, with publicly held corporations,
42 8
"informing shareholders would... be tantamount to public disclosure."
Although there are reasons why this should be cautiously undertaken, 429
421. She can always argue, for example, that a co-agent's conduct cannot "reasonably" be
imputed to the organization, that it is not "likely" to result in "substantial" injury, that
reporting up or out is "not necessarily in the best interest of the organization," that the
circumstances do not "warrant" referring the matter to the "highest authority," or that
"reporting out" is not "necessary" to prevent "substantial" injury to the organization. The
list goes on and on.
422. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.13(b).
423. See id. R. 1.13, cmt. 4 ("Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be
necessary.").
424. Id. R. 1.13(b).
425. Id.
426. See id. R. 1.13 cmt. 5 (2003).
427. Simon, supra note 387, at 82. For example, certain rights, such as preemptive rights,
can only be modified through an amendment of the organization's charter document.
Amendments to charter documents typically require a shareholder vote.
428. Id.
429. As discussed by William Simon, public disclosure could affect the stock price and
trigger shareholder lawsuits and government investigations, but if these potential
consequences were to be viewed merely as "default decision-making procedure[s] when the
normal corporate processes fail to achieve agreement" and as an "extension of the corporate
processes," public disclosures could be entirely consistent with acting in the best interests of
the organization. Of course, an assessment of whether going forward with litigation is truly
in the best interests of the corporation would require some evaluation of the substantive
merits. See id. at 84.
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going to shareholders may be the most appropriate course 430
of action, as the
court in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp. decided.
If the misconduct by co-agents is so serious that the organization is
imminently threatened with "substantial injury," 43 1 and remedial measures
are either ineffective or nonexistent, the organization's lawyer has little
further recourse. At this point, Rule 1.13(c) gives the lawyer one final
option: a very restricted right to go outside the organization for help when
she concludes that the highest echelons of the organization were acting
against its interests. 4 32 This "reporting out" provision is permissive, not
mandatory: The lawyer "may" reveal confidences entrusted by the coagent, "but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization." 433 "Reporting
out" may be done without regard to any restrictions under the duty of
confidentiality provision of Rule 1.6. Therefore, according to the comment,
it is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the
violation (as required for disclosure under Rule 1.6), although it is required
that the matter still be "related to the lawyer's representation of the
4 34
organization."
As noted above in the previous section, the framing and qualified
language of Rule 1.6 make it an unlikely basis for a lawyer's decision to
"report out" to protect the organizational client. A lawyer wishing to
"report out" would more likely rely on the more expansive "reporting out"
provision of Rule 1.13, provided that she is not unduly confused by Rule
1.6's incongruity with Rule 1.13. Although amended Rule 1.13 was
intended to "more actively encourage" up-the-ladder reporting, 4 35 both
Rules 1.6 and 1.13 seem to discourage the lawyer from doing so in the first
place.
In sum, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Model Rules amendments provide the
type of complex and ambiguous environment (a "fertile breeding ground")
where self-serving interpretations of the situation that lead to lawyer
acquiescence are likely to take root. The confusing or high triggering
standards, the copious qualifications, and the cautionary language, as well
as the lack of any coherent theory of a co-agent's authority, make it difficult
for any lawyer to be confident in her decisions to report up the ladder or
report out, if she chooses to do so.

430. 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that the lawyers violated the antifraud
norms of the securities laws by proceeding with closing, instead of insisting that shareholder
proxies be resolicited with disclosure of the new information).
431. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(c) states that the lawyer may make
further disclosures outside of the organization if "the lawyer reasonably believes that the
violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization" and
remedial measures are ineffective.
432. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 386, § 1.13:401, at 421.
433. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13.
434. See id. R. 1.13 cmt. 6.
435. See ABA Final Report, supra note 417, at 44.
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With respect to inside counsel, the recent reform's impact will be limited
because, ultimately, it is based on an inadequate model of fraud, the
venality hypothesis, which cognitively misorients us away from the lion's
share of the problem. This model's assumption is that accommodating
lawyers are explicitly and deliberately choosing the unethical route; thus,
recent reform relies predominantly on behavioral exhortation, backed by the
threat of disciplinary or civil sanctions, 436 as the solution. 437 But the
solution to the problem of lawyer acquiescence in fraud cannot arise from
merely recalibrating a "rational" actor's cost-benefit calculus. The solution
needs to address the complex economic, psychological, and ideological
forces that incline inside counsel to be complicit in fraud, not through any
overt or explicit calculation, but through a subtle and implicit
reconfiguration of preferences, self-conception, and motivation.
IV. ALTERNATIVE REFORM: TRANSFORMING THE ETHICAL ECOLOGY
In this part, alternative reforms are proposed which transform the ethical
ecology of inside counsel for the purpose of supporting the new
gatekeeping responsibilities imposed by the SEC. Organized from most
important to least important, it is generally proposed that (i) public
companies transfer the oversight of the corporate legal department to a
committee of independent board members; (ii) the law guarantee whistleblower protection to inside counsel under Sarbanes-Oxley and, accordingly,
permit the disclosure of client confidences under any claim alleging
retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley or a common law claim of retaliatory
discharge; and (iii) public companies limit ex ante the amount of equity
investments that an inside lawyer may accept as compensation or, in the
alternative, fashion equity compensation in a manner that minimizes
potential conflicts of interest.
These general measures are based on the premise that "[f]or the
gatekeeper to be an effective monitor of management on behalf of investors,
it must be independent of management. '438 Accordingly, these measures
should enhance the independence of inside counsel by neutralizing or
redirecting the situational pressures that lead to acquiescence in managerial
misconduct.
They should encourage inside counsel to (i) prevent
436. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2004) ("Sanctions and discipline"). A violation of section 205
shall subject the attorney to "civil penalties and remedies for a violation of the federal
securities laws" and the "disciplinary authority of the [SEC]." Id.
437. To be fair, Lawrence Hamermesh, the Reporter to the ABA Task Force, has admitted
that the 2003 amendments, standing alone, are "ineffectual and incomplete," and that these
amendments were submitted as a mere supplement to other corporate compliance initiatives.
Hamermesh, supra note 356, at 54, 55. Also, the Task Force did make a few "mild"
corporate governance recommendations, which are beyond the scope of this Article. See
ABA Preliminary Report, supra note 142, at 197-201 (proposed corporate governance
recommendations).
438. See Coffee, GatekeeperFailure,supra note 11, at 335.
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misconduct by reducing the benefits of unpunished acquiescence in
managerial wrongdoing and (ii) police misconduct by encouraging inside
counsel to monitor, investigate, and report the misconduct of culpable coagents, 439 Below, I spell out in greater detail the content of my proposals as
well as how they mitigate or reduce the situational pressures discussed in
Part II.
A. Structure
In response to the prosecution's query as to why Belnick failed to raise
with board members the issues flagged by outside counsel, 440 Belnick's
defense attorneys argued that this chief counsel, despite his high stature,
simply lacked independent access to the board. First, in Belnick's view,
reporting his concerns to the board was not his job. He had not regularly
read the minutes of the board's compensation or audit committees. "It was
not my obligation to keep an eye on the committees," he said to the
44 1
prosecutor. "You act as if I was there as a prosecutor."
Second, even when Belnick sought out board access, he was rebuffed by
Kozlowski.
When the board convened to discuss the $20 million
unauthorized finders' fee to board member Frank Walsh, Kozlowski
beckoned Belnick, who was invited to the meeting, 442
to meet him at the
doorway-and then firmly pushed him out of the door.
Third, Belnick was repeatedly reminded of his status as subordinate and
outsider.
Kozlowski regularly belittled and undermined Belnick's
authority. He persisted in mispronouncing his name as "Bel-a-nick. '44 3 He
hired a law firm behind Belnick's back. 444 Belnick was being "secondguessed on the company's response to possible government regulatory
questions about faulty sprinkler heads." 445 An inside attorney that Belnick
446
had fired was rehired the next day by Kozlowski into a Tyco division.

439. For an overview of "preventative" and "policing" measures, see Jennifer Arlen &
Reinier Kraakman, Controlling CorporateMisconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability

Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 693 (1997) (analyzing the diverse mechanisms through
which corporate liability can influence legal compliance).
440. Belnick failed to raise with the Board concerns about management's use of loan
programs for personal purposes and certain aggressive acquisition accounting practices.
These concerns were initially raised by Tyco's outside counsel, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.
See Lin, supra note 28.
441. Anthony Lin, Combative Cross Examination of Belnick Continues, N.Y. L.J., June

29, 2004, at 4.
442. Belnick attempted to hire Sullivan & Cromwell to probe the unapproved and
undisclosed mid-2001 $20 million finder's fee payment to board member Frank Walsh for
making introductions that ultimately led to the merger between the company and CIT Group,
Inc. Belnick was excluded in the board discussion about the finder's fee, and was later
instructed by board member Joshua Berman to dismiss Sullivan & Cromwell. See Rozen,
supra note 217, at 70, 71.
443. See Fishman, supranote 22.
444. See Rozen, supra note 217, at 70.
445. See id.

446. See id. at 69.
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And Belnick was excluded from key social events. He was not invited to
the $2.1 million lavish Roman orgy-themed birthday bash that Kozlowski
hosted in the island of Sardinia for his new wife (at the company's
expense). 44 7 On numerous occasions, Belnick threatened to quit, but in the
44 8
end he chose to stay.
Like all inside counsel, Belnick was subject to intense obedience,
alignment, and conformity pressures.
As a subordinate reporting to
Kozlowski and an agent to the de facto principal (Kozlowski), Belnick
(perhaps reluctantly) accepted Kozlowski's framing of his roles and
responsibilities, which included a lack of independent access to the board.
What might make inside counsel more than "mere employees" and not so
aligned to the de facto principal? The answer is to simply change the
structure so that inside counsel obeys a different master and accounts to a
different principal. More specifically, my first proposal requires the boards
of public companies to redirect the responsibilities over legal affairs from
449
that of the senior officers to a committee of independent board members
4
50
who may be organized as the audit committee or a separate QLCC.
To
minimize costs, the audit committee could double as the QLCC. 45 1 The
committee's mission would include the oversight of legal compliance, the
handling of all internal reports of evidence of material violations, and the
ensuring of the quality of the company's legal resources. Accordingly, the
committee would demand that the company's lawyers, both inside and
outside counsel, inform directors of all material issues as they make
corporate policy. This committee would make hiring and firing decisions,
evaluations, and compensation determinations for the general counsel and
would determine the budget for her department. This would be a dramatic
change from the status quo, as boards generally play no role in the
retention, evaluation, or compensation of counsel, apart from special
circumstances, 4 52 or in legal compliance.
447. See id.; Anthony Lin, A CautionaryTale, Corp. Counsel, Sept. 2004, at 1.
448. See Rozen, supra note 217, at 70, 74 (summarizing views on why Belnick chose to
stay).
449. Independent board members are board members who are not employees of the
company.
450. The gist of this suggested reform is favored by other academics. See, e.g., Campbell
& Gaetke, supra note 130, at 42 ("The responsibility for the selection of the corporation's
lawyer should be moved into the hands of a decision-maker that better represents the
interests of shareholders.
The most appropriate corporate decision-maker for that
responsibility is the corporation's independent audit committee."); Fisch & Rosen, supra
note 116, at 1136 (advocating a legal audit committee with similar objectives as a formal
mechanism for empowering directors to obtain legal advice).
451. Another alternative would be to require audit committees or QLCCs to designate an
outside lawyer or law firm as "general counsel" in the absence of inside counsel, although
this alternative is less desirable due to law firms' lack of easy access to back-channel
information. See ABA PreliminaryReport, supra note 142, at 198-99 (suggesting that audit
committees could designate outside general counsel).
452. Special circumstances include where counsel is retained to assist an independent
board committee in connection with an independent investigation. Fisch & Rosen, supra
note 116, at 1123.
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The above reform could be accomplished through statute, an SEC
regulation, or a stock exchange rule. To prevent circumvention of this
reform by choosing not to hire inside lawyers, companies without general
counsel (above a specified market capitalization) should be required to hire
general counsel by the time they are subject to the reporting requirements of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.453
My proposal sharply alters the inside counsel's ethical ecology. First, it
redirects the obedience and self-interest pressures felt by inside counsel as
"mere employees" of the company and subordinates to business
management. Recall how Milgram's experiments suggested that we are all
inclined to obey the commands of legitimate authority. By entrusting all
authority 4 54 over the legal department to the independent directors, the
identity of the ultimate authority empowered to direct inside counsel would
be changed. This should result in a subtle but perceptible change in the
interaction between inside lawyers and managers. Inside lawyers should
not view managers as bosses to be brazenly bypassed in order to make a
report. Managers should not be seen as the main recipients of ingratiating
overtures contrived to preserve inside lawyers' employment or to obtain
good bonuses and promotions. While management would still be given
deference on most business matters, management's authority on legal
matters (which, of course, have business consequences) would be
constrained, not only by the board, but also by inside counsel, who should
be more comfortable in exercising their gatekeeping functions.
Second, my proposal mitigates the "faithful agent" pressures that cause
lawyers to align their views and conduct with management's preferences.
Recall the auditing vignettes study455 and similar research showing how we
tend to align our views to those whom we are accountable. By changing the
reporting relationships of the corporate legal department, we would be
changing the audience to whom inside lawyers are generally accountable.
This change should reduce the automatic tendency to conflate the corporate
client with the senior officers whom inside lawyers have traditionally
served. It should assist the lawyer in gaining psychological independence
from those officers at the critical time when they act unlawfully and outside
the scope of their authority. It should support the ability of the inside
lawyer to determine when the specific co-agent no longer represents the
corporation, and thus when the lawyer no longer owes the co-agent any
duty. 456 My proposal also remedies the disjuncture between the beneficiary
of the lawyer's fiduciary duty (the corporation) and the lawyer's reporting

453. In the alternative, public companies without general counsel could be required to
explain in public filings why they choose not to hire general counsel.
454. All authority includes the authority to hire, fire, determine salaries and bonuses, and
determine budgets.
455. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
456. Gordon, supra note 176, at 1206.
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that the independent board best
duty (senior managers) to the extent
457
represents the corporation's interest.
Third, my proposal mitigates the "team player" pressures that can lead to
organizational silence. Recall the organizational behavior literature that
shows our strong tendency to stigmatize whistle-blowers as dissidents. A
committee responsible for legal affairs that has an independent basis of
power separate from the central chain of command 458 can help to
First, proper
destigmatize internal whistle-blowing in two ways.
implementation of this committee 459 can ultimately regularize the
communication of dissent as an important and normal duty of the employee
to the corporation at large. This should in turn help to insulate such
expressions from being perceived as "disruptive" or "insubordinate."
Instead of being regarded as the ultimate act of betrayal, internal whistleblowing could then be seen as a legitimate and loyal expression of
corporate dissent. Second, it can serve as a "visible signal" and reminder
"of the firm's attention to high ethical standards" 460 and the firm's greater
receptivity to whistle-blowing. The message to companies considering
financing through the national securities markets would be clear: Once you
have public shareholders, you owe a duty to your public investors to be
truthful and follow the law.
Fourth, my proposal encourages inside lawyers (and outside lawyers) to
report suspected misconduct to the board by, in effect, redefining the job of
lawyers to include greater access to the board. By getting rid of the
middleman (for example, the CEO), inside lawyers are more likely to report
evidence of material violation to the board. Given the independent
directors' committee's mission, meetings with the board (without the
CEO's presence) should be a normal, although not necessarily frequent,
occurrence. Familiarity with board members should increase the lawyer's
comfort level in reporting a senior officer's actions and increase the
likelihood that some back-channel information (often the kind that relates to
457. The incongruity between the inside lawyers' reporting and fiduciary duties will be
reduced by more closely aligning both duties. This harmonization should lessen instances of
conflict between the lawyer's imperative to obey superiors and her ethical duty to the
corporation by making one body (the board) the beneficiary of both.
458. Miceli & Near, supra note 248, at 292; see also Callahan et al., supra note 367, at
204-05 (noting that the ombudsman approach is superior, because (1) existence of a
centralized "channel for dissent encourages reports," (2) it is more straightforward because it
obviates questions about the "identification of the appropriate supervisor to receive a report,"
(3) it "conveys a strong message" that it is open to dissent, and (4) it is "removed from the
fray" (the central hierarchy)).
459. Of course, proper implementation is a tricky art, not a science. At minimum, the
existence of this channel needs to be widely publicized, as do the clear reporting procedures.
The employee also needs to be persuaded that there will be no retaliation for making internal
reports. This can be done with clear prohibitions against retaliation and publicized accounts
of punishment of retaliating managers. For suggestions for creating a climate conducive to
internal whistle-blowing, see, e.g., Miceli & Near, supra note 248, at 76-77.
460. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure
in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 691, 704
(2002).
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corporate wrongdoing) would be conveyed to the board. This new
reporting structure would also signal to outside lawyers the company's
greater receptivity to negative information. 4 6 1 Just as important, the board
would have access to a typically risk-averse voice through the general
counsel4 62 to counterbalance the sometimes optimistic or risk-preferring
voice of the CEO. 463 Since, as the recent scandals show, boards have been
"kept in the dark [by the CEOs] about the company's... susceptibility to
risk, ' 464 the general counsel's participation in the board's risk assessments
should lead to enhanced decision quality by the board, given its
consideration of multiple perspectives.465
Ineffectiveness objection. Why rely even further on independent
directors (by requiring inside counsel to report to them) when they have
recently proven impotent? Are not boards captured by the senior
management they are supposed to monitor? Critics of my proposal might
cite to the Enron board, which was an exemplary "board on paper, fourteen
members [with] only two insiders." 466 But this objection begs the question:
How should "independence" be defined? And were Sarbanes-Oxley's
narrow attempts to prevent the capture of the audit committee 467 enough?
461. See Fisch & Rosen, supra note 116, at 1136.
462. See generally Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results:
The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 375, 377-78
(1997) (predicting that the "systematic overstatement of risk is a robust, if not universal,
phenomenon in the legal profession"). But see Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules,
Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 1399, 1420-24 (2000)
(using prospect theory to explain why lawyers may take unreasonable risks to conceal their
own or their client's legal or ethical violations); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 113, 173 (1996) (suggesting that loss-frame
scenarios in litigation may trigger risk preference in lawyers).
463. Langevoort, supra note 36, at 288 (providing a more detailed discussion on traits,
such as over-optimism, that are disproportionately represented in executive suites); Donald
C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate
Irresponsibilityand the Lessons of Enron, 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 968 (2002) (providing a
neo-Darwinian explanation for why certain traits, such as optimism, overconfidence, and
ethical plasticity, are selected in corporate promotions tournaments); Richard W. Painter,
Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers andAuditors, 29 J. Corp. L. 397,
402 n. 19, 404 (2004) (positing that stock options may have increased managers' preference
for risk, which preference is likely to be triggered in loss-frame scenarios).
464. Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor
and Knowledge, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1187, 1207 (2003).
465. Morrison & Milliken, supra note 260, at 719 (citing M.E. Shaw, Group Dynamics:
The Psychology of Small Group Behavior (1981)).
466. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the
Modem Business Corporation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233, 1241 (2002). Also, the outside
directors had relevant business experience, many with accounting backgrounds and prior
senior management and board positions. But the Enron board's independence was seriously
compromised by side payments and social ties.
467. The SEC adopted rules ensuring that audit committee directors are independent,
focusing only on the issue of material economic benefits from the company. Excluded from
the audit committee are individuals employed by or otherwise affiliated with the issuer or a
subsidiary, or receiving consulting or other compensatory fees from the issuer (other than for
director service). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat.
745, 776 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (Supp. II 2002)) (Standards for Audit
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(The answer is no.) As the "ineffectiveness" objection suggests, in many

companies, CEOs exercise enormous de facto power over their corporate
boards. 468 This "capture" is due to several reasons, including the outside

directors' almost exclusive reliance on senior managers for companyWithout more scrutinizing definitions of
related information. 469
independence and reform of the director selection process, the problem of
captured boards is likely to persist (despite my proposals). 470 On the other
hand, there is some evidence that firms with higher numbers of independent
directors are less likely to commit financial fraud, 47 1 and that directors are

Committees); see also Standards Related to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities
Act Release No. 8220, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, 79 SEC Docket 3736 (Apr. 25,
The New York Stock
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220htm.
Exchange and Nasdaq have revised their listing standards to extend more exacting
independence standards to a majority of the company's directors. See SEC, NASD and
NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745,
81 SEC Docket 2082 (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://www.sec.govlruies/sro/3448745.htm.
468. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-HeavenlyCity or Potemkin
Village?, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597, 608-639 (1982) (noting limitations on independent directors'
ability to monitor management integrity and efficiency); James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundationsand Legal Implications of
Corporate Cohesion, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 83 (examining social
psychological mechanisms that lead to independent directors insulating board colleagues
from legal sanctions); Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors and
Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 Indus. & Corp.
Change 293 (1995).
469. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation,69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 772 (2002) (noting that the CEO controls
much of the information that reaches the compensation committee); Sanjai Bhagat &
Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921, 950-53 (1999) (noting that independent directors are "often
ignorant about what is happening inside the company"); Brudney, supra note 468, at 609
n.37 (noting that, while the entire corporate hierarchy typically supports the efforts of
management, boards generally do not have any staff devoted to their important activities);
Langevoort, supra note 36, at 308 (noting that the CEO and senior managers are in control of
the information flow to the board).
470. The persistence of the problem of captured boards means that inside counsel's
situational pressures will, too, persist.
471. Bhagat & Black, supra note 469, at 933 (positing, based on studies evaluated, that
either "independent directors help to control financial fraud," or "that managers who are
prone to commit fraud resist oversight by independent boards"). But see Roberta Romano,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J.
1521, 1533 (2005) (concluding that the literature on the composition of audit committees
does not support the proposition that 100% independent audit committees will reduce
financial statement wrongdoing). In response to Romano's conclusion, I note that many of
these studies have the irremediable flaw of having adopted cosmetic definitions of
"independence" for directors, which is problematic, given the inherently flawed selection
process of directors. See id. at 1531 (noting definitions of "independence" adopted). For a
recent critique and reform proposal for the director selection process, see Michael B. Dorff,
Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the ManagerialPower and Optimal Contracting
Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. Corp. L. 255 (2005). Also, some of the studies
reviewed by Romano appear to support the proposition that completely independent audit
committees do "improve performance," although Romano dismisses them as "not a source
for valid inferences because of methodological flaws." Romano, supra, at 1532 n.27. In

1060

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

generally unlikely to participate in fraud. 472 Many observers have also
noted a trend in boards becoming more "active" and more powerful in the
1990s, as relative CEO power declined. 473 And as the recent corporate

scandals have shown, once boards confront blatant misconduct, they at least
have the capacity to make the right decisions, which often include the

immediate termination of misbehaving executives, financial restatements,
and full public disclosure. 4 74 Although reforms to mitigate board capture
are beyond the scope of this Article, my reform assists by giving these
directors direct access to inside counsel by reducing the information
disparity between the board and the CEO. This access strengthens not only
inside counsel's hands, but the board's as well.
Impracticability objection. Will not my proposal simply require too
much of the independent directors' time? This objection begs the question:
Should directors spend more time on legal affairs? Certainly, my proposal
questions the validity of the status quo. On average, directors spend about
addition, Romano admits that most of the studies reviewed relate to firm "performance"
rather than financial statement misconduct, the latter (and not the former) being the relevant
issue for Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. at 1530. Moreover, notwithstanding Romano's conclusions,
many of the studies Romano reviewed suggest that there is generally a positive correlation
between a higher number of independent directors and less financial wrongdoing. See
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance
12-102 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 04-37, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101.
472. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 138, at 728, 729 (concluding that, based on the
evidence, board involvement in frauds is unlikely).
473. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in
Corporate Governance, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2002) (noting several high-profile board
revolts to support the observation that the board capture phenomenon is less valid today);
Bebchuk et al., supra note 469, at 768 n.27, 773-74 (noting CEO tenure declines and more
common CEO forced resignations as evidence of boards becoming more independent); Ira
M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the
Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1283, 1285 (1998) (noting "[t]he
evolution of boards [in the 1990s] from managerial rubber-stamps to active and independent
monitors ... [as a response to] performance problems associated with managerial
entrenchment").
474. Third and Final Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, at 297, In
re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.king.comlfiles/tbl-s48News/PDFUpload3O7/ 01 29/WorldCom-Report-final.pdf
; id. at 260-61 (reaffirming conclusions that, while the Audit Committee failed to detect
accounting fraud, such failures resulted from "deference that the Audit Committee showed to
the Company's former senior financial Management and the external auditor, rather than
from any overt act or omission" and thus the Examiner "does not recommend that the
Company consider any accounting-related claims against" them); see also Final Report of
Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, app. D, at 46, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003) (Role of Lay, Skilling, and Outside Directors), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/examinerfinal.html. The report concluded that the evidence
reviewed was
not sufficient for a fact-finder to conclude that any of the Outside Directors failed
to act in good faith, or that they acted with a conscious disregard for known risks.
This is particularly true in an environment in which management often failed to
provide the Board with meaningful information and even intentionally misled the
Board from time to time.
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180 hours per year on board business, including preparation and travel
time.47 5 In contrast, managers work full-time for their companies. The vast
discrepancy between managers and independent directors in the amount of
time each group respectively devotes to a company's affairs "grants an
enormous advantage to officers in any dispute between management and the
board." 4 76 The SEC has at least partially acknowledged that board
members need to spend more time on legal affairs, as reflected in its
adoption of an alternative QLCC reporting approach. 47 7 And some scholars
predict that the board will take on more responsibility for legal
compliance. 478 While achieving the optimal balance between board neglect
and board micromanaging 47 9 should be a challenge, I believe that the
correct balance has not yet been struck for many companies. Obviously,
this change in board responsibilities will have some cost consequences, but
costs are not necessarily dispositive, and may be an appropriate trade-off for
the company.480
475. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporations and Other Business Organizations 156 (9th
concise ed. 2005) (noting that outside directors spend about 180 hours per year, including
preparation and travel time).
476. Michael Dorff, Softening Pharaoh's Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory and
Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 811, 851
(2003).
477. See supra notes 350-52 and accompanying text.
478. Langevoort, supra note 464, at 1202 (noting that the boards will take on more
responsibility for legal compliance).
479. Let me clarify that I would not require the independent directors to micromanage
legal affairs, which they understandably are reluctant to do if earnings results are good. The
best analogy for the relationship between the general counsel and the independent directors
is probably the relationship between the CEO and the board (not in terms of power, but in
terms of the frequency and quality of interaction). Generally speaking, "the board's most
important task is not business decision-making, but monitoring and supervision, most
notably via the selection and compensation of the CEO." Id. at 1200. Management typically
does not engage the board in day-to-day strategic business decisions. Similarly, the general
counsel does not need to confer with the board on day-to-day legal decisions, but the board
should establish a dialogue with her about her views of material legal risks. Many general
counsels are comfortable in asserting their role in making day-to-day legal decisions in the
best interests of the company. There will, of course, be times when consultation with the
board or management is necessary, but this should not be unduly frequent.
480. As a result of increased board attention to legal matters, outside directors may need
to whittle down the number of companies that they represent and, in turn, companies may
need to jack up their compensation. This increase in director compensation can theoretically
be offset by a decrease in CEO compensation, commensurate with a decrease in CEO's
responsibilities. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Stephen Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187, 246 (1991)
(arguing for an increase in base compensation and a limitation in the number of boards that
outside directors may represent as part of a general proposal for the quinquennial election of
directors). Of course, many scholars question directors' abilities to rein in executive salaries.
See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 469; Bhagat & Black, supra note 469, at 931 (reporting
studies suggesting that executive compensation tends to be higher in firms with a high
percentage of outside directors); Dorff, supra note 476. Admittedly, without additional
reforms that reduce or eliminate the structural bias, high levels of director compensation may
in fact compromise director independence, since CEOs, who currently exercise much
influence over director selections in some firms, may be reluctant to renominate adversarial
or scrutinizing directors. Gordon, supra note 466, at 1243. The issue of how to improve the
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Circumvention objection.
Cannot a "corrupt" manager simply
circumvent inside counsel by not consulting her when choosing to engage
in misconduct? While this certainly can happen, most significant frauds
481
require substantial cooperation or acquiescence from inside lawyers.
Cannot the corrupt manager resort to retaining his own counsel and thus
bypass the general counsel? 48 2 Given the structural nature of my reform,
this should not be a major problem. Since the general counsel would report
to the independent directors, it would be clear that the general counsel
would be responsible for the retention of all counsel within the confines of
the legal budget allocated by the independent board committee. Thus, a
CEO's defiance of this structure by hiring his own counsel would trigger a
"red flag" for misconduct and could serve as insubordination grounds for
terminating the CEO. 483 Also, inside counsel's easy access to back-channel
information often means that, sooner or later, they are likely to learn of

board's accountability (to the law or to shareholders) is beyond the scope of this Article,
although it is, of course, entirely relevant to whether an inside attorney will report
misconduct to the board in the first place (given the ex ante level of the board's receptivity to
such reports).
481. Burton & Dzienkowski, supra note 7, at 692-711; Koniak, supra note 337, at 195
(noting that "without lawyers, few corporate scandals would exist and fewer still would
succeed long enough to cause any significant damage," and discussing the involvement of
several prominent lawyers and law firms in corporate scandals); Rhode & Baton, supra note
191, at 9 (discussing involvement by both in-house and outside counsel in the Enron
scandal).
482. A corollary to this question is: "Can't a clever manager resort to hiring 'gray
lawyers' (who do not purport to be practicing law) from [a multidisciplinary practice
"MDP"]?" For a definition of "gray lawyer," see, e.g., Burnele V. Powell, The Lesson of
Enronfor the Future of MDPs: Out of the Shadows and into the Sunlight, 80 Wash. U. L.Q.
1291, 1301 (2002). To the extent that managers hire gray lawyers who can displace much of
the consulting work typically performed by lawyers, Sarbanes-Oxley's goals are impaired, as
those critical gatekeeping duties are imposed only on licensed attorneys or those who hold
themselves out as licensed attorneys. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(c) (2004) (defining "attorney").
On the other hand, these gray lawyers will also not be able to claim the attorney-client
privilege over client communications, so there may be an offsetting disadvantage for
managers to using them. This concern has been brought to the attention of the SEC. See
Letter from Robert E. Rosen, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm'n
(Dec.
17,
2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/rerosenl.htm
(calling for a more inclusive
definition of "attorney" that would not increase the demand for firms of nonpracticing
securities law consultants and would also include legally trained individuals who report to
the CFO and not the CLO, e.g., tax managers who have legal backgrounds).
483. Of course, the language of the relevant employment contract needs to be scrutinized
in order to complete this analysis.
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misconduct. 484 As noted earlier, knowledge of shaky accounting
in Enron
485
was widespread within the company and among inside lawyers.
One final point bears mentioning. Much of the concern underlying the
"circumvention" objection arises from the common assumption that errant
corporate managers are blatantly corrupt and thus predisposed to "active"
circumvention. But such a characterization presupposes venality-that
these CEOs are, too, making explicit, conscious choices to sacrifice ethics
for profit. While this may be true in some cases, most securities frauds
committed by corporate managers may, in fact, be banal, where motivated
4 86
reasoning, rather than any explicit calculation, is the driving mechanism.
The same venality assumption underlies the fear that corrupt managers (or
boards captured by corrupt managers) will resort to "opinion shopping," the
4 87
continued search by a determined wrongdoer for a compliant gatekeeper.
Whether this is a realistic fear or not, with respect to auditors, solutions
adopted to address this issue include the entrusting of the appointment of
auditors to the audit committee of the board and the requirement of public
disclosure when the company switches auditors. 48 8We should consider
similar solutions with respect to the general counsel.

484. See Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 11, at 1308-09 (observing that many
corporate actions require the participation of multiple individuals, which increases the
likelihood that counsel will be aware of client misconduct). There are many ways inside
counsel can learn of misconduct through the backchannel.
For example, they can
inadvertently hear a suspicious remark, they can be informed of the misconduct by an
outraged employee, or a routine audit can uncover the fact that the CEO has retained a law
firm without the permission of general counsel.
485. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing a lawyer's role as a "team player"); see also Dan
Feldstein, Skilling Says He Did No Wrong: Lawyer Told Not to Stick Neck Out, Hous.
Chron., Feb. 8, 2002, at IA (describing what measures Enron's inside attorney Jordan Mintz
took when confronted with company fraud). Lisa Nicholson provides a detailed account of
the knowledge of Enron's in-house legal department about the accounting problems. See
Nicholson, supra note 366, at 601-03; see also Batson Report Appendix C, supra note 3, at
190-202 (analyzing the role of Enron's inside attorneys).
486. See Langevoort, supra note 280, at 139-41 (noting that securities fraud is often the
result of simple recklessness born of self-serving, overly optimistic views of a firm's
prospects, which have little basis in reality, even though they are honestly held); Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 19-20 (2002) (noting that "the alleged perpetrators were
not shady criminals but seemingly responsible business people" who were subject to
judgment biases). But see, e.g., Mark Maremont, Rite Aid Case Gives First View of Wave of
Fraud on Trial, Wall St. J., June 10, 2003, at Al (describing the "great lengths" to which
both the former CEO and the general counsel of Rite Aid went in order to "hide their
tracks").
487. See Gilson, supra note 80, at 911 (noting that the compliant gatekeeper might be
required to agree up front to management's position as a condition of engagement);
Kraakman, supra note 11, at 72-74.
488. For example, the SEC could adopt a rule or regulation that requires disclosure as a
"material event" on Form 8-K when the general counsel is terminated for a certain category
of reasons. See infra Part IV.B (discussing whistle-blower protections).
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B. Whistle-Blower Protection
At Tyco, Kozlowski's questioning of Belnick's loyalty in a discussion
about the recall of the faulty sprinklers triggered an outpouring of
frustration by Belnick. Belnick threatened to leave. Kozlowski warned that
Belnick "would leave with nothing-no severance, no bonus. Belnick said
he would sue and argue that he had been constructively fired because he
was unable to do his job." 489 Of course, Belnick probably did not know
that his rights to sue his employer for constructive discharge would be quite
490
limited.
Unlike outside lawyers, inside lawyers may get into employment disputes
with their client, sometimes leading to their discharge by a co-agent. While
outside lawyers also may be terminated by their clients, rarely do such acts
threaten their livelihood, as lawyers in private practice are typically
diversified. Inside lawyers, on the other hand, may be faced with the
dilemma of doing the right thing and losing one's job, or obeying one's
boss and violating the law or other ethical mandates. The moral dilemma is
exacerbated by the fact that, in many jurisdictions, inside lawyers have no
legal redress against management retaliation.
The law of retaliatory discharge for inside counsel is a complicated
patchwork of conflicting judicial and administrative decisions on the
common law of retaliatory discharge and state professional ethics codes,
and state and federal whistle-blower protection statutes, including SarbanesOxley. The basic tension in these cases is between the conception of inside
counsel primarily as an employee, deserving some judicial protection from
retaliation, and as a lawyer-advocate, whose client has an unfettered right to
terminate. Since the law in this area seems to be undergoing change, I will
491
summarize the developments in some detail.
The first courts addressing this issue categorically denied inside counsel
492
the common law right to sue under the tort of retaliatory discharge,
489. See Rozen, supra note 217, at 70.
490. New York has refused to recognize a wrongful discharge claim for inside counsel.
See Wise v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 282 A.D.2d 335 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
(holding that affirmative claims by in-house counsel against defendant employer "for
damages, grounded in the theory of wrongful discharge, do not fall within the exception
permitting an attorney to disclose confidences or secrets necessary to defend 'against an
accusation of wrongful conduct') (quoting Model Code of Prof'1 Responsibility DR 4101(c)(4) (1983)).
491. For good summaries of recent developments in this area, see 2 Villa, su ra note 393,
§ 6.08; Lucian T. Pera, Lawyers as Whistleblowers: The Emerging Law of Retaliatory
Discharge of In-House Counsel (Ass'n of Corporate Counsel 2005) (on file with author).
492. See Sally R. Weaver, Client Confidences in Disputes Between In-House Attorneys
and Their Employer-Clients: Much Ado About Nothing-Or Something?, 30 U.C. Davis L.

Rev. 483, 493-94 (1997) (noting that, in the prior decade, courts have issued twelve
decisions that considered whether inside lawyers may state a claim for retaliatory discharge,
but only three have recognized such a cause of action for inside lawyers). However, courts
have been more willing to extend other statutorily protected rights to inside counsel. Id. at
492-93. For the proposition that inside counsel do not have a cause of action, see, e.g., Willy
v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that the attorney asked to
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which, for lay employees, would provide relief if the employee's retaliatory
dismissal threatened public policy. These decisions are often grounded in
the belief that attorneys do not need the additional incentive (as do other
employees) to uphold the public interest that the tort of retaliatory discharge
provides. 4 93 These courts argue that the existence of a state professional
ethics code, which clearly prescribes what an attorney must do in those
situations, makes the tort superfluous for employed lawyers. 494 The other
major reason is that courts fear that the recognition of the tort of retaliatory
discharge would significantly impair the special relationship of trust
between attorneys and their de facto clients by chilling communications. 49 5
Accordingly, inside lawyers' special role as lawyer-advocates supersedes
their role as employees and, thus, being lawyer-advocates requires them to
potentially sacrifice their economic livelihood in order to protect the
4 96
"integrity of the legal profession."
Fortunately for inside counsel, this harsh line is slowly giving way to a
view that recognizes the situational constraints of their role as employees.
These courts recognize an inside lawyer's limited right to sue under a tort of
retaliatory discharge when acting under certain "public interest"
concerns. 497 These cases hold that a lawyer should be entitled to the rights

violate the law did not qualify for Texas's public policy exception), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988), aft'd, 503 U.S. 131 (1992); Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,
584 N.E.2d 104, 107-08 (Ill. 1991) (holding that the attorney did not have cause of action
against the employer for retaliatory discharge even where public safety was implicated);
Herbster v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding tort of retaliatory discharge was not available to general counsel working solely for
a corporation and whose oral contract was terminable at will).
493. Weaver, supra note 492, at 494; see, e.g., Gambro, 584 N.E.2d at 109 ("In-house
counsel do not have a choice of whether to follow their ethical obligations as attorneys
licensed to practice law, or follow the illegal and unethical demands of their clients. Inhouse counsel must abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct.").
494. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d at 108 ("In this case, the public policy to be protected, that of
protecting the lives and property of citizens, is adequately safeguarded without extending the
tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel.").
495. Id. at 110 ("If extending the tort of retaliatory discharge [to in-house counsel] might
have a chilling effect on the communications between the employer/client and the in-house
counsel, we believe that it is more wise to refrain from doing so.").
496. Id. ("[Flor all attorneys know or should know that at certain times in their
professional career, they will have to forgo economic gains in order to protect the integrity of
the legal profession.").
497. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Ct., 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994)
(same); GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161, 166 (Mass. 1995) (permitting inside
counsel to maintain an action for wrongful discharge in limited circumstances); Parker v. M
& T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that the New
Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act was not inconsistent with the Code of
Professional Ethics and that a wrongfully discharged attorney could recover monetary
damages-as opposed to reinstatement-from a retaliating employer). The "public interest"
standard varies somewhat. See Allan Dinkoff, Analyzing the Attorney Whistleblower Claim:
A Modest Suggestion for the Twenty-First Century, in Understanding Developments in
Whistleblower Law 2 Years After Sarbanes-Oxley, at 371, 378 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 6864, 2005). The General Dynamics court
constrained the right to claims grounded in "explicit and unequivocal ethical norms
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of a nonlawyer to sue where no sensitive confidentiality concerns are
implicated or, if they exist, confidentiality can be adequately safeguarded
through procedural devices, for example, in camera proceedings. 4 98 While
this departure from the traditional line is significant, the leading case
representing this view makes it clear that where the claim cannot be pursued
without breaching the attorney-client privilege the suit must be
dismissed. 499 As sternly warned by this court, "the in-house attorney who
publicly exposes the client's secrets will usually find no sanctuary in the
courts."

500

More recently, a third line of cases, which began appearing in 2000, have
gone even further and permitted inside counsel to reveal client confidences
to the extent that they reasonably believe necessary to establish a retaliatory
discharge claim. 50 1 These courts show sensitivity to the fact that inside
counsel will have great difficulty pursuing any claim for retaliatory
discharge without disclosing some attorney-client communications, given
the role that inside lawyers play and the nature of the allegations inherent in
a retaliatory discharge claim by employed lawyers.
Despite this emerging trend, many courts do not recognize this cause of
action or have not had an opportunity to do so. Among those courts that do,
many have not fully addressed the critical issue of whether inside counsel
may use confidential or privileged information to pursue a claim. Of those
that do, many neglect to distinguish the duty of confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege, which are two distinct concepts. 50 2 And only two
judicial decisions to date have extended state statutory whistle-blower

embodied in the Rules of Professional Responsibility and statutes, and claims which are
maintainable by the nonattorney employee." 876 P.2d at 503 (emphasis omitted).
498. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503-04 (addressing confidentiality concerns).
For criticism of the General Dynamics decision, see Weaver, supra note 492, at 502-06.
499. See GeneralDynamics, 876 P.2d at 503-04; Meadows v. KinderCare Learning Ctrs.,
Inc., No. CV-03-1647, 2004 WL 1068793, at *5 (D. Or. May 11, 2004) (dismissing a claim
of wrongful discharge brought by former inside counsel and stating that, since the claim was
based on the attorney's opposition to alleged discriminatory practices, it could not be proved
without disclosing privileged communications which would violate public interest in
maintaining client confidentiality).
500. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503.
501. See, e.g., Alexander v. Tandem Staffing Solutions, Inc., 881 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the professional rules permit a petitioner to disclose client
confidences to the extent reasonably necessary to make a claim against an employer-client
under the Florida Whistleblower Act); Burkhart v. Semitool, Inc., 5 P.3d 1031, 1041 (Mont.
2000) (holding that professional rules permit an attorney to reveal confidential attorneyclient information "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish an
employment-related claim against" an employer-client); Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int'l Inc.,
78 S.W.3d 852, 866 (Tenn. 2002) (holding that "a lawyer may ethically disclose the
employer's confidences or secrets when the lawyer reasonably believes that such
information is necessary to establish a claim against the employer"); Spratley v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 603, 608 (Utah 2003) (holding that the professional rules
permit attorneys to make disclosures reasonably necessary to establish a wrongful discharge
claim against an employer-client).
502. See Pera, supra note 491, at 20-22.
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protection specifically to inside counsel. 503 Even if a state or federal
whistle-blower protection statute is deemed to cover inside counsel, the
inside lawyer may be prevented from pursuing the statutory claim due to
confidentiality/privilege concerns. For example, in Willy v. Coastal
Corp.,504 the first decision to address attorney-client privilege or
confidentiality in a lawyer-as-whistle-blower case under a federal whistleblower protection statute (in this case, environmental protection statutes),
the U.S. Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board ("DOL")
held that the discharged lawyer was not permitted, as a matter of federal
common law, to use any privileged or confidential information of his
former employer to prove his claim.
The Willy decision does not bode well for inside counsel seeking relief
under the civil whistle-blower protection provision, section 806 of
Sarbanes-Oxley. The DOL, which decided the Willy case, has jurisdiction
over all Sarbanes-Oxley section 806 administrative complaints and should
reach a similar result to that in Willy. However, there is potential for each
5
federal circuit to reach a different conclusion at the appeals stage. 50
What can be done to counteract self-preserving tendencies and encourage
inside lawyers to take an ethical stand within their companies? First,
Congress should clarify that the civil and criminal whistle-blower
protection provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley sections 806 and 1107 also
prohibit retaliation against inside counsel for reporting up the ladder.
Congress should also make clear that inside counsel have a right to file a
complaint under section 806 for retaliatory discharge. 506 As noted above,
the SEC's conspicuous failure to address this issue in the final
implementing regulations promulgated under section 307, and the lack of
clear legislative intent and clear language extending protection to inside
counsel, are problematic in light of the Willy decision.
Of course, defining the right is not as simple as it sounds. Should this
right be triggered only when the CEO or another officer with authority over
counsel retaliates against inside counsel, or should it be triggered also in
cases of board retaliation? Put differently, can the board ever terminate
503. See 2 Villa, supra note 393, § 6.11 (citing Burkhart, 5 P.3d at 1041; Parker v. M & T

Chems., Inc. 566 A.2d 215, 222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)). The majority of whistleblower statutes only apply to public sector whistle-blowers, and only a few extend protection
to private sector whistle-blowers. Id.
504. See ARB Case No. 98-060, at 34-36 (U.S. Dep't of Labor Feb. 27, 2004), available
at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/arb/decsn2/98_060a.caap.pdf (finding that in the absence
of a claim that the company engaged in ongoing crime, fraud, or misconduct, or a claim that
the attorney was fired for breaching a duty owed to the company as in-house counsel, as
opposed to the employee, the attorney was precluded from using privileged material in order
to establish his claim). In this case, the information and documents ultimately held
privileged had already been introduced into evidence.
505. See Pera, supra note 491, at 24.
506. A whistle-blower may seek relief by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
within ninety days of the retaliatory act and may file suit in federal court if the Secretary
does not issue a final decision within 180 days after the complaint is filed. 18 U.S.C.A. §
1514A(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(D) (West Supp. 2005).
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inside counsel (without liability) for taking a report of material violation 5up
07
the ladder? What if the lawyer was mistaken but acted "reasonably"?
What if the board reasonably and genuinely has lost confidence in counsel
after counsel made a report in good faith? What if the board is "captured"
by management or otherwise fails to exercise "due care"?
Raising these sticky issues is only meant to highlight the complexity of
issues that are likely to arise, not to provide any magic answers. One could
imagine, however, that these issues would be played out at trial and that
different standards might apply, depending on which party was the
retaliating actor. 50 8 Perhaps a new "business judgment rule" would evolve
to evaluate board actions for these types of cases. Perhaps a standard that is
deferential to board action would develop, but the lawyer-claimant who
makes a report in good faith and is terminated as a result could still be
awarded, say, the present value of five years' wages at the rate of payment
prior to the retaliatory act. 509 I mean only to point out that if we want
inside lawyers to report matters up the ladder, we need to address the
"threatened self-interest" that prevents her from doing so in the first place.
Second, the SEC should enact regulations or interpretive guidelines that
clearly indicate that section 205.3(d), which permits disclosure of issuer's
confidences under certain circumstances, was intended to cover claims
made by inside attorneys under a retaliatory discharge claim pursuant to
section 806. In addition, state courts and state ethics oversight boards
should conform their interpretation of state professional rules to the ABA
ethics opinion 5 10 which interprets Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) as permitting an
inside lawyer to disclose client confidences to the extent "the lawyer
reasonably believes is necessary to establish her claim" of retaliatory
discharge. 5 11 As noted above, mere recognition of a cause of action under
Sarbanes-Oxley section 806 is not enough. Even if courts granted a cause
of action under Sarbanes-Oxley, the right is useless if inside attorneys are
barred from disclosing client confidences in order to pursue their claims.
As mentioned in Part III above, the current SEC regulation (section
205.3(d)) on disclosure of confidences does not indicate whether an inside
lawyer can disclose a client's or co-agent's confidences in a retaliatory
discharge case.

507. The statute protects the employee, so long as the employee "reasonably believes" the
action in question to be a law violation. Id. § 1514A(a)(1).
508. See, e.g., Dinkoff, supra note 497, at 378.

509. Id. This will allow counsel time to find work or, if that becomes unfeasible, to train
in another field.
510. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001)
("A Former In-House Lawyer May Pursue a Wrongful Discharge Claim Against Her Former
Employer and Client as Long as Client Information Is Properly Protected") ("We conclude
that a retaliatory discharge claim or similar claim by an in-house lawyer against her
employer is a 'claim' under Rule 1.6(b)(2).").
511. Id. One should note that this opinion does not purport to address whether a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge exists for inside counsel.
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Third, to support these measures, the SEC should require companies to
disclose voluntary or involuntary terminations of their general counsel
based on professional reasons. 512 This would parallel existing SEC rules
requiring disclosure on Form 8-K for auditor terminations, which some
have argued has historically been the best guarantor of an accounting firm's
independence. 5 13 In the case of an actual auditor switch, an adverse market
reaction typically follows. 5 14 While certainly such a notice to the public
markets would have grave consequences, 5 15 the most likely and immediate
effect would be to increase corporate compliance by increasing the cost of
5 16
locating a "pliable gatekeeper.
These measures are critical to counteracting the enormous obedience,
alignment, and self-interest pressures that arise from the fact that inside
counsel are economically tied to a single client, as well as the reality that
their career trajectory is under the control of the senior officer responsible
for legal affairs. Inside counsel seem to recognize that taking an ethical
stand seriously risks one's career. In a recent survey of inside counsel, "48
percent believed that establishment of laws protecting attorney
whistleblowers" was necessary to ensure the well-being of the
5 17
organizational client.
"Chilling communications" objection. But will not allowing disclosure
of co-agent's confidences for retaliatory discharge claims lead to rampant
lawyer whistle-blowing, the chilling of communications between the lawyer
and co-agent, and-ironically-result in even less compliance with the law,
because businesspeople would then be afraid to seek out legal advice? 5 18 A
512. In the SEC's second proposal, the issuer would have the burden of publicizing the
attorney withdrawal. The idea of requiring the issuer to disclose on a Form 8-K was
originally proposed by a commentator who reasoned that the disclosure would serve as a
mechanism to ensure that investors would learn of possible misconduct within the company.
See Fraidin & Mutterperl, supra note 384, at 655 n.203.
513. Gordon, supra note 466, at 1225 n.1 I (noting that such auditor firing is a "high
visibility sanction" that may ultimately cause more harm to officers and directors than to the
accountants).
514. See James A. Yardley et al., Supplier Behavior in the U.S. Audit Market, II J.Acct.
Literature 151 (1992) (noting that four studies report significant negative market reactions to
auditor switches following disclosure of disagreements with auditors and/or receipt of a
qualified opinion).
515. Letter from Anthony J. Horan, Corp. Sec'y, J.P. Morgan Chase, to Jonathan Katz,
Sec'y,
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm'n
(Apr.
9,
2003),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jpmorganchase040903.htm
(commenting
on
Securities Act Release No. 33-8185 and Securities Act Release No. 33-8186, and expressing
concern that the immediacy of the company's required reporting actions, without the
opportunity to investigate the matter fully, could have grave and unnecessary consequences
for the investing community).
516. See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 72-74 (discussing the practice of shopping for
compliant gatekeepers).
517. See Brown, supra note 148, at 97.
518. This "chilling communications" concern explained the ABA Task Force's
withdrawal of the originally proposed mandatory "reporting out" (disclosure of client or
constituent crime to a third party) provision of Model Rule 1.6. Hamermesh, supra note 356,
at 39.
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quick review of the arguments answering this objection suggests that the
normative and empirical foundations of this objection are problematic at
best.
First, this objection profoundly misunderstands the nature of modem
corporate frauds, which require substantial cooperation or acquiescence
from lawyers. As Susan Koniak notes, "[W]ithout lawyers, few corporate
scandals would exist and fewer still would succeed long enough to cause
any significant damage." 5 19 Second, fears of "chilling," or rampant
whistle-blowing on the part of lawyers, are highly speculative. 5 20 Third,
this objection often assumes the myth that confidentiality is absolute, when
in fact it is waivable by the entity, lasting only as long as it is in the entity's
interest. 52 1 Fourth, even assuming that there would be some chilling, the
to
least desirable form of communication-advice to co-agents about how 522
avoid penalties for breaking the law-would most likely be threatened.
Fifth, this objection assumes that confidentiality is an end in itself, when the

519. Koniak, supra note 337, at 195 (discussing the involvement of several prominent
lawyers and law firms in corporate scandals).
520. See Coffee, Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 11, at 1306-07 (noting that auditors
have, on very few occasions, reported under their statutory obligation to report illegal acts
under Section IOA of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Cramton et al., supra note 331,
at 813, 816-17 (noting that there is no evidence that longstanding exceptions to
confidentiality duty or attorney-client privilege have restrained the candor between co-agents
and lawyers, and also noting that the incidence of lawyer whistle-blowing is "astonishingly
low," despite prevalent exceptions to the confidentiality duty); Hamermesh, supra note 356,
at 50 (noting that the ABA Task Force was unable to discern any evidence of lack of candor
or client reticence in the majority of states where older and permissive confidentiality rules
prevailed); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege,69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 157, 163-65 (1993) (summarizing studies
on the effect of the attorney-client privilege on client communications); William H. Simon,
Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1142-43 (1988) (noting that the
absence of an evidentiary privilege for accountants does not appear to drastically inhibit
disclosure to them, and that even sophisticated people often volunteer self-inculpatory
information to the police after Miranda warnings); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality,74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 377-96 (1989) (discussing the 1962 Yale study on the
attorney-client privilege and reporting the results of the Tompkins County study, suggesting
that some of the justifications offered for strict confidentiality are open to question).
521. See Cramton et al., supra note 331, at 813 (noting that confidentiality duty and
privilege do not belong to agents and can be and are waived by future management and
bankruptcy trustees); Thornburg, supra note 520, at 173 (noting that the privilege may be
waived by the corporation without the participation of the employee whose communication
is at issue).
522. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 11, at 362 (analyzing Kaplow &
Shavell's arguments in the gatekeeper context); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal
Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102
Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1989) (analyzing the role of legal advice as a component of the
sanctioning system and arguing that the case for protecting ex ante communications-when
co-agents inquire about the law for purposes of complying with the law-is far stronger than
the case for protecting ex post communications-when co-agents seek to avoid penalties for
breaking the law).
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ultimate goal of the law is to achieve compliance with the law, "not'523to
maximize uninhibited communications between the attorney and client.
Finally, any potential chilling of communications would be offset by any
benefits accruing to the organizational client in having an independent and
empowered inside lawyer as a gatekeeper who is more likely to urge co524
agents to follow the law and whose advice is more likely to be heeded.
Moreover, as a normative matter, it seems perverse to care more about the
candor of an irresponsible co-agent than averting the possible harm that
might befall the organizational client, innocent third parties, shareholders,
securities markets, or the legal system. 525 Inside counsel seem to
understand that there should be limits to the norm of confidentiality. In a
recent survey, seventy-one percent of inside counsel supported sacrificing
the attorney-client privilege to ensure the well-being of the organizational
5 26
client.
C. Compensation
To counter the prosecution's attempt to characterize Belnick as having
been bribed by Kozlowski with unauthorized loans and bonuses, the
defense argued that Belnick's lavish compensation was well earned.
Belnick testified that Kozlowski told him at their first meeting that the pay
at Tyco was "very generous," 52 7 and that Belnick had believed that
Kozlowski, as Chairman, was fully authorized to set his salary without
formal board ratification. 5 28 Belnick testified that no Tyco director had
ever asked him about his compensation, though "they most assuredly knew
that [he] wasn't working for free." 529 The defense argued that the $17
million bonus, a crucial element in the prosecution's case for venality, was
530
not a bribe, but a reward for his triumphant handling of an SEC inquiry.
Belnick also testified that he had believed Kozlowski's assurances that he
was eligible for the employee relocation loan program, adopted to assist
employees moving from Tyco's old New Hampshire offices to New York,
even though Belnick's old Paul, Weiss office was just a few blocks from his
new Tyco office. 53 1 He testified that he had no intention of hiding his

523. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 11, at 361 (noting that the "norm of client
confidentiality is a means to an end, not the end in itself").
524. Id. at 363 (arguing that, even if it were true that clients would consult less, this
impact could be more than fully offset by the fact that it would become more dangerous to
disregard the lawyer's advice under a "noisy withdrawal" regime).
525. Simon, supra note 520, at 1142.
526. See Brown, supra note 148, at 97.
527. Lin, Belnick Testifies, supra note 25, at 1.
528. Id.
529. See id.
530. Lin, Trial Under Way, supra note 25, at 1.

531. See Lin, supra note 447, at 1; Lin, Trial Under Way, supra note 25, at 1. Belnick
received $14 million in interest-free employee "relocation" loans to renovate a $2.8 million
Manhattan apartment and buy a $10 million luxury home in Park City, Utah (where Tyco
had no office). See Bilodeau, supra note 33.
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lavish bonuses and loans, but merely deferred to CFO Swartz on whether he
needed to disclose532them on questionnaires used to prepare the company's
proxy statements.
One of the most eyebrow-raising aspects of Belnick's compensation was
that his annual bonus was set at one-third of Kozlowski's. 53 3 Such a mutual
linking of fortunes can create a serious conflict of interest. As expert
witness Professor Thomas L. Hazen testified during the trial, "The
company, not the chief executive, is the general counsel's client." 534 A
linked bonus puts tremendous economic pressure on the general counsel to
simply do what the CEO wants, which may contravene what is best for the
company. In other words, a linked bonus will contribute to obedience and
alignment pressures.
But the general counsel does not need the extra situational pressure of a
linked bonus to obey or align with management. Part II above argues that
two modem corporate compensation practices exacerbate situational
pressures. 535 First, subjectively appraised bonuses, which are a growing
component of total compensation, create substantial obedience and
alignment pressures. Second, the practice of incentives-based equity
compensation for inside lawyers subjects them to additional self-interest
pressures that, through motivated reasoning, may constrain their ability to
carry out their fiduciary duty to the organizational client. On top of those
pressures is the hard reality that inside counsel, unlike their outside
counterparts, are completely economically dependent on their sole client.
What can be done to reassure the threatened self-interest? First, as part
of "best practices," corporate boards should reduce the subjective
component of an inside lawyer's compensation package. Instead of a large
discretionary bonus that would be awarded to the inside lawyer upon the
completion of the fiscal year and the satisfaction of her boss, she should
receive a higher base salary and a smaller bonus. Coupled with a change in
reporting to a committee of independent board members, this different
allocation should mitigate the pressures to obey and align herself with
management.
Second, the SEC, state courts, and state ethics oversight boards should
pass rules that would restrict ex ante the amount of equity investments that
a lawyer may accept as compensation. In the alternative, these regulatory
authorities could permit boards to replace the lawyers' stock options with a
grant of shares that do not vest until six months after the lawyer's
employment is terminated (voluntarily or involuntarily), or the vesting

532. See Lin, Belnick Testifies, supra note 25 (noting Belnick's testimony that Tyco had
entrusted disclosure issues to the financial rather than the legal department).
533. Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyer Caught in Tyco Tangle Leaves Friends Wondering, N.Y.

Times, Sept. 24, 2002, at Cl (noting that, under a second contract, Belnick's bonus would be
no less than one-third of that received by Kozlowski); see also Alexei Oreskovic, Next in
Line for Scrutiny: GC Salaries,Nat'l L. J., June 14, 2004, at 1.

534. Oreskovic, supra note 531, at 1.
535. See supra Part II.A. 1.b.
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could be accelerated upon termination. These measures should mitigate
self-interest pressures that arise from compensation being tied to the
company's stock price, and should lessen the temptation to acquiesce in the
aggressive earnings management practices of senior officers. 536 While
these may sound like radical measures, the traditional view in the legal
was that lawyer equity investments in clients
profession until the late 1990s
537
should generally be avoided.
D. Ethical Norms
Testifying in his own defense, Belnick described his struggle to carve out
a role for himself in his new company. Belnick said that CFO Swartz was
lionized in the company as a financial whiz and that Swartz and the finance
department, not the legal department, were in charge of securities filings.
Thus, Belnick did not second-guess Swartz's assurances on disclosure or
employee loan eligibility matters. Prosecutor John Moscow repeatedly
asked Belnick why he had not sought advice from outside lawyers on a
number of "red flag" issues. He challenged Belnick on whether he had
familiarized himself with the corporate bylaws, board meeting minutes, and
actual terms of the various loan programs. Belnick responded indignantly,
he "did not go on an archeology expedition backward into Tyco
stating that
538
history."
As discussed in Part II, Belnick, like all employees, struggled with
persistent conformity pressures to be a "team player." Although Belnick
appeared to have difficulty fitting in with the Tyco crowd, he understood
well one of the sacred rules of conformity in many companies: Do not
make waves.
Conformity pressures are especially difficult to deal with, because they
arise from the mere fact of being surrounded by peers, which one cannot
avoid in any institutional setting. Thus, I advance only a tentative solution
to the problem of conformity pressures. While creating a corporate
environment that regularizes the act of dissent should mitigate pressures to
conform, the most effective way to lessen the impact of conformity
pressures is to counteract them with competing conformity pressures from
another social network. Active participation in bar-sponsored continuing
legal education ("CLE") programs that allow open discussion of ethical
issues facing inside counsel should help. To have the desired effect, these
programs should be based on the Alcoholics Anonymous model, which
relies heavily on "positive" conformity pressures that induce the participant

536. Alexei Oreskovic, Counsel in Spotlight, Legal Times, June 21, 2004, at 1 (discussing
proposals for setting the compensation for compliance officers).
537. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 132, at 412.
538. Lin, supra note 447, at 1.
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to make the morally correct choice. Conventional forms of ethics training
produce limited evidence of changing behavior. 5 39
Of course, all lawyers, especially inside lawyers, have a problem with the
duty of confidentiality. However, unlike lawyers at law firms, inside
counsel cannot camouflage a reference by alluding to "one client of
mine." 540 The inside lawyer is thus left with three unpalatable options.
First, assuming she has the requisite client authorization or approval to do
so, she may hire a law firm to provide legal advice on her ethical
obligations. But, depending on the nature of the ethical issue, 54 1 she may
need to obtain a conflicts waiver from the law firm, which may be
impracticable. Moreover, the law firm's loyalty would necessarily run to
the organization that retained it. Second, she may also consult with other
inside lawyers in her department, but she must be aware that such
consultations may not be confidential if the other inside lawyers conclude
that her interests are potentially adverse to the interests of the organization.
Third, she could also hire her own personal lawyer, which may be an
542
impracticable financial burden.
One possible solution to the problem of confidentiality would be to allow
pseudonymous participants to discuss their ethical dilemmas through
computer-mediated communications, such as Internet chat rooms and
virtual social worlds. 543 Although this possibility seems outlandish now,
consider the fact that lawyers already chat pseudonymously on blogs and
bulletin boards in communities such as "greedy associates," 544 exchanging
all kinds of confidential information. Within our lifetimes, we will see ever
increasing amounts of social interaction mediated through online
communities, many of them represented by immersive graphical
environments. This provides at least the possibility of serious, repeat-play
social interactions with fellow (but pseudonymous) attorneys in a specific
bar-sanctioned CLE environment that encourages ethical behavior. This
would create a sort of "ethical team" pressure counter to that of the firm. If
certain legal tweaks (for example, an expansive interpretation of Model

539. Joseph L. Badaracco & Allen P. Webb, Business Ethics: A View from the Trenches,
37 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 8 (1995).
540. 1 Villa, supra note 393, § 3.35 (noting that, by virtue of the inside lawyer's position,
confidentiality is easily breached when an inside lawyer informally consults with another

member of the bar).
541. If the inside lawyer is seeking advice regarding her rights vis-A-vis her employer's,
the inside lawyer's interest could be construed as being adverse to the organization's and,
thus, a conflict of interest waiver would be necessary.
542. Also, bar associations provide opinions on ethical issues raised by anonymous
lawyers. Unfortunately, the process can take months, and most ethical issues are timesensitive. 1 Villa, supra note 393, § 3.35 n.1.1.
543. Another commentator has also suggested using the Internet. See id. § 3.35.
544. This website had been used as a forum for law firm associates to trade salary and
bonus information, but now also lists job openings, among other things. See
hqp://www.greedyassociates.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2005).
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Rule 1.6(b)(4)) 545 that help reinforce the pseudonymity of the
communications are required, 546 they would not be difficult to create and
implement.
To be clear, I am not calling for legal interventions to mitigate
conformity pressures. Rather, I am acknowledging that any effective
reform of lawyer conduct probably needs to be accompanied by a reform of
attendant ethical norms.
Impossibility objection. Skeptics will say that pressures to conform to
peers can never be completely eliminated. As I acknowledged above, this is
probably correct. But this should reassure those who fear that my proposals
would create rampant whistle-blowing. The concern is that an ambitious,
overeducated, newly empowered, and more independent inside lawyer will
become unduly confrontational and uncooperative, making frequent and
unnecessary reports ("false alarms") to the board. For many, this would be
disastrous to the efficient functioning of the public company. But I believe
that this scenario is very unlikely, precisely because there is no way to
eliminate conformity pressures. Pressures to be a "team player," despite all
of my reforms, will remain and persist substantially. To the extent that
these pressures will reduce the likelihood of opportunistic and overly
aggressive inside lawyer conduct, conformity pressures can be good.
CONCLUSION

On the fifth day of jury deliberations, Belnick's defense counsel Reid
Weingarten met in the prosecutor's conference room to iron out the last few
details of the plea bargain. The District Attorney John Moscow was
prepared to drop all felony charges against Belnick. Instead of twenty-five
years in state prison, Belnick would risk none and plead guilty to one
misdemeanor. Plus-as a sweetener-the District Attorney's office would
547
use its influence to settle civil suits brought by the SEC and by Tyco.
But then applause erupted from the courtroom, signaling that the jury had
finally reached a verdict. 54 8 The plea deal was still on the table: Belnick
could take it and never hear the verdict. "Do we have a deal?" Moscow
anxiously asked.5 49 Weingarten's cell phone rang. It was Belnick, who
was screaming, "Whatever you're doing, stop ....
We're taking the verdict,
we're taking the fucking verdict!' Weingarten was surprised Belnick was
550
putting 25 years in prison back on the table."
545. This rule is an exception to the rule of confidentiality, where confidences may be
disclosed "to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules." Model
Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 1.6(b)(4) (2004).
546. One might, for instance, be concerned about firms trying to determine the true
identity by subpoenaing relevant Internet Service Providers or virtual community firms.
Compare the music industry's attempt to discover the identity of file sharers.
547. See Fishman, supra note 22.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id.
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As the foreman rose to announce the verdict, "Belnick crossed himself,
turned to his wife and mouthed, 'I love you.' Three Paul, Weiss lawyers
sobbed as the foreman said 'not guilty' to each count." Belnick hugged
everyone, sobbing and shouting, "'For two years, what they did to me!' ' 55 1
While the jury sympathized with the prosecution's story that Belnick
should have had a more vigilant presence, they felt that reasonable doubt
favored Belnick. "He didn't hold up his fiduciary responsibilities to the
shareholders," one juror said.
But "[e]verything that he got was
documented through e-mails and memos with the company's signature,"
said another juror. "The evidence we had satisfied us that he got it the right
way." 5 52 The jurors seemed satisfied that Belnick received his bonuses and
lucrative benefits through ordinary means: His boss simply gave them to
him. The situation seemed actually quite banal.
Regardless of Belnick's actual guilt or innocence, this case vividly
illustrates the underlying importance of situational factors: Who you report
to, who you are paid by, and how you are paid matters. This is something
that the Belnick jurors-employees subject to obedience, self-interest,
alignment, and conformity pressures-must have identified with and
understood in granting their acquittal. Perhaps, also, the jurors saw past the
excessive sums of money given to Belnick and ultimately acknowledged
how consistently Belnick acted with what many (especially many lawyers)
consider is the appropriate, morally detached role of lawyers.
While the solution proposed by this Article is not a panacea for all
corporate malfeasance, 5 53 it is based on a more adequate model of fraud,
one that takes into account the situational pressures of a general counsel like
Belnick. This model is not built on the premise that a person's unethical
actions are typically the product of a cold and careful weighing of
alternatives, or that only certain aberrant individuals are predisposed to
5 54
succumb to infectious greed.

551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Specifically, I do not generally address the malfeasance of senior managers, nor do I
engage in the broader debate about how best to provide incentives for organizations to care
about the law, although that issue is clearly relevant to whether the board will be receptive
ex ante to a report of evidence of a material violation or will reject the bad news and "shoot
the messenger." See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, OrganizationalIncentives to Care About the
Law,Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1997, at 39 (providing a cogent defense of vicarious
liability for criminal acts); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failureof
Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (criticizing mitigation of penalties for
firms with "internal compliance structures"); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational
Misconduct:

Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 Fl. St. U. L. Rev. 571 (2005)

(criticizing the U.S. legal system's move toward duty-based organizational liability as a
means for deterring organizational misconduct).
554. I share the view of Milton Regan who notes, "We need to move beyond the claim
that unethical behavior is attributable mainly to a decline in the personal morality of lawyers
or the integrity of law firms-and that this results from the change in law practice from a
profession to a business. See Milton C. Regan Jr., Eat What You Kill: The Fall of a Wall
Street Lawyer 6 (2004).

2005]

THE BANALITY OF FRAUD

1077

Although the context is in many respects incomparable, the basic
sentiment of Hannah Arendt in her famous account of the trial of Nazi
Adolf Eichmann captures the insight that the causal forces behind a
person's actions are often better explained by looking at that person's role
in the organization (in Eichmann's case, an opportunistic bureaucrat) rather
than their psychiatric record:
The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and
that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still
are, terribly and terrifyingly normal.
•. .Eichmann was not lago and not Macbeth . . . Except for an
extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, he
merely, to put the matter colloquially,
had not motives at all .... He 555
never realized what he was doing.

Eichmann was operating in accordance with and within the boundaries
set by prevailing social norms of Germany at the time. Any solution to the
problem of lawyer acquiescence in fraud must also take into account the
prevailing ethical norms and role ideologies of lawyers.
Although many are quick to point out that inside lawyers simply do not
wish to monitor their business brethren and resent the imposition of any
gatekeeping duties, I believe that many inside lawyers (and lawyers
generally) hunger to be more ethical and want independence from the
demands of senior management. 556 But until that time comes, inside
counsel must continue to grapple with their gatekeeping duties and their
overwhelming situational pressures.
"This is a brave new world. You used to become a general counsel
because you wanted to watch your kids play soccer," said Weingarten,
referring to the stereotype of in-house lawyers as quality-of-life refugees
he says, "it's become the hardest job, the most
from firm jobs. Now, 557
dangerous place to be."

555. See Arendt, supra note *, at 276, 287.
556. See Brown, supra note 148, at 96-97 (noting that an overwhelming majority of inhouse counsel want an expanded role in preventing and reporting fraud, with greater access
to the CEO and the board).
557. Lin, supra note 447, at 1.
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